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Abstract 
This dissertation studies an instance of collaborative governance (called Maarpu) in a 
subnational government in India (Andhra Pradesh). Through an in-depth case study the 
dissertation examines the implementation of Maarpu’s antecedents, processes and outcomes. At 
the outset, the study begins to understand India’s bureaucratic functioning from a historical 
perspective and takes an organizational theory approach to understanding how organizational 
structures influence the decisions that organizational actors make. The single biggest finding and 
contribution of this study to collaborative governance literature is that collaborative structures 
are not necessarily designed for the mutual benefit of actors and institutions involved; rather, 
they are the result of the politics of bureaucratic structures that are designed to create winners 
and losers. I refer to this as the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm. The study argues that this is 
the result of bureaucratic politics that infiltrates organizational structures and functioning. The 
study finds that policy and administrative entrepreneurs in positions of public authority influence 
the structure of collaborative initiatives creating a certain perception to take shape within the 
implementation hierarchy. The perception that Maarpu is a health-related initiative and not a 
collaborative initiative percolated through the implementation hierarchy and existing power 
balances, turf battles and institutional rivalries between participating departments helped 
maintain that perception. Findings from this revelatory case provide insights to refine theory, 
guide practice, and design better collaborative initiatives. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Overview of the Study 
Collaboration is broadly defined as a governance mechanism aimed at making actors 
within the public and private spheres work together to achieve common goals; it is a boundary 
spanning tool for governments addressing complex and wicked problems in both developed 
countries like the US (Kettl, 2006) and developing countries like India (Radin, 2007). Public 
management scholars in the US have argued that engaging citizens in the decision making 
process of the government has both instrumental and intrinsic value (Bingham, Nabatchi, & 
O'Leary, 2005; Nabatchi, 2010, 2012). Development scholars, multilateral aid agencies and 
national governments in developing countries have operationalized the same concept differently 
when they discuss community involvement to bring about accountability and transparency to the 
bureaucratic service delivery processes (Cornwall, 2008; 2015; Joshi, 2013; Martines et al., 
2005; Murgai, Pritchett, & Wes, 2006). Thus, the new mantra for policy implementation is 
multi-sectoral collaborative arrangements that involve intergovernmental coordination and 
citizen engagement.   
The idea that policy implementation involves the federal and state governments together 
navigating through complex intergovernmental arrangements is not new to a federal system like 
the United States (McGuire, 2006b; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984) or India (Appleby, 1953, 
1956; Mathew, 2006). What is new to the 21st century, however, is the idea of the collaborative 
public manager—where collaborative practices have percolated down to daily bureaucratic 
functioning (O'Leary, Gazley, McGuire, & Bingham, 2009), the classic tension between 
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bureaucracy and democracy notwithstanding (Meier, 1997; J. P. Olsen, 2006; Waldo & Lane, 
1986).  In this context, the focus of this study is on the instrumental value of collaborative 
governance—its ability to facilitate cross-boundary work, address the concerns of accountability 
and transparency and thus improve the overall quality of service delivery. To better understand 
the causal mechanisms between collaborative governance and improved service delivery, this 
study examines the policy formulation and implementation process of a collaborative governance 
initiative called Maarpu to improve maternal and child health services through inter-
departmental coordination and citizen engagement by Andhra Pradesh (a subnational 
government in India).  
Drawing on a historical analysis to understand the role of India’s civil service 
bureaucracy and multiple perspectives from organization theory, this study will show how 
organizational actors’ engagement in collaborative governance is shaped by the nature of 
organizational structures they operate in. Specifically, the study identifies the causal mechanisms 
of how external environment influences (like the Millennium Development Goals and the 
Government of India’s social sector policies and their focus on inter-sectoral collaboration and 
citizen engagement) are converted into rational models of program implementation at the 
subnational level; this process of conversation is shaped by bureaucratic politics, which involves 
key actors in positions of public authority to make decisions that are favorable to some groups 
(winners) and unfavorable to other groups (losers). Through an in depth case study of Maarpu 
across India’s intergovernmental structures at the subnational level (state, district, and village-
levels of administration) this study identifies how these groups of winners and losers use 
perception, power balances, turf battles, institutional histories to shape the implementation 
process and outcomes. Thus, the central argument of this dissertation is that collaborative 
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structures are inherently political and not necessarily designed for the mutual benefit of the 
actors and institutions involved. This finding has profound implications for understanding the 
implementation of collaborative governance initiatives.       
The overarching research question guiding this study is: how do bureaucrats in an 
intergovernmental setting shape the implementation processes of a collaborative governance 
initiative? To examine this question at a more granular level, the following subsidiary research 
questions are addressed: 
1. How and why did the collaborative governance initiative emerge the way it did? 
2. To what extent and under what conditions do bureaucrats at multiple levels of the 
hierarchy engage in intergovernmental collaboration and involve the community? 
Maarpu is a Telugu (the language native to Andhra Pradesh) word for change i.e., change 
from working in bureaucratic silos to working together to address a collective goal—the 
improvement of maternal and child health outcomes. It is a collaborative effort between the 
following departments at the subnational level: 1) Health, 2) Women & Child Development, and 
3) Rural Development (and its constituent subunits like the Panchayati Raj Institutions (i.e., local 
government bodies), Rural Water Supply, and the Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty 
(SERP) that oversees the Village Organizations (VOs) and Self-Help Groups (SHGs)). Thus, 
health related services like providing immunizations, birth planning, and deliveries fall under 
Health. Nutrition related services fall under the Women & Child Welfare department’s flagship 
program called Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS); the ICDS provides pre-school, 
groceries, and cooked for kids below five years, pregnant ladies, and nursing mothers. Sanitation 
related services come under the purview of the Sarpanch (i.e., the locally elected village head) of 
the Panchayati Raj Institutions, water services are provided by Rural Water Supply, and finally 
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the VOs and SHGs are collectives1 of village women to promote savings. The idea of Maarpu is 
to have all these departmental services “converge” at the village-level through monthly meetings 
to ensure service delivery integration and identify service delivery gaps. Furthermore, anchoring 
within the VO and SHGs structures is hoped to ensure sustainability and accountability among 
service providers. 
In spite of increased global and national attention, political support, and bureaucratic 
commitment to incentivize governance mechanisms potentially improving service delivery 
through collaboration, we must question why there is such wide variation in service delivery 
outcomes across and within subnational regions in India. The federal government and 
subnational governments in India are increasingly relying on collaborative governance 
mechanisms, including inter-agency coordination and citizen engagement to improve service 
delivery (Choudhary, 2007). This is particularly true in the context of implementing the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Government of India’s National Rural 
Health Mission (NRHM) to improve rural healthcare services. However, little systematic 
research has been conducted to examine how bureaucrats within the implementation hierarchy 
interpret, operationalize, communicate, and diffuse information related to collaborative 
governance mechanisms and how these dynamics shape the policy implementation processes and 
outcomes. This study is a necessary first step to apply and test the research propositions 
regarding collaborative governance originating in the West to the Indian context and also to 
understand how the Indian context can further refine our understanding of implementing 
collaborative regimes in developing countries.   
 
1 VOs and SHGs were first initiated in 1995 with World Bank funding to promote savings and loans to economically empower 
women from marginalized and disadvantaged socio-economic groups. 
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Although this study examines the implementation processes of a particular collaborative 
governance initiative within a subnational region in India, the findings have potential to 
contribute both to theory and practice of collaboration. At the outset, to the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to provide micro-level insights and analysis capturing the 
implementation life cycle of a collaborative initiative in India by examining its antecedents, 
processes, and outcomes. This is the first study to comprehensively uncover policy formulation 
and implementation processes as it relates to collaborative governance within the traditional and 
deeply hierarchical government bureaucracies in India. Even though India is the largest 
democracy in the world, having a federal system of government wherein the government is 
responsible for the social welfare of 1/6th the world’s population, public management scholars 
know little about how Indian bureaucracies function. From a theoretical and practical standpoint, 
findings from a different country context could provide interesting insights for further 
investigation (Farazmand, 1999). 
I buttress these claims by examining the findings emerging from the subsidiary research 
questions. The first question, for example, documents the antecedents of the collaborative 
governance initiative. The findings uncover the process that led to the formulation and eventual 
implementation of the collaborative initiative. This will help scholars to better understand the 
importance given to collaboration by bureaucrats as a governance mechanism to address service 
delivery issues—was collaboration the preferred choice or was it a choice of last resort? If 
intergovernmental collaboration and community engagement was indeed a choice of last resort, 
it has serious implications for the claim that collaborative governance is the preferred mechanism 
to address complex issues in the 21st century. Such an outcome raises important questions: what 
other alternatives were considered prior to collaboration?  
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The second question explores the process and speaks to the heart of the dissertation: First, 
how do bureaucrats actually implement the collaborative initiative? Second, how does 
collaborative governance finally manifest itself in the local communities where street-level 
bureaucrats have to engage with the beneficiaries they serve to improve service delivery? The 
influences of external environment and how street-level bureaucrats use their individual 
discretion (i.e., their understanding of the policy intent and circumstantial limitations to deliver 
services as prescribed) to shape implementation processes and outcomes is well understood 
(Lipsky, 2010; O'Leary, 2013). However, little research has examined how street-level 
bureaucrats’ discretion is shaped at the very outset of an implementation rollout by the 
bureaucratic politics that play out at the upper echelons of government within the 
intergovernmental arrangements created for collaboration. From a theoretical perspective, it is 
critical to understand not only what aspect of bureaucratic politics affects implementation of 
collaboration on the ground, but also how these aspects of bureaucratic politics interact with well 
understood factors that shape the discretion employed by street-level bureaucrats. In other words, 
it is important to observe the implementation processes and document perceptions among 
bureaucrats within each hierarchy and then to examine how this plays out in an 
intergovernmental and community setting on the ground.     
Further theoretical importance embedded in the second question lies in understanding the 
outcomes of implementing the collaborative initiative. While it is important to understand 
whether initiating collaborative arrangements improves service delivery, it is also critical to 
assess how sustainable these collaborative arrangements are really. Moreover, not only whether 
they are sustainable, but what factors influence their sustainability. It is well understood within 
the collaboration scholarship that leadership is a key driver of collaboration and that enthusiasm 
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to collaborate waxes and wanes along with these leaders. Thus, efforts to institutionalize reforms 
are essentially aimed at sustainability. The answers to the second question revisits the question as 
to who is more important for sustained collaborative action: institution or individual? The value 
of institutionalizing collaborative arrangements may be marginalized if it is only the individual 
that matters. Community members may not take collaboration seriously if they realize that these 
institutional arrangements can be subverted. However, it is also possible the answer may not be 
as simplistic, perhaps suggestive of a more symbiotic relationship between the institutions and 
individual.  
For practitioners and policy makers, the findings have implications for the design of 
collaborative arrangements and offer reform ideas at a structural and functional level. 
Understanding the antecedents, in the first question, informs us about the decision making 
process and reform efforts prior to the initiation of the collaborative initiative. If collaborative 
mechanisms were not the initial choice and only a sub-optimal choice at a later stage, then policy 
makers must think about the structural barriers to collaboration that first need to be addressed. To 
the extent that bureaucrats are unable to work across agency boundaries, because bureaucratic 
structures only incentivize accountability to the hierarchical chain of command, policy elites 
must think about how ineffective intergovernmental collaboration might be without addressing 
such structural barriers. Findings regarding the process and outcomes will illuminate the extent 
to which collaboration is carried out given the structural barriers. Specifically, the answers will 
provide insights into how bureaucratic perceptions of collaboration effects their engagement, as 
well as the sustainability of the initiative. By shedding light on the various trade-offs of engaging 
in collaboration, the findings have implications for the design of collaborative initiatives. Policy 
makers and practitioners can think about structuring incentives and aligning goals differently to 
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make the implementation of collaborative initiatives a more practical and feasible bureaucratic 
enterprise.      
An analytical case study approach is used to examine the decision making and 
implementation processes aimed at bringing about administrative and service delivery integration 
among health, nutrition, and sanitation departments at the state, district and village-level in the 
state of Andhra Pradesh, India. In depth examination of the implementation process was 
conducted at the district and village level of administration in Medak district of Andhra Pradesh. 
I selected this district within the subnational region because the district administration had made 
the implementation of this collaborative initiative a priority and thus it serves as a revelatory case 
(Yin, 2008, p. 48). According to Yin (2008), a case study approach is ideal for investigating a 
research question in its real life context and when data needs to be collected through interviews 
from people involved in the events and processes being studied. The primary unit of analysis is 
the implementation process itself with several embedded units of analysis. The primary mode of 
data collection is through in-depth interviews of 86 administrators, in total, engaged in 
implementation across the three departments and along the three levels of hierarchy. 
Additionally, as a way to triangulate my findings from multiple data sources, I collected date 
from 28 instances of village-level collaborative meetings, 12 instances of administrative review 
meetings, 43 instances of citizen interactions, interviewed 9 subject matter experts and reviewed 
numerous programmatic and departmental documents.   
Fieldwork was conducted in two waves in India during 2012-14. I use the integrative 
framework for collaborative governance (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012) to conceptualize 
the collaborative governance initiative and as a guide for data collection. By drawing on relevant 
literature I developed context-specific theoretical propositions and an analytical framework to 
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better suit the study at hand. Using theoretical tenets from organization theory and bureaucratic 
politics I develop an analytical framework—an implementation scorecard to trace the process of 
implementation at the state, district and village-levels of administration. The implementation 
scorecard is used to identify external influences, the rational model of implementation, key 
decision makers, and the groups that viewed the decisions as favorable (i.e., the winners) and the 
groups that viewed the decisions as unfavorable (i.e., the losers) at each level of 
intergovernmental structures. All qualitative data from interviews and observations from 
meetings were transcribed, along with various documents were analyzed using NVivo 10.  The 
primary mode of analysis for this qualitative research is a method called process tracing that 
helps in exploring casual mechanisms and analyzing complex decisions from the data collected 
(George & Bennett, 2005).     
 Finally, there is methodological significance to the overall research design and questions. 
The study provides a framework to conduct implementation research within an 
intergovernmental collaboration and community engagement setting. The research design is 
replicable and lends itself to comparative studies to help practitioners and scholars understand 
the conditions under which collaboration might and might not work.  Last, based on the micro-
level insights from this qualitative study researchers may begin to examine specific hypothesis to 
understand the instrumental value of collaborative governance.  
  As Farazmand (1999) reminds us there “is a new subfield of globalization in town now, 
and there is a need to integrate the studies of public administration from the comparative, 
international and global perspectives” (p. 518). This study is an initial effort towards such an 
integration by using theoretical lens developed in the US to examine the implementation of a 
multi-stakeholder initiative by a subnational government in India in the context of the UN 
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MDGs. Situating this study within the domain of public administration is the logical choice 
because the burden of implementing these global agreements fall on the shoulders of government 
bureaucracies. It is the bureaucrats who have to understand, interpret, and implement these 
agreements which call for increased multi-sectoral and stakeholder partnerships. The study of 
how bureaucrats operationalize implementation is critical given the renewed focus on service 
delivery and involvement of beneficiaries in the designing and monitoring of programs to ensure 
effective implementation (2015), India Report). Thus, to the extent that global elites and national 
policy makers want to institutionalize cross-sectoral collaborations as key drivers for improved 
governance, it is imperative for public administration scholars to understand how bureaucrats 
responsible for implementation navigate and negotiate through their local context to implement 
global priorities and national policies. 
There are two themes contributing to the rising prominence of collaboration as a 
governance mechanism across administrative systems in the world. The first has to do with the 
nature of complex problems that governments are responsible for today, which are boundary 
spanning. A common example from the policy implementation literature (Laurence J. O'Toole, 
2014) is that in the past the road transport department was only responsible for road construction. 
But with changing times and new environmental regulations, the Road Transportation 
department’s role has spread over its traditional boundary, requiring it to work with another 
agency. Globally, a similar issue faced by governments and local administrations is the issue of 
maternal and infant mortality—the death of a woman during pregnancy or after childbirth and 
the death of a child after childbirth. While health bureaucracies across the world are largely 
responsible for maternal and child health services through the administration of vaccines and 
child birth services; these outcomes are highly correlated to an individual’s social, economic and 
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environmental factors. We thus see that the role of health ministries has become boundary 
spanning because they have to now work with ministries administering sanitation and poverty 
alleviation programs. This implementation imperative is best captured by the logic of a 
collaborative advantage: a single actor or agency acting alone cannot achieve what actors and 
agencies working across boundaries can achieve jointly (Huxham & Vangen, 2013). In 
bureaucratic terms, this translates into the ineffectiveness of working in silos.  
The second theme has to do with addressing a lack of accountability and transparency in 
the bureaucratic processes delivering services. This concern for accountability and transparency 
is echoed in the classic question within public administration literature: to whom are bureaucrats 
accountable? (Rohr, 2002; Waldo, 2005). Seen from a democratic governance lens, bureaucrats 
are accountable to citizens and this is possible only when citizens and bureaucrats have a 
common platform to interact; for example, venues where citizens are involved in the decision 
making process (Adams, 2004; Nabatchi, 2007). A similar variant of this democratic ethos in 
governance is seen globally among developing countries with the emphasis on community 
involvement in monitoring the services being delivered by traditional government bureaucracies, 
but not so much in decision making (Mullen, 2011). The logic of community involvement, as 
scholars have argued, has both intrinsic and instrumental value. It not only empowers 
communities to ask questions, have access to information, and thus be effective participants in 
the democratic administration process, but also brings citizens and bureaucrats on a common 
platform so as to make the latter accountable and transparent thereby improving governance.  
This normative and sweeping preference for viewing collaboration as a tool for achieving 
coordinated action has also led to a consensus among public management scholars that much of 
the “literature on collaboration is often celebratory and only rarely cautious” (O'Leary et al., 
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2009, p. 6). Given the acceptance and pervasiveness of cross-sectoral work, third-party 
contractors, and civil society as the new pillars of government, McGuire, Lee, and Fyall (2013) 
observe: “there is one aspect of collaborative public management research that appears to have 
gone missing, however: government” (page 2). Thus, there have been calls for the need to 
engage in research focused on public managers engaged in collaboration through 
intergovernmental arrangements. Furthermore, there have been calls for us to understand how 
bureaucrats in other country contexts interpret and implement collaborative initiatives (O'Leary 
& Vij, 2012). The scholarship on collaboration is largely prescriptive in that it encourages public 
managers to embrace the inherent conflict that arises out of collaboration or that it must be 
avoided if not absolutely needed (O'Leary & Bingham, 2009). What is needed then is systematic 
and empirical research to understand how collaboration manifests itself in a different country’s 
context and examination of any evidence to support the claim that governance can be improved 
through collaboration. This study is a necessary first step to address this gap in the public 
management scholarship by focusing on the implementation of a collaborative initiative in India 
within an intergovernmental and community setting.  
Roadmap of the Study 
Chapter 2 introduces India’s federal system of government, the Indian bureaucracy, and 
provides a historical background to the case study. The chapter serves to understand the 
structural preconditions for collaborative governance in India by tracing the evolution of 
administrative structures within key bureaucratic institutions. It then proceeds to an in-depth 
discussion about Appleby’s reports studying the administrative structures and practices prevalent 
in India at the time and his assessment of their relevance to democratic governance (1953, 1956). 
The chapter then traces the evolution and adaptation of bureaucratic institutions, roles and 
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reforms with reference to three broad time horizons: pre-independence (i.e., the colonial era), at 
the time of independence and planned development (1947-1970s), and the era that ushered in 
deregulation and a changed role for government of India (1980s-1990s). In this context, I discuss 
the impact of colonial rule, constitutional status to local government institutions, economic 
liberalization, and new public management reforms on the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) 
and district administration.  
Chapter 3, titled Era of the Collaborative Bureaucrat, is the sequel to Chapter 2. The 
chapter turns its attention to India’s commitment to national and global development goals 
(2000-2015) and the implications of the historical evolution of administrative structures on 
implementation of collaborative governance at the state, district, and village-levels of 
administration. What emerges from this literature review and analysis is the conceptualization of 
a collaborative bureaucrat; an organizational actor that operates in a paradoxical environmental 
where the organization’s structures are rigid and wired toward centralization, but at the same 
time is mandated to work in an environment of devolved power, decentralization, and 
collaboration. In conclusion, I propose three key theoretical propositions pertaining to the 
collaborative bureaucrat and the organizational structures to guide the case study.    
Chapter 4 situates the case study under the analytical lens of different streams of 
organizational theory literature. Namely, the perspectives of the rational system, natural and 
open system, and a political theory of the bureaucratic organization. I use these streams of 
organization theory to better understand the bureaucratic organization. The underlying argument 
of this chapter is that organizational structures influence the decisions that actors within them 
take. I use these organizational perspectives to reflect on the paradoxical nature of India’s 
bureaucratic organization and situate the collaborative bureaucrat within these structures. Finally, 
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I contextualize these perspectives to develop an implementation scorecard capturing the complex 
implementation environment within India’s decentralized administrative structures. In essence, 
the implementation scorecard is an analytical framework to better understand my findings.  
In chapter 5, I introduce the case study, discuss the research design, data collection and 
analysis methods. Using Yin’s (2008) typology of case study designs (p. 46), I use a single case 
study, which is embedded with multiple-case studies. Within this single case, I select a particular 
geographic area or a district to examine the implementation process across 27 villages that share 
similar socio-economic, cultural, and geographic characteristics (common factors that can 
account for variance in implementation results). I discuss the purposive sampling strategy used to 
select informants for the interviews from the three agencies involved in the initiative and across 
the different levels of implementation hierarchy. Furthermore, I discuss data collection strategies 
to ensure validity of findings.  
The findings are organized by the two subsidiary research questions and are thus 
presented in two chapters. In chapter 6, I address the first research question (how and why did 
the collaborative governance initiative emerge the way it did?) related to the emergence of 
Maarpu and in chapter 7 I address the second research question (to what extent and under what 
conditions do bureaucrats at multiple levels of the hierarchy effectively engage in 
intergovernmental collaboration and involve the community?) related to the implementation 
process of Maarpu. Chapter 6 is thematically titled The Policy of Implementation to capture the 
antecedents, rhetoric, and the associated bureaucratic politics that led to the final formulation of 
the collaborative initiative. Chapter 7 is thematically titled The Implementation of Policy to 
capture all the processes and outcomes that unfolded as a result of bureaucratic politics and how 
specifically perception, turf battles, institutional histories, and the maintenance of  power 
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balances influenced bureaucratic discretion that finally shaped the implementation processes and 
outcomes. 
There are several major findings from this study. The findings confirm that bureaucratic 
structures responsible for implementing the collaborative initiative are paradoxical i.e., they are 
rational, natural, open and political at the state, district, and village-level with varying degrees of 
influence at each administrative level with profound impact on the implementation processes and 
outcomes. However, what permeates throughout the intergovernmental structures is the 
politically charged nature of bureaucratic and collaborative structures. Thus, as a consequence of 
these inherently political structures the overarching finding is that the policy of implementing 
Maarpu was one of collective action to address maternal and child health issues, the 
implementation of Maarpu’s policy was skewed towards programmatic indicators dominated by 
the Health department’s agenda. The findings suggest fear for formal authority ensures all 
relevant stakeholders agree to the collaborative framework of implementation, in principle. The 
collaboration literature teaches us about the key role played by leaders in driving collaboration, 
but this study also sheds light on the role played when such boundary-spanning leaders occupy 
positions of formal authority in traditional bureaucracies respective of the leader’s policy 
prescriptions. In reality, to the extent that individuals engage in collaboration within strictly 
demarcated bureaucratic boundaries depends on an individual’s agency.  
In the conclusion, Chapter 8, I discusses the findings and their implications for the theory 
and practice of collaborative governance. The limitations of the study and ideas for future 
research are also discussed. To better contextualize and provide analytical reasoning to all the 
paradoxical findings from the case study, I introduce the idea of a bureaucratic-collaboration 
paradigm. In such a paradigm, the bureaucracies and officials adopt a collaborative governance 
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initiative (with all its constituent parts of an open system; diffused power, shared values, 
collective good, joint action, horizontal hierarchies through convergence committees) and 
essentially converted it into a rational and closed system (Government Orders (GOs), training 
programs, and review meetings at the state and district-level and functioning in bureaucratic silos 
at the village level). I refer to this process of converting (and reducing) a collaborative 
governance initiative into a set of formalized instructions by individuals in positions of public 
authority as the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm.  
There are three aspects of such a paradigm, which are also the key contributions of this 
study to the literature examining the implementation of collaborative governance regimes:  
1. A collaborative governance initiative is reduced to a formalized set of instructions 
with the aim of institutionalizing collaborative practices among the participants.  
2.  Collaborative structures are not necessarily designed for the mutual benefit of actors 
and institutions involved; rather, they are the result of the politics of bureaucratic 
structures that are designed to create winners and losers.  
3. Formal authority and power is needed to make bureaucratic actors collaborate across 
departmental boundaries. 
This dissertation will show how the combined effect of these three aspects of the bureaucratic-
collaboration paradigm resulted in the emergence and implementation of Maarpu as an illusion 
of collaboration. 
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Chapter Two 
Structural Preconditions for Collaborative Governance in India 
No other large and important national government, I believe, is so dependent as India on 
theoretically subordinate but actually rather distinct units responsible to a different 
political control, for so much of the administration of what are recognized as national 
programs of great importance to the nation (Appleby, 1953, p. 21). 
Introduction 
This chapter lays the foundation for this study by examining the structural preconditions 
for collaborative governance in India. Rather than take a temporal view (i.e., documentation of 
historical events in chronological order), I approach this chapter thematically covering India’s 
Constitution, landmark reports, public sector reforms, and new institutions. Thus, the chapter 
covers the historical evolution of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), the District Collector, 
and institutions of self-government. The chapter analyzes the consequences of India’s federal 
polity and colonial legacy on effective policy implementation. Many eminent scholars during the 
early phase of India’s independence and development planning (1947-1960s) were asked by the 
newly formed government to study existing administrative structures and processes with a focus 
on the questions of whether and how colonially inherited administrative structures were relevant 
in a post-independence era that promised democratic governance. In this context, I examine two 
important reports written by Paul H. Appleby based on his study of India’s administration during 
1953-1956. An analysis of Appleby’s reports provides a useful baseline to understand the extent 
of change in India’s bureaucratic functioning today. The chapter then turns to major governance 
reforms after these reports that affect the functioning of government bureaucracies, for example, 
constitutional status given to local government institutions, economic liberalization, and public 
sector reforms. I then discuss the impact of these reforms on the Indian bureaucracy in general 
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and on district administration in particular. Finally, I present three theoretical propositions that 
require empirical study to understand the ability of India’s social service bureaucracies to engage 
in collaborative governance.  
The Republic of India: Duality in the Republic’s Federalism 
The Federal Structure, Units of Government, and Administrative Services  
The Republic of India has a federal structure of government with a central government, 
twenty-nine states or subnational governments, and seven union territories. India follows the 
Westminster system of parliamentary democracy, with an Upper House (Rajya Sabha) and a 
Lower House (Lok Sabha). Following a national election, the leader of the majority political 
party is elected to be the Prime Minister, the executive head of the government in the Lok Sabha, 
whose members are elected by the people of India. Members of the Rajya Sabha are elected by 
the state legislatures in a proportional representation system. Each of the states have their own 
elections once every five years among the regional and national parties. The leader of the 
majority political party is elected Chief Minister, or executive head, of the state government. 
Unlike state governments, union territories do not have elections and are ruled by the central 
government.2 Other political positions of formal authority include the President of India and state 
Governors. The President of India is elected by members of both the houses and presides over all 
branches of the government (executive, legislative, and judiciary). Similarly, a Governor is 
appointed by the central government to preside over state governments.   
This multiparty democratic system of elections in India is governed by an autonomous 
body, the Election Commission of India, which conducts elections once every five years for the 
 
2 This is true with the exception of New Delhi (the national capital region) and Pondicherry, where elections are conducted every 
five years in a manner consistent with other state governments. 
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central and state governments. In 1993, as a result of an amendment to the Constitution, a third 
tier of government was put into motion: local government units in urban (municipalities) and 
rural areas (panchayats). This effectively makes India a “multilevel federation,” even though 
these local government units have little or no power over administration (Mathew, 2006, p. 173). 
Between the state and local government units, the nerve center of administration unique to the 
Indian context is the institution of the District Collector; an institution vested with formal 
authority, power, and prestige with roots in India’s imperial and colonial history. The District 
Collector is a career bureaucrat of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) who serves a two 
year duration as the chief executive of a particular district (or geographic area) responsible for 
the implementation of all central and state government programs and law and order.   
 A professional cadre of bureaucrats or civil servants are recruited and placed by the 
central government to serve at the central and state governments, providing “administrative 
synergy to the federal union of India” (p. 158). The All-India Services and the Central Civil 
Services together constitute the permanent civil service bureaucracy in India. The All-India 
Services has three main components: the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police 
Service (IPS), and Indian Forest Service (IFS). The Central Civil Services cadre (20 categories 
altogether) are recruited to a particular ministry for the entirety of their careers (similar to the IPS 
and IFS), including the Indian Revenue Service (IRS), Indian Railway Traffic Service (IRTS), 
Indian Foreign Service, Indian Engineering Services, and Indian Economic Service to name a 
few.   
Additionally, every state has their own competitive, merit-based, state-level civil services 
recruitment process, where examinations are held within each subnational region. The state-level 
cadre work in a range of state-level government agencies at the top, middle and lower level of 
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the administrative hierarchies. Furthermore, after several years of dedicated service, a few such 
officers may be recommended to the title of IAS, but they will continue to work only at the state 
level. Thus, at the subnational level, government bureaucracies are staffed with members from 
the All-India Services, Central Civil Services, and the State Civil Services. However, only a 
member of the IAS can hold the position of the District Collector, thus, consolidating the 
prestige attached to these two institutions.   
 Within this federal structure, the Constitution of India divides the power of legislation 
between the central and state governments by giving them each legislative privilege over certain 
policy domains. These policy domains are divided into three lists:  union, state, and concurrent. 
The overarching goal behind such a division of power and flexibility in the transfer of legislative 
powers between the central and state governments is to enable the central government to 
maintain national unity, security, and uniformity of social and economic development. The union 
list covers 100 subjects on which the central government has the prerogative to legislate (e.g., 
national defense, railways, highways, telecommunications, and foreign affairs). The state list 
covers 61 subjects that are the states’ prerogative for legislation (e.g., regional law and order, 
public health, sanitation, fisheries, and state pensions). The concurrent list covers 52 subjects 
over which the center and states both have power of legislation (e.g., education, forests, social 
security, and population control), though in the event of a conflict the central government’s 
legislation will prevail over the state legislation.  
 The Constitution of India grants states administrative, legislative, and fiscal powers for 
which they are not dependent on the central government. However, the balance of power in 
terms of legislation and sharing of revenue is tilted much more towards the central government 
(Majeed, 2005). For example, the central government can transfer subjects from the state list to 
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the union list, change state boundaries, and dissolve state governments, if there is a threat to 
communal harmony or national security. In such instances, the Constitution allows for the central 
government to transform from “a federal form of government into a near unitary one” (Tummala, 
2004, p. 212). To gain a better appreciation of this duality within India’s federal polity, it is 
important to understand the socio-cultural milieu of India and the antecedents that led to the 
framing of the Constitution.   
Historical Context of the Constitution of India 
At the time of independence from the British in 1947, in addition to the British India 
provinces, 562 princely states became independent in India. The cultural pluralism that existed at 
that time in the region continues to define the character of India today. India is the seventh 
largest country geographically and the second most populous country in the world, with a 
population of 1.4 billion (ranging from .6 million to 170 million per state).  Of the total 
population, 72% live in rural areas and 27.8% live in urban areas. The population is 85% Hindu, 
13.4% Muslim, 2.3% Christian, 1.9% Sikh, 0.8% Buddhist, and 0.4% Jain or other (Mathew & 
Hooja, 2009). These groups, particularly the Hindus, are further divided into castes and sub-
castes. While Hindi is the official language of the nation, spoken by 30% of the population, the 
country has 114 spoken languages, of which 22 are officially recognized by the Constitution, and 
the Constitution allows for English to be used for official purposes (Mathew, 2006). Although a 
rising economic power,3 India is still a poor country, with a per capita income of $2900 and an 
average literacy rate of 65.38% among the states, ranging from states with 100% literacy (e.g., in 
Kerala and Goa) to states with literacy below 50% (e.g., Bihar). Thus, the issue of utmost 
 
3 India is the fourth largest economy in the world after the U.S., China, and Japan in terms of purchasing power 
parity (PPP). 
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importance at the time of independence for the framers of the Constitution was how to ensure an 
indestructible union made up of such diverse and disparate groups.  The year 1947 was a 
turbulent time for India, which faced independence from the British, partition into India and 
Pakistan, a refugee crisis, and demands for secession from different princely states. The leaders 
at the time needed a reliable administrative machine to ensure stability amidst a turbulent 
transition. The leaders did not have to look far for a solution, as they came to rely on the Indian 
Civil Service (ICS) cadre to help the central government hold the nation together, in much the 
same way that they had for the British from 1858 to 1947.  
The British East India Company ruled over India from 1757 until it handed over the 
realm of administration to the British Crown in 1858. Under the Government of India Act of 
1858, a “highly centralized form of government was established with the governor general 
functioning as the agent of the British government” (Mathew, 2006, p. 156). Although the British 
administration of India moved slowly toward a relatively more federal structure, the overarching 
ethos of the British was to have a strong central government to control all of the disparate 
groups. The Government of India Act of 1919 introduced a “dyarchy” (Majeed, 2005, p. 181), 
which classified subjects as central or provincial. The Government of India Act of 1935 brought 
about division of powers between the center and provinces; thus, the “constituent units of 
federalism included the governors’ provinces and the 562 Indian (princely) states” (p. 182). This 
development moved the structure of British government and administration in India from a 
unitary to a more federal system. However, there was provision for the “governor general, in 
case of a breakdown of the constitutional machinery in a province, to assume all or any of the 
powers entrusted to the province” (p. 182). The administrative machinery that ensured British 
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rule across this vast land populated with diverse and sometimes factious groups was the Indian 
Civil Service (ICS), an elite civil service of the British Empire in British India. 
At that time, the ICS ruled over a population of 300 million, with each ICS officer 
administering on average 300,000 people. Thus, the ICS became known as the “steel frame” 
upon which the entire British Empire relied for its rule in India. At the beginning of the ICS 
regime, all of the 1000 posts were British; however, by 1947, there were 510 Indian and 429 
British members (Potter, 1973). Thus, at the time of independence, leaders of the new nation 
appointed eminent ICS officials to key administrative portfolios, retaining the cadre but 
renaming it the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). A national leader of great stature, Home 
Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (who was responsible for national security, law, and order), 
strongly advocated for retaining the cadre and structure of the ICS (Radin, 2007). Patel also 
noted in Parliament the role of the ICS in ensuring that the country did not collapse during 
partition. Thus, the legacy of the ICS as the “steel frame” was passed on to the IAS to ensure the 
stability and unity of a new nation.      
The British Parliament passed the Government of India Act of 1947 on July 18, 1947; on 
August 15, 1947, India emerged as an independent nation divided. With the help of the 
remaining Indian ICS cadre and the existing law and order machinery, all princely states and 
provincial territories became part of the new union. The Constitution of India came into effect on 
January 26, 1950, with India’s civil service bureaucracy closely resembling the structure and 
purpose of the British civil services in colonial India. In addition to the ICS, the British 
administrative legacy included the railways, legal system, army, and postal system.  When the 
Constitution of India was adopted, there were fourteen states and six union territories.4 From this 
 
4 As a result of various state reorganization committees, there are now 29 states and seven union territories in India. 
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historical perspective, it is important to bear in mind that “Indian federalism is not the result of a 
compact between two or more pre-existing sovereign entities, but rather, has evolved from the 
sovereign will of the people to live together as one organic political union” (Mathew, 2006, p. 
167).5 India is thus defined as a “Union of States” with a federal structure. Interestingly, the 
Constitution of India does not use the term “federal,” because the framers of the Constitution 
intended it to be “federal if necessary but not necessarily federal” (p. 158).  
 Thus, the post-independence evolution of India’s Constitution and the purpose and 
administrative structure of its civil service bureaucracy reflect “concerns about centrifugal 
forces that might fragment India” (Majeed, 2005, p. 180). This evolution led to the establishment 
of “a rather centralized polity in which the Union government is vested with sufficient powers to 
ensure not only its dominance, but also its ability to rule in a unitary fashion if necessary and 
politically feasible” (pp. 180-181). Thus, the duality within the Constitution of India exists 
because it also provides for a federal system of government with legislative, judicial, executive, 
and administrative powers exclusive to the states. This duality inherent within the Constitution 
and the resultant administrative structures has implications for administrative effectiveness and 
the implementation of programmatic goals.   
  
 
5 There were certain princely states at the time of independence, such as the Nizam of Hyderabad, that had to be coerced into 
joining the union by the Central Government.  
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Appleby’s Reports on the State of India’s Public Administration (1953, 1956) 
Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of Reports 
Paul H. Appleby visited India in the capacity of a consultant in public administration to 
make a study of India’s administrative systems during 1953-56 and later as a visiting scholar to 
the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), New Delhi, in 1961. At the time, the 
government in India called upon eminent scholars to study the existing administrative structures 
in India and make recommendations for improvements. In this context, India’s first Prime 
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, reached out to the Ford Foundation, which responded by assigning 
Appleby the task of surveying India’s administrative system. Appleby’s engagement with India 
resulted in two important reports: Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey (1953) and 
Re-Examination of India’s Administrative System: With Special Reference to Administration of 
Government’s Industrial and Commercial Enterprises (1956). The reports received immediate 
attention from Parliament for the praise, concern, and insightful observations made by Appleby 
about how government functions in India. The context of Appleby’s reports must be seen in light 
of this moment in India’s history, particularly when Appleby was assigned the task to review and 
suggest improvements for India’s bureaucratic machinery.  
In 1953, India had begun the second critical phase of nation building; trying to bring 
people out of poverty and deprivation by undertaking a centrally planned development agenda 
focused on rapid and balanced socio-economic development. The first phase of the new nation’s 
journey took place between 1947 and 1950, when the Constitution of India came into effect. In 
the words of the then-Cabinet Secretary who wrote about the first phase in the introduction to 
Appleby’s first report:  
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…the consolidation of freedom, the political and financial integration of the 
territories of the former Indian States, the drawing up of a constitution, the 
rehabilitation of displaced persons and the establishment of new and common 
administrative services for the Centre and the States, were among the urgent pre-
occupations of the Government. 
 There was consensus among the nation’s elite and policy makers that the existing 
administrative structures, which were a legacy of colonial rule, served the nation well during the 
first critical phase, when national integration was the most pressing need. However, the question 
Nehru wanted to pursue was whether the existing administrative structures were relevant and 
conducive to rapid, balanced socio-economic development. Accordingly, Appleby’s assignment 
was to “broadly attempt an appraisal, and examine the state of public administration in the 
context of on-going development programmes and discussions on reorganization of the 
machinery and structure of Government” (A. P. Saxena, 2004, p. 159).  
To observe how bureaucratic structures and individuals operate and interact with the 
socio-cultural reality of the external environment, Appleby reviewed numerous government 
documents, conducted interviews, administered a questionnaire, engaged in small group 
meetings, travelled to 10 states in addition to the capital, visited project field sites, and interacted 
with private citizens and businessmen. Having travelled across India, Appleby commented that 
what the government was trying to achieve in terms of social and economic development for its 
people was unprecedented in history As a note for those unfamiliar with the Indian context and 
those interested in comparative studies, Appleby underscores the need to acknowledge the 
endogenous nature of the government’s administrative structures, indeed, as they are a product of 
the nation’s history and culture.   
The first report (Appleby, 1953) is organized into eleven sections covering all key aspects 
of public administration in a federal polity: a general appraisal, structure and administration, 
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personnel administration, financial administration and fiscal policy, the development program, 
irregularity and corruption, center and the states, miscellaneous issues (e.g., states and local 
government, paperwork, time-saving techniques, planning), recommendations, a call to develop 
a theory of democratic governance and welfare in the Indian context, and a conclusion. The 
second report (Appleby, 1956) specifically deals with public sector enterprises, their 
administrative procedures and readiness to achieve the aspirations of the second five-year plan 
period (1956-1961). In the following sections, I discuss key themes pertinent to effective 
implementation of the development agenda that emerge from the two reports.      
Administrative Structure, Responsibility, and Delegation 
In his reports, Appleby is fully cognizant of the striking contrasts within India’s socio-
cultural groups, the legacy of the country’s colonial history, the influence of caste hierarchy and 
divisions within the society, the bureaucratic structures and functions that have evolved 
reflecting caste hierarchy and rigid divisions, and the need for India to achieve rapid, balanced 
development to break away from this vicious circle. Yet he is also poignantly aware of the social, 
cultural and historical perspective justifying existing institutions and their structures, as well as 
the immediate need for their reorganization to meet the aspirations of India’s planners and its 
people. In his reports, he grapples with the duality inherent in India’s Constitution and its 
implications for effective administration, even as he is generous with praise for India’s system of 
government:  
I have come gradually to a general judgement that now would rate the government of 
India AMONG THE DOZEN OR SO MOST ADVANCED GOVERNMENTS OF THE 
WORLD (emphasis in the original) (Appleby, 1953, p. 8).  
Appleby was prescient to qualify what he meant by the terms “now” and “advanced.”  
First, “now” shows he is skeptical, and rightly so, about what the future might hold, in a context 
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where honest and charismatic central political leadership is scarce and multiple regional parties 
and coalition governments undermine the political and development process (Tummala, 2004). 
Second, he clarifies that, by “advanced,” he is referring not to being efficient or effective but 
rather to high democratic aspirations. Such praise notwithstanding, Appleby is unsparing in his 
assessment of how the government functions in India and its detrimental effects on the nation’s 
aspirations for democratic governance. The central thesis of Appleby’s reports is that even 
though the center is powerful enough constitutionally to ensure national integration, 
administratively it is weak and dependent on the states for matters of policy implementation, 
particularly with regard to social welfare. In his reports, he articulates the implications of such an 
administrative structure for responsibility and underscores his concern over the current practice 
of delegation that impedes effective implementation.  He also notes a similar pattern of 
administrative tardiness and ambiguity in assigning responsibility occurring at the subnational 
level, between the state, district, and local bodies.   
A constant theme in Appleby’s reports is that of “diffused responsibility” and how it is 
derived from the structures set forth by the Constitution. He also highlights how, in his view, the 
concepts of coordination, administration, decentralization, and autonomy of states are 
incorrectly operationalized, leading to ineffective implementation of programs. He also discusses 
how the lack of a typical pyramid-shaped hierarchy, coupled with socio-economic barriers 
between personnel, disables the use of delegation. The effect of diffused responsibility and lack 
of delegation is underscored in the context of the bureaucracy’s inability to rapidly implement 
development programs.   
Appleby defines structure as what “determines where responsibility lies, how and to what 
extent responsible and controllable delegation takes place” (Appleby, 1953, p. 9). He identifies 
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several interrelated issues as a result of “fundamental and binding structural determination” made 
in the Constitution that results in the assignment of administrative responsibility a futile 
endeavor (p. 16). Another consequence of the constitution determining such a structure is that it 
makes the central government weak and dependent on the state governments for its work. For 
example, other than the critical domains of national defense, foreign policy, and collection of 
taxes, many of the domains related to social welfare and development projects, like public 
health, agriculture, and fisheries, are the state’s prerogative. Appleby contemplates whether there 
was any theoretical reasoning for such a division of administrative domains, whether it was 
guided by particular sentiments of the Constitution’s framers, or whether it simply did not 
receive the needed critical attention. For example, public health and issues related to the spread 
of diseases cannot be contained to the boundaries of states clearly represent a national concern, 
but these issues nonetheless fall into the state’s policy and administrative domain. He also 
discusses, in particular, the untapped potential of India’s fisheries sector to bring about rapid 
rural development and laments that even an issue directly related to the national interest, despite 
the local nature of economic development, is in the exclusive domain of the states.  
The second example, a corollary to the seemingly arbitrary assignment of policy and 
administrative domains between the central and state governments results in reducing the 
activities of the central government to staff functions when in fact it should be engaged in line 
functions, specifically in the case of the development program. Appleby finds that the central 
government is primarily involved in staff functions: planning, logistics, personnel and financial 
control, legal review, and public reporting, all constituting an interministerial dance of 
paperwork and conferences, whereas a line organization carries out programs, delivers services, 
enforces laws, and achieves program objectives. Other than the functions of national defense, 
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foreign policy, and collection of central taxes, the central government is a just a large staff 
organization. Thus, the central government cannot hold the state “specifically accountable” and 
can only depend on its ability “for influencing and co-ordinating administration actually in the 
states’ system” (Appleby, 1953, p. 10). 
A third aspect of the structure inherit in the Constitution actually pits the center and states 
against each other. This is a legacy of the colonial rule, during which the British began to cede 
power in provincial territories as a mechanism to retain power; in reality, the British lost nothing 
by allowing the small and separate provinces to operate as separate government units. Even if the 
British never held self-government in India as an aspirational goal, such an arrangement allowed 
the British to control India in a unitary and centralized manner while still giving the appearance 
of provincial self-governments. The emerging federal character of the Constitution could be seen 
through the colonial experience of provinces, where the rulers’ administrative autonomy was a 
constant desire. Additionally, the diverse and disparate provinces and princely states at the time 
of independence had to be made part of the union, thus contributing to the “ideological pattern 
emphasizing the parts of India rather than the wholeness of India” (Appleby, 1953, p. 51).  Such 
a perspective leads Appleby to address what he considers “the fundamental administrative 
problem of India---its lack of organic unity” (p. 51). It is in this context that Appleby finds the 
operationalization of the term decentralization in India’s administrative landscape to be 
incorrect, because, instead of state governments viewing it as an extension of an organic whole 
emerging from the center, it is mixed with the meaning of the term autonomous states, which 
implies that the states are independent units. “Yet,” Appleby notes, “the constitution does not 
provide for autonomous states, and their creation would destroy India as a nation” (p. 16). 
Viewed together, these three perspectives lead Appleby to the following conclusion: 
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The power that is exercised organically in New Delhi is uncertain and 
discontinuous power of prestige. It is influence rather than power (Appleby, 1953, 
p. 17)   
The central government’s lack of power over the state governments and inability to hold 
them accountable explains, at least in part, why there is such great variation in the developmental 
status within India’s subnational regions. A subnational region’s development or achievement of 
social welfare is thus a function of its own history, administrative capabilities, and political 
priorities. If indeed there is no power over the states, then how does the central government 
exercise its influence over the states? Appleby’s answer to this question does not augur well for 
future generations of political and administrative reforms of the central government aiming to 
institutionalize governance reforms, as he seems to suggest that the extent to which the center 
can get any work done at the state level is a function of the individual’s agency or factors other 
than formal mechanisms of administration: 
Any real power in most of the development field is the personal power of 
particular leaders and the informal, extra-constitutional, extra-administrative 
power of a dominant party coherent and strongly led by the same leaders. 
Dependence for achievement, therefore, is in some crucial ways apart from the 
formal organs of governance, in forces which in the future may take quite 
different forms (Appleby, 1953, pp. 17-18). 
Thus, central ministries have little room to maneuver and facilitate effective 
implementation. Requirements for interministerial reviews and auditing of expenditures with an 
eye solely to spot irregularities leads to delays in project approvals. Furthermore, the situation is 
aggravated by the presence of the cadre from multiple services at the center, leading to 
interpersonal rivalries, which encourage further delays in approvals and communication. 
Assessing the situation at the top tier of government, Appleby says: 
The sequel to a structure not built with an eye to large and diverse action is a 
structure in which the diffusion of responsibility through a Cabinet at the top level 
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of executive government is extended by a vast lateral diffusion of administrative 
responsibility at subordinate levels (Appleby, 1953, p. 18). 
Exacerbating the links of diffused responsibility and accountability in the center-state 
administrative continuum is the pattern and practice of appointing key personnel. The 
departmental heads in state governments are officers of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) 
cadre who are recruited by the central government and appointed to work in both the central and 
state governments. To whom, then, is the IAS officer accountable? Does the officer owe his 
allegiance to the central government that recruited him or to the state government that he 
currently serves? At the organizational level (national or subnational), when there is little or no 
discretion to select personnel on the basis of an individual’s qualification or motivation, the 
organization is bound to be “less fully accountable for its performance than it ought to be;” 
however, such personnel practices are justified in the name of “impartiality, objectivity and 
political neutrality” (Appleby, 1953, p. 18). A similar pattern of shared decision making, 
excessive reviews and tedious approvals is prevalent at the state level. In this context, Appleby 
notes: 
Within the state, the same pattern of diffused responsibility is the general rule, 
modified in some by the simple fact of having a smaller number of ministries 
(Appleby, 1953, p. 18).   
 Appleby observes a similar structure at the district and sub-district level of administration 
(also referred to as field administration). At the central and state government level, there is no 
focal point to consolidate the lines of responsibility. The District Collector’s office, at the level 
of the district administration, is the only administrative unit within India’s decentralized 
administrative structures where responsibility and accountability can be consolidated. However, 
even here Appleby notices responsibility being diffused; the source of this diffusion is the pattern 
of appointment. The District Collector is the formal authority presiding over all units of 
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government at the district and sub-district level, thus carrying, in essence, the weight of all 
national and state government programs in the district. The District Collector is an IAS officer 
recruited and posted by the central government to districts, which are essentially geographic 
areas. Observing the implications of such an assignment, Appleby explains: 
He is impersonally assigned by “Government”---which is everybody, and more or 
less responsible to every ministry carrying on functions in his area. No ministry 
knows how much of his time it is entitled to, and none has any capacity for 
insuring that it receives that portion of this time and energy (Appleby, 1953, p. 
20). 
All line ministries have field functionaries stationed at the district and sub-district level. From an 
administrative and technical sense, these field functionaries are under the hierarchy of the 
District Collector. Thus, the District Collector has considerable power and formal authority and 
technically has the administrative machinery to get work done, but in reality the responsibility is 
shared; at the same time, however, no one is really responsible for anything, because: 
…this arrangement involves in its own turn an interaction of the responsibilities 
and personnel of the ministries of health, education and agriculture, along with the 
home ministry and the ministry of finance, in association with the development 
and/or Community Projects offices, and some lingering associations with the 
Collector (Appleby, 1953, p. 20). 
The issue of administrative structures leading to diffused responsibility is brought into 
sharper relief by Appleby’s observations about the functioning of Community Projects at the 
national, state, and district levels of administration. Community Projects are a “highly intensive 
form of development applied in the agricultural field” aimed at improving food production and 
quality of village life (Appleby, 1953, p. 43). Given the technical nature of the projects and the 
dearth of financial resources, Appleby is generally pleased with the progress. However, there are 
several areas for improvement (e.g., delayed payments, outdated training programs) as a result of 
existing procedures and structures. At the national level, Appleby identifies up to four 
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committees and advisory boards that are each a “governmentally representative body” (with the 
Planning Commission of India at the apex) with two levels of administrators: a chief 
administrator and two subordinate project officers with no intermediary administrators (p. 45). 
Each committee or advisory board has representatives from all concerned ministries (secretaries, 
deputy secretaries, assistant secretaries, and project officers on deputation from other ministries). 
With regard to such an “organization,” it is anybody’s guess to what extent each member shares 
responsibility.  
The organizational chart for the Community Projects organization is similar at the state 
and district level in terms of its diffused responsibility. Appleby identifies committees at the state 
and district level, each of which is associated with an advisory board; in each instance, these 
committees and boards comprise a “governmentally representative body.” Additionally, there are 
commissioners, development officers, and project officers at the district and sub-district level. As 
is the practice in almost all programs, the district collector is the chair of the district level 
committee, who: 
…in his role of being responsible to everybody for everything in his district may 
prove more of a controlling factor than the District Development Officer 
nominally “in charge” of community development in that district (Appleby, 1953, 
p. 46). 
In practice, however, all “higher officials and ministers will not often sit on the various 
Committees and boards, and goodwill can be expected to minimize the disadvantages of such a 
formally structured proliferation of diffused and confused responsibility” (p. 46). Appleby is 
critical of such a “self-defeating organizational lay-out” (p. 46).  
Appleby also discusses “an astonishing lack of capacity and/or facilities for 
administrative delegation” (Appleby, 1953, pp. 18-19). While this deficiency stems from the 
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structure, it is further exacerbated by the shape of the internal hierarchy and the influence of the 
socially prevalent caste system on bureaucratic structures. The internal hierarchical structure of 
departments is “not filled-in” in the middle; thus, Appleby seems to suggest that the hierarchy 
has the shape of an hour-glass instead of a pyramid (p. 19). An implication of such a structure 
with a weak intermediary cadre is that the gap between the levels of the hierarchy is too big to 
facilitate effective communication and delegation. In addition, there is also with a disparity in 
prestige, class, and pay between those at the top and those at the bottom. The combined effect of 
these gaps is that the art of delegation has not been developed or practiced. The bureaucratic 
culture is also influenced by the socially prevalent rigid caste system. As a result, communication 
across cadres is frowned upon. There is thus rigid compartmentalization between cadres that 
actually need to communicate with each other because the services they provide are intimately 
connected. Furthermore, communication with superiors in the hierarchy about ground realities is 
not a general practice. Both the consequences of practices that rigidly reflect a class hierarchy 
within bureaucracies and the inability to delegate to the subordinate levels have resulted in a 
culture of delays.  
Finally, as a consequence of constitutional mandates and administrative structures, 
Appleby makes the interesting observation, regarding the government’s functioning, that 
coordination has become a substitute for administration. Instead of viewing administration as a 
managerial activity involving decisions, action, follow-up, review, and evaluation, he observes 
that administration “usually means anything involving money or personnel matters” (Appleby, 
1953, p. 17). He seems to suggest that, because of diffused responsibility, lack of delegation, 
inordinate delays, and the inability to hold individuals accountable, officials are engaged in a 
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“cumbersome process of cross-reference and consultation” (p. 17). Towards this end of 
describing India’s administrative processes, he states: 
There is no accepted terminology to cover administration of programs which are 
the important end-product of all public administration, no concentration of 
attention or structure on “action administration” or “program administration”, and 
the civil servants of highest rank are more concerned with “co-ordination” than 
with “administration” in action terms (Appleby, 1953, p. 17). 
Appleby’s second report (Appleby, 1956), written after an interval of two years and three 
visits between 1953 and 1956, underscores the same themes, but specifically in the context of 
India’s public sector enterprises. The second report was intended for internal communication, not 
publication; thus, Appleby is scathing in his assessment of how India’s government functions. 
Once published, the second report provoked a heated debate in the Indian Parliament. The 
second report came at the beginning of the second five-year plan, 1956-1961. In this report, 
Appleby emphatically supports Nehru’s vision for India and shares his concern, as voiced in the 
first report, that the existing administrative structures and practices are not conducive for a post-
independent India’s aspirations for democratic governance. The central thesis of the second 
report is that as the Indian society advances, the size of government will grow, thus implying a 
greater role for delegation across administrative hierarchies if the goals of rapid and balanced 
economic development are to be achieved. By consequence, this also means that the focus of 
government should move away from needlessly circuitous procedures, as well as redundant and 
petty reviews.  It thus does not augur well for effective administration if the delegation of 
authority (particularly at the subordinate level) and increasing individual responsibility do not 
correspond with the growth of government.  
Appleby does acknowledge the progress being made, yet he observes that the 
achievements are driven by individual efforts rather than organization-wide efforts. He notes that 
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the progress thus far is beyond the “capacity of the Indian administrative system” and that such 
reliance on individuals is not sustainable (Appleby, 1956, p. 2). He references Chester Barnard 
while discussing the issue of delegation, noting that delegation is not the abdication of 
responsibility but rather the enlargement of individual and organizational responsibility. In this 
context, Appleby underscores the root cause of India’s administrative problem, which: 
“…is an insistence on the avoidance of the making of decisions which should be 
made by others---notably by subordinates” (Appleby, 1956, p. 5).  
 This aspect of administrative delays in decision making and lack of delegation is further 
illustrated in the situation of subordinates in the Indian context. Appleby explains that when a 
proposal from a senior official from a programmatic ministry is sent to “Finance, Home Affairs 
or the Planning Commission,” in a technical sense this senior officer is subordinate to the 
“lowest ranking officer” in the ministry that needs to give permission (p. 5), who must then 
prepare a note on the proposal being sent by the superior officer from the programmatic ministry. 
Because decision making powers have not been delegated at the lower levels of the hierarchy, 
Appleby notes that, in this confusion, these “subordinates do not have the faintest idea of how to 
act in the capacity of superiors” (Appleby, 1956, p. 6). This results in the subordinates delaying 
decisions by searching for precedents or finding gaps within the proposal that need to be further 
addressed. The impact of such proposals are held up at the upper echelons of the government in 
this way can be felt in other parts of the country where industries need to grow, and the pattern 
reverberates across all units of government. The following quote aptly summarizes Appleby’s 
discussion of structure and its implications on responsibility, delegation and effective 
administration: 
The building of individual responsibility contributes importantly to organizational 
responsibility. Here, by a curious proliferation of the conceptions of parliamentary 
responsibility and Cabinet responsibility and by reliance on excessive procedures 
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of cross-reference there has been built an extraordinary evasion of individual 
responsibility and a system whereby everybody is responsible for everything 
before anything is done (Appleby, 1956, p. 6).  
Impact of Appleby’s Reports 
 Appleby’s reports gained legitimacy because the then-Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, used them to stimulate discussion and reflection among fellow Cabinet Members and 
Chief Ministers. Several insights from the reports, particularly those related to excessive delays 
in decision making and rigid departmentalization within bureaucracies like the caste system, 
struck a chord with Nehru. He would frequently reference Appleby’s reports in his written 
communications to the chief ministers. Both Nehru and Appleby shared a common concern 
about whether India’s civil service bureaucracy would change from its colonial orientation of a 
master ruling over its subjects to a system revolving around the needs of citizens. The reports 
spoke to Nehru’s belief that the current administrative structures, descending from their colonial 
past, were archaic in the context of India’s democratic aspirations. However, not all of Nehru’s 
colleagues thought the same way, and there was disagreement over the contextual relevance of 
Appleby’s recommendations, although there seemed to be general agreement regarding his 
observations.   
 Many of Appleby’s observations and recommendations were about structure and its 
impact on effective administration. While Appleby understood that the fundamental federal 
structure and concurrent parliamentary systems of the center and state cannot be altered, he did 
suggest several other reforms to speed up the process of administration. Although not a central 
theme of his recommendations, Appleby also suggested the creation of two new institutions to 
support the research and practice of public administration: an Institute of Public Administration 
for India and an office of Organization and Management. While his recommendations regarding 
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the consolidation of responsibility were met with little action and much criticism, the 
recommendation to set up two new institutions was immediately taken up and implemented.  
Appleby’s second report generated more media attention and scrutiny from Parliament 
than the first. The second report was even tabled for discussion in Parliament. The implications 
of reform emanating from the second report were considered too drastic at the time; in particular, 
these included a reduced role for Parliament in administrative matters, a reorientation of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General’s role, an expanded intermediary cadre of officers with more 
powers of responsibility, and delegation. In his second report, Appleby minced no words when 
he called out the Parliament and the Auditor General’s office for indulging in petty and futile 
review exercises, causing delays, and hampering decision-making. The following quote from a 
member of the Parliament during the ensuing debate aptly captures the resistance to Appleby’s 
reports: 
‘More and more unfettered bureaucracy’ is, therefore, the Doctor’s prescription, 
and however much his friends might wish to sugar-coat it, the country won’t 
easily swallow the pill…It is, as I said before, refreshingly provocative and some 
of its recommendations…are very sound. But, it shows no basic understanding of 
India’s problems today; it shows no understanding, no effort at understanding, 
how in the present set-up India cannot possibly wish to change straightway, how 
in the present set-up we must proceed to tackle our problems from the point of 
view of parliamentary administration and that, as I said before, short of a 
revolution, a parliamentary set-up is as democratic a mechanism as one can ask 
for. Therefore, the report, as it has come to us, becomes by and large unacceptable 
(A. P. Saxena, 2004, p. 181). 
 Nehru was emphatic in supporting Appleby’s observations and recommendations but 
conceded that no progress could be made towards meaningful reform. India’s political, economic 
and social landscape has changed considerably since the time of Appleby’s reports; what remains 
to be seen is the extent to which the administrative structures and bureaucratic functioning in 
India reflect these changes.  
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Winds of Change: New Reforms, Institutions, and Roles 
The changes that have swept across India’s political and administrative landscape since 
Appleby’s reports have been along the lines he predicted, involving increasing demands of 
subnational units of government for the devolution of power and autonomy. Regional political 
parties have stronger voice at the national level, central government’s leadership has relatively 
weakened, and there have been calls for greater de-centralization of administration and citizen-
centered service delivery in the name of democratic governance. In this context, three major 
reforms can be identified as having a profound impact on government bureaucracies: 
constitutional status to local government bodies, economic liberalization of the economy, and 
adoption of public sector reforms.  
After several decades of slowly moving in the direction of devolving power to the people, 
the institutions of local government (panchayats in rural areas and municipalities in urban areas) 
were constitutionally mandated in 1992. Similarly, after decades of centralized planning by the 
government, India began the process of economic liberalization in 1991. Also during the 1990s, 
public sector reforms were adopted to change how India’s government bureaucracies function. 
Therefore, the question facing public administration scholars today has to do with what changes 
have taken place within India’s administrative structures in response to new reforms. 
Additionally, as a result of these changes, are the administrative structures capable of delivering 
on the promise of intergovernmental coordination and democratic governance?  
Rise of Regional Political Parties 
         The fragmentation of India’s political landscape began during the 1980s, when it became 
clear that “centralized federalism” dominated by a single national party had not met the goals set 
forth by the Constitution (Majeed, 2005, p. 181). This decade saw the beginning of coalition 
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politics, in which regional political parties and their state governments wield greater power than 
the central government in policy and administrative matters. The idea that state governments, 
and not the central government, can better address and contextualize their development needs 
began to take shape. Furthermore, as a result of India’s economic liberalization reforms, state 
governments became emboldened to embark on their own development paths (Choudhary, 
2007). Thus, today, India’s federal polity is referred to as “cooperative federalism.” However, 
this trend has further highlighted the disparities in social and economic indicators at the 
subnational level. Some states, such as Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and 
Andhra Pradesh, have emerged as economic powerhouses while states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, 
and Odisha lag behind economically. Social sector indicators like health and education, which 
are in the state’s policy and administrative domain, show wide variation within and across states, 
even among those states that have well-developed economic indicators. In spite of such a 
paradigm shift in India’s federal system, the administrative structures have remained the same.  
With the waves of decentralization in motion, policy elites and planners hoped that local 
government institutions like the panchayat would be further emboldened. Institutions of local 
government are seen as instruments of democratic governance, which can include the voice of 
citizens in government, improve efficiency of the state’s service delivery, and make service 
providers accountable to the people (Mullen, 2011).  
Historical Context of Panchayats: Local Government Institutions 
The concept of a panchayat (literally meaning a group or council of five people) has 
existed since ancient India, when groups of village elders presided over village matters. These 
“village bodies, in both the North and South, have been the pivot of administration, the centre of 
social life, and above all, a focus of social solidarity” (Mathew & Hooja, 2009, p. 171). Matters 
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needing arbitration would be brought to the attention of a village panchayat. These village elders 
also ensured that each caste group adhered to their work to ensure the status quo. The British, 
noting how these village administrative units formed a “caste-ridden feudal structure,” referred 
to them as “little republics” (p. 171). However, the panchayats were not accountable in a 
democratic sense, because the village elders from upper castes typically constituted the council. 
The first instance of an accountable institution of local government was the Madras 
Municipal Corporation, introduced by British colonial rulers in 1687 for the purpose of revenue 
collection in big towns. Members were not elected but rather nominated by the District Collector. 
The next phase of local government reform, in 1882, focused on decentralization to improve 
administrative efficiency and revenue collections. It was during this time that the term self-
government began gaining currency, as the British government’s reform allowed for popular 
elections of two thirds of members to rural government boards. The British continued the process 
of decentralization through various commissions in 1909, 1919, and, finally, 1935. Throughout, 
the British noted the persistence of caste politics in the workings of panchayats, but the process 
of decentralization of power was inevitable given increasing demands for independence and the 
British desire to retain power. The Government of India Act of 1935 was a landmark act of 
autonomy for provinces, as it made way for popular elections in the provinces, giving further 
impetus to popularly elected local governments within them.  
Mathew and Hooja (2009) note that, at the time of independence, when India’s 
constitution was being written, the concept of a village panchayat as an instrument of democratic 
governance and development was not given priority. This was in spite of village panchayats 
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being at the heart of India’s freedom struggle and Mahatma Gandhi’s6 vision for a 
democratically governed India. Rather than mandating state governments to strengthen and 
utilize local government institutions as an integral part of the development agenda, it was left to 
state governments to decide how they would use local government institutions. This relegation of 
status for local governments should be seen in the context of the Constitution’s planners’ fears 
over fragmentation and the desire for a strong central government. Gandhi also envisioned 
panchayats as being politically neutral, but subsequent efforts to revitalize local governments 
rejected this notion. It was firmly believed by later development planners that allowing local 
governments to be political reflects the democratic desires of citizens and makes them active 
participants in the country’s political process. Thus, from this point on, panchayats were seen as 
political instruments for regional political parties and also as potential competition by locally 
elected state representatives. 
 With no constitutional recognition, state governments did not take local government 
institutions seriously, with the exceptions of West Bengal and Kerala, where there had been 
elections since the 1970s (Mullen, 2011). Several factors can be seen to influence the events that 
finally led to according constitutional status to local governments. The most important of these is 
that the condition of social sector indicators and services in villages was appalling, with no 
mechanism to hold anybody responsible. The experience of West Bengal and Kerala showed 
that, with strong local governments, social sector indicators and services could improve even 
without strong industrial growth (Mullen 2012). Thus, demands for constitutional recognition of 
local government began in the 1980s, with civil society groups, representatives of local 
 
6 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was one of the preeminent leaders at the time of India’s struggle for independence from the 
British. He is best known for his non-violent freedom movement against the British. For his contributions and sacrifices, he is 
known as the Mahatma [great one].  
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government, and planners encouraging bottom-up planning and citizen participation in the 
development process. The 1980s was also a time when the central government began initial 
efforts to liberalize the economy and when regional parties were playing a bigger role in the 
central government. All this created an environment conducive to demand for decentralized 
institutions and devolution of power, and constitutional amendments to strengthen panchayats 
were part of the electoral debates in 1991 (Mathew & Hooja, 2009, p. 175). Finally, in 1992, 
Parliament amended the Constitution, and local government institutions were afforded 
constitutional status.   
The local government institutions are organized in a three-tier system: village, 
intermediate, and district. The idea behind such a structure was to promote district-level 
development planning, where community generated plans would come from each village 
panchayat to be consolidated at the district level (Krishnamachari, 1962). All members of the 
panchayats are elected; currently, there are more than 240,000 village panchayats, 6,000 
intermediate panchayats, and 500 district panchayats. To avoid the capture of local government 
institutions by elites and to make the institutions inclusive, the Constitution provides for 
affirmative action. Seats are reserved for members from socially and economically 
disadvantageous communities in proportion to their population in the village, and one third of all 
seats are reserved for women. However, the promise of decentralization that begins with 
elections can only be realized when there is administrative power and control. Thus far, states are 
conducting elections as mandated but have resisted efforts to devolve administrative and fiscal 
powers.  
The Constitution provides for the transfer of 47 subjects (i.e., policy and administrative 
domains) to local governments, but no state has fully complied with this law (Mathew & Hooja, 
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2009). A major impediment to the transfer of administrative functions is that the policy and 
administrative domains to be transferred “are so broad in scope that in certain instances all the 
spheres of government—Union, state, and local—will have to undertake some implementing 
responsibility in varying degrees” (p.177). Additionally, there is also the perceived loss of power 
for the state government and potential competition politically at the village level.   
 Thus, constitutional recognition accorded to local governments has only resulted in 
creating new institutional roles and structures, with no changes to existing administrative roles 
and structures. Furthermore, the new combination of administrative structures further 
exacerbates the situation of diffused responsibility and delayed decision-making. As a result, 
without adequate administrative and financial autonomy, the promise of decentralized 
democratic governance in India has yet to be realized (A. K. S. Kumar et al., 2011; Maddick, 
1970; Mishra, Mishra, & Pal, 2000; Mullen, 2011).  
Economic Liberalization & Public Sector Reforms  
 India’s move towards a market-based economy began in the 1980s, but it was the adverse 
balance of payments situation in 1991 that precipitated the issue. In 1991, India began the 
process of systematically implementing economic liberalization reforms. The implications of 
such a paradigm shift meant encouraging greater private sector participation, foreign direct 
investment, and a different expectation of the government’s role. This was indeed a watershed 
moment for India’s government given its origins of central planning through the five-year plans 
that began in 1951. The liberalization reforms of 1991 are a reference point in the discourse and 
scholarship examining India’s development.   
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The reform agenda touched on every aspect of the economy, society, and government, 
including fiscal discipline, industrial and trade policy, foreign direct investment, financial sector 
reforms, privatization, and the social sector. Several arguments have been put forth to discuss the 
pace and impact of India’s economic liberalization reform. Sen (2001) argues that, without 
adequately addressing the human development issues like primary health, education, and status 
of women, the process of economic liberalization will only lead to greater inequalities. 
Ahluwalia (2002) argues that the full potential of reforms has not been realized because 
implementation is slow and ineffective. Others have argued that reforms in India move slowly 
and gradually, absorbing the changes internally in the process (Caiden & Sundaram, 2004). This 
“gradualist approach” to reform has “meant a frustratingly slow pace of implementation” 
(Ahluwalia, 2002, p. 68); nonetheless, this approach “implies a clear definition of the goal and a 
deliberate choice of extending the time taken to reach it, to ease the pain of transition” (p. 86). 
For example, when privatizing public sector enterprises, instead of selling them away all at once, 
the government embarked on a program of “disinvestment” where it would sell a part of its stake 
to private players. An argument can be made that the bureaucracies responsible for the 
implementation of reforms contributed to this gradualist approach.  
While economic liberalization has meant a withdrawal of government in many spheres, a 
notable exception is the social sector (health and education), particularly in rural areas. In this 
area, it has been noted that government has to play a greater role than before through investments 
and encouraging the participation of beneficiaries in monitoring health and education service 
delivery (Ahluwalia, 2002). The impact of economic liberalization reforms has put India on 
course to be one of the world’s fastest growing economies, but the country still has its share of 
extreme deprivation and variation in social indicators. India’s economy grew at an average rate 
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of 6% per year during the ten-year period between 1992-1993 and 2001-2002 and continues to 
grow, making it the world’s fastest growing economy (Ahluwalia, 2002). However, this growth 
has not trickled down uniformly, leading to extreme variation across demographic groups and 
geographic regions. The most recent Socio Economic and Caste Census 2011 released by the 
government of India highlights disparities between the rural poor and urban educated middle 
class in their annual income and educational attainment, both of which are key development 
indicators (Al-Habil, 2011; Meyer & Birdsall, 2012) .7 Thus, two decades after its onset, 
economic liberalization, far from reducing the role of government, has in fact increased demands 
on the government and its bureaucracies to deliver services ever more effectively for both the 
rural poor and the urban middle class. While both groups and regions have different 
requirements, they have in common the demand for the government to be accountable and 
transparent.    
 The tectonic shifts and worsening disparities between India’s demographic groups and 
geographic regions has also led to a changing role for government, which also means a changing 
role for its bureaucracies. Several efforts at changing how bureaucratic institutions function have 
been made between 1991 and the present. Although these reforms began under the aegis of the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund in 1991, the government of India continued with 
 
7 In July 2015, the Government of India released the results of the Socio Economic and Caste Census 2011, which 
paints a grim picture of the quality of life in rural areas and underscores the need for effective implementation of the 
government’s development programs (Rukmini & Bansal, 2015). According to this report, 73% of the households in India are 
rural, and the main earning member of 75% of these households makes less than $1000 annually. Furthermore, 35.7% of rural 
households are illiterate, 14% have a member who is literate but has not passed primary school, 17.8% have a member who 
passed primary school, and only 3.5% have a member with a graduate degree. The report also reveals that the standard of living 
for the socially and economically disadvantaged groups (called Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) is substantially worse. 
At the same time, a middle class of 150 million people has emerged whose annual income ranges from $3000-$15000. The rapid 
rise of the middle class is often seen as evidence of India’s economic emergence; the size of the Indian middle class doubled from 
5.7% of all households in 2001 to 12.8% of all households in 2010 (Meyer & Birdsall, 2012).  
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its own version of the “good governance” reform agenda, essentially internalizing key elements 
from new public management to collaborative governance (Choudhary, 2007). 
The government planning documents clearly identify roles for three key actors in the 
sustainable development of India: state, civil society, and the market. The causal link between 
governance and development is clearly stated in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-07): 
Governance relates to the management of all such processes that, in any society, define 
the environment which permits and enables individuals to raise their capability levels, 
provide opportunities to realize their potential and enlarge the set of available choices. 
These processes, covering the political, social, and economic aspects of life impact every 
level of human enterprise, be it the individual, the household, the village, the region, or 
the national level…It covers the state, civil society and the market, each of which is 
critical for sustaining human development [emphasis added] (GOI 2002a) (Choudhary, 
2007, pp. 22-23). 
Choudhary (2007) broadly groups the reforms undertaken to achieve the government’s vision of 
good governance into the following categories: economic governance reforms, administrative 
reforms, and political governance reforms. Economic governance reforms, which began in 1991 
as part of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), include a greater role for the private sector 
in service delivery of health and education, removal of the license raj,8 disinvestment and 
privatization of state enterprises, and enabling market- and investor-friendly laws. Political 
governance reforms include increasing the role of civil society, citizen participation in program 
design and implementation, and decentralization of government through local governments. The 
task of effectively implementing economic and political governance reforms falls on India’s civil 
service bureaucracy, but this also means the bureaucracy has to first implement a range of 
administrative reforms before it can effectively move the state, civil society, and markets to work 
 
8 License Raj and Permit Raj are colloquial terms used to refer to a system of excessive regulations and permissions 
prevalent in India. Because India’s economy post-independence began as a centrally planned economy, any private 
enterprise needed to seek permission and get clearances from a range of government bureaucracies. This culture led 
to administrative delays and corruption and did not create an investor-friendly environment for private businesses.  
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together. The administrative reforms package is more aligned with the new public management 
reforms, which focus on “disaggregation, competition, and incentivization” (Dunleavy et al., 
2006, p. 467) and expect government bureaucracies to function like businesses by “promoting 
efficiency, reducing the burden on government and giving more choice to citizens” (Batley, 
1999, p. 761). Effective implementation of administrative reforms meant that bureaucracies had 
to downsize their workforce, design and implement performance management systems, design 
and facilitate mechanisms to engage citizens, and cede ground to private industry and civil 
society.  
 At the time of independence, the role and orientation of the Indian bureaucracy shifted to 
a focus on the people’s welfare. As a result of the changes both before and after 1991, the 
bureaucracy had to re-dedicate itself to facilitating private industry and civil society to provide 
for the wellbeing of society. Despite its changing roles, however, the Indian bureaucracy’s 
fundamental structures have remained essentially the same over time. This phenomenon is aptly 
captured by Caiden and Sundaram (2004) in the context of administrative reforms and 
bureaucratic change: “Governments have been managerially decentralized but politically 
centralized” (p. 377).     
Impact of New Reforms and Institutions on India’s Civil Service Bureaucracy 
The fact that India’s civil service bureaucracies have remained unchanged in their 
structure and functioning as agents of the central government, despite adapting to economic and 
social changes, creates an interesting paradox and also speaks to their resilience and ability to 
survive. Even though their structure has been shown to be unconducive to effective 
administration, they have helped to mitigate the risk of losing control over the region (during the 
colonial era) and fragmentation of the union (from independence to the present day). Thus, 
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implementation of any reform is painfully slow in India because the bureaucracies must absorb 
the proposed changes within the basic structure before beginning implementation. Moreover, 
implementation may be ineffective depending on local and contextual factors.  
Impact on Bureaucratic Functioning 
 Dwivedi, Jain, and Dua (1989) review the impact of various administrative reform 
commissions from independence until 1987 and find that, other than peripheral changes, no 
changes were made to the basic administrative structure that was essentially a colonial legacy. 
The authors note that none of the reports after Appleby’s (1953, 1956) touch upon “basic 
principles and concepts” that need to be re-examined in light of changing times (Dwivedi et al., 
1989, p. 259), such as consolidation of responsibility and the use of delegation to lower levels of 
the hierarchy. Instead, in the post-Appleby period, from 1956 to 1983, the authors conclude that 
“[t]here was no attempt made to overhaul the original administrative structure; piecemeal 
reforms were undertaken but within the existing administrative framework” (p. 260). Examples 
of “piecemeal” reforms relate to “qualifications for public services, salary structure of public 
services, district administration, work procedures, and reorganization of the Foreign Service” (p. 
259). The authors conclude that, even as change was sweeping through the nation with 
increasing urbanization, population growth, uneven development and calls for decentralization, 
India’s civil service bureaucracy retained the basic structure it inherited from the British, 
including centralized decision-making, inflexible adherence to rules, and a lack of delegation (p. 
256).  
Caiden and Sundaram (2004) find that the implementation of new public management 
(NPM) reforms in has not reduced but only changed the orientation of the role of government. 
They find that India adopted all elements of the NPM reforms to make bureaucracies productive, 
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responsive, decentralized, accountable, and transparent; but, realizing that solutions have to be 
“home-grown, sequential and inclusive” it adapted them to its unique context and needs (Caiden 
& Sundaram, 2004, p. 377). However, the progress of implementing these reforms has been slow 
and unsuccessful in India. The authors state that NPM reforms are “technocratic” (p. 380) in 
nature and typically applied to organizations to improve their capability and capacity. In the case 
of India, it inherited a highly capable bureaucratic machinery. The authors argue that the 
underlying causes of ineffective administration in India are not being addressed by NPM reforms 
and thus what “Appleby said over fifty years ago is unfortunately still true of Indian 
government” (p. 378). Thus, to absorb these technocratic reforms, new structures and roles are 
created without addressing or changing the existing, administratively ineffective structural 
issues.  
Impact on the Indian Administrative Service (IAS)  
More recent studies, situated two decades after economic liberalization, NPM, and 
governance reforms, continue to attest to the unchanged functioning and decadence of 
government bureaucracies in India. In the past, a majority of the civil service members were 
educated in the humanities and liberal arts, but greater emphasis on technical education in the 
Indian society has led to more civil service members having technical backgrounds (Radin, 
2007). Krishna (2010) finds that, compared to thirty years ago, the bureaucracy has become less 
elite (with most members upper castes and urban areas) and more representative of India’s 
diverse social groups. Radin (2007) traces the origins of the Indian civil service bureaucracy to 
the British Indian Civil Service (ICS), examining the changes in Indian society and economy. In 
her review of current practices of personnel recruitment training, posting, and functioning, she 
finds that India’s development policies and their implementation frameworks reflect a “shift in 
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policy boundaries” and are “increasingly viewed not as a separate track but as a set of policies 
that involve multiple players and move across traditionally separate systems” (p. 1537). 
Nonetheless, an examination of the foundational training course syllabus indicates little to no 
change in topics and skills to reflect the new reality. 
The public administration section of the syllabus communicates a continued command 
and control approach. There is no indication that problems of corruption, working with 
Panchayat officials, dealing with politicians, serving as a bridge between the people and 
the politicians, and issues of secularism will face the new officers. Neither does it deal 
with need for officers to find ways to creatively integrate separate national policies at the 
local level (Radin, 2007, p. 1543). 
In terms of recruitment and functioning, she finds little evidence to conclude that the 
bureaucratic machinery has changed course to effectively deliver the promises of its new role. 
Even though there is a felt need among officials for sub-national specific personnel and technical 
experts, the recruitment pattern is still faithful to the basic, inflexible structure involving a cadre 
that is centrally recruited and sub-nationally posted; nonetheless, her respondents still “envision 
a role for an all-India service, such a service would provide service and national unity, 
particularly at times when democracy is at test” (Radin, 2007, p. 1545).  
 Krishna (2010) compares the findings from this study to Potter’s book titled India’s 
Political Administrators: From ICS to IAS (1986) to conclude that “continuity trumps change,” 
as the IAS has remained the same (p. 433). Potter’s book broadly outlines three contemporary 
characteristics of the IAS that are a faithful legacy of its colonial origins: first, the focus of 
administration has shifted from providing legitimacy to a colonial master to finding a balance 
between internal pressures from democratically elected leaders and external pressures for 
democratic governance; second, the result of this balancing act seems to be that the IAS is more 
effective at maintaining administrative status quo than responding to the specific social and 
economic development needs of subnational regions; and third, because IAS officers are 
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centrally recruited, their accountability to state governments is questionable (Wyatt, 1998). Still, 
government bureaucracies continue to operate in an environment of increased external pressures: 
the common man of modern India is more politically active, and the “illiterate Indian peasant is 
swiftly becoming a feature of the past” (p. 441); new transparency laws like the “Right to 
Information Act (RTI) makes it incumbent upon government officials to disclose information 
whenever requested in writing by a member of the public”; and an independent and hyperactive 
media “are quick to smell out stories involving official misdeeds and juicy scandals” (p. 442). 
Unfortunately, these changes seem only to have made the bureaucracies function ever more 
slowly, trading speedy decisions for inaction fearing instant public rebuke if actions go wrong in 
an age where media attention is pervasive.  
 Finally, Krishna (2010) sees India’s bureaucracy continuing to function in the same 
manner and argues that unless “the very structure of governance in India is re-thought—evoking 
images of anarchy in some minds—alternatives to the IAS are hard to imagine” (p. 442). The 
IAS is still the world’s largest cadre of generalist managers; like other centralist civil service 
cadres, they are centrally recruited, are promoted based on seniority and not results, and disallow 
any lateral entry of experts. The prestige associated with the civil services, IAS in particular, has 
also remained; results of the All-India Civil Services exam are widely publicized in regional and 
national media, and considerable attention is directed to the future generations of administrators. 
The position of the IAS within the civil services is also highly competitive, adding to its prestige; 
Krishna notes that only one in a thousand applicants successfully secured an IAS position (p. 
434). Some scholars have argued that the IAS is responsible for the decadence of India’s civil 
service bureaucracy, for the unholy nexus between politicians and bureaucrats (Mitra, 2010), for 
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poor social sector indicators and uneven development progress (N. C. Saxena, 2010), and for the 
persistence of corruption and poverty (Gupta, 2012).  
Scholars have long debated over the direction of causality regarding the interaction 
between politicians and the civil services. In his first report, Appleby (1953) puts the onus of 
India’s public administration future squarely on the shoulders of its political leadership. There is 
also no shortage of literature to indicate the nexus between politicians and civil servants serving 
their individual needs; the frequent issue of transfers of senior civil servants in India speaks to 
this point. In discussing the causal mechanism, N. C. Saxena (2010) explains that politicians also 
know the limitations of the system and do not make promises that cannot be speedily delivered 
by the civil service bureaucracy. As a result, the local politician has to appeal to politics of caste 
and class identity to be connected with these constituencies rather than focus on improving 
service delivery, which is often a lost cause. This is because efficiency in the civil services “was 
always narrowly defined; it was seen in terms of adherence to rules and contempt for politics, but 
never in terms of increased public satisfaction” (N. C. Saxena, 2010, p. 450). This lack of faith in 
the bureaucracy changing direction for the better is echoed by Gupta (2012) in an ethnographic 
study of how the Integrated Child Development Scheme was being implemented by the Women 
and Child Welfare Department in Uttar Pradesh. The quote below aptly captures the popular 
perception of India’s bureaucracy: 
Rather than try to improve the delivery system, many IAS officers are compromising 
with the rot and accepting a diminished role for themselves by becoming agents of 
exploitation in a state structure which now looks like something out of the medieval 
period—authoritarian, brutal, directionless, and callous to the needs of the poor (N. C. 
Saxena, 2010, p. 451).     
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Impact on District Administration 
The general praise, criticism or assessment of India’s civil service bureaucracy either 
targets the IAS or takes a “whole of bureaucracy” approach .  The latter approach, however, only 
leads to sweeping statements and misses an opportunity to really understand the challenges, 
identify areas of improvement, and assess how changes are implemented where administration in 
India actually takes place: at the level of district administration (Krishnamachari, 1962; A. K. S. 
Kumar et al., 2011; Mathew & Hooja, 2009; Sadasivan, 1988; Yugandhar & Mukherjee, 1991). 
District administration represents the “cutting edge” of service delivery, as this is where a 
majority of India’s citizens experience government and where all international, national, and 
state governance experiments are tested. The institution of the District Collector is the most 
famed of all public institutions in India; it is an institution rich in history and vested with formal 
authority to connect the masses of India to the central government’s policies. A district is a 
“territorial unit that hosts almost all state agencies and departments while serving as the point of 
interaction between the government and the citizen” (Mathew & Hooja, 2009, p. 169). There are 
a total of 607 districts with populations varying from .2 to 2 million. All local bodies exist at the 
district or sub-district level, with the District Collector as the “administrative head, or fulcrum, 
with responsibility for coordination and supervision of a number of district offices” (p.169-170). 
The District Collector is a bureaucrat – specifically, an IAS officer – rather than an elected 
representative and has been referred to by scholars as the district-Maharaja,9 lynchpin or kingpin 
due to the crucial administrative role and power vested in the institution.  
 
9 The term Maharaja is a colloquial word in India that refers to a king or monarch. The word is originally from Sanskrit and thus 
is common to many Indian languages that share their roots with the Sanskrit language.  
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Sadasivan (1988) explains the institution of the district collector in the context of 
territorial administration that emerged as an administrative tool during the Mauryan Empire 
(324-232 BC) on the Indian subcontinent. As an administrative concept, the institution was 
highly effective for its centralized and command and control style of administration that it 
sustained over the centuries through various imperial rulers. The role of the district authority has 
varied over time and has included executive, judicial, and even military powers. The British 
retained the institution because it was engrained in the culture and suited the command-and-
control mode of British administration. The term “district collector” began to be used during the 
British colonial era primarily because of the function of revenue collection. Thus, since its 
origins, the pivotal administrative unit in a district has always been an agent of its principal 
(either an imperial ruler or a democratically elected government) notwithstanding the changes to 
which it adapts in its external environment. In particular, the role of the District Collector was 
increased significantly post-independence because of an expanding welfare state—a function 
alien to the institution prior to independence, to which it now had to re-orient itself. In spite of 
centuries of existence and volumes of literature on India’s public administration, Sadasivan 
(1988) notes that a theory of territorial administration has not emerged; instead, the “behavior of 
the administration is determined largely by expediency, ego-centrism and individual pragmatism, 
rather than by application of values, objectivity of action and spirit of public service” (p. xviii).  
As Krishnamachari (1962) informs us, a focus on re-orientation of the district 
administration to build the capacity of local governments has existed since the early planning 
period. Other than “law and order, administration of justice and functions specifically pertaining 
to revenue administration,” all other development planning and implementation was to be taken 
up by local governments (p. 33). Although local governments did not have constitutional status 
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until 1992, they were always envisioned as essential instruments of democratic governance 
organically connecting villages, districts, and states. By 1962, almost all states had passed 
legislation to set up democratically structured local governments units at the district and village 
levels. This administrative structure was sought to usher in an era of district-level decentralized 
planning. Paradoxically, even as institutional structures for decentralized planning and 
development were being created, the role of the District Collector gained further centrality. In 
this new role of overseeing development and welfare, the office of the District Collector was 
called upon to function, as it always had, as a unifying link between diverse and disparate local 
communities and the central government. These increasing functions have left the District 
Collector with little time to focus on anything concrete or substantial. Various accounts of the 
job inform us that, in their short tenure, most of the district collectors’ time is spent in 
understanding local politics and context, attending to protocol, conducting review meetings, and 
ensuring law and order. As a result, most district collectors are averse to trying anything 
innovative and simply seek to allow the status quo to continue (Dwivedi et al., 1989; Krishna, 
2010; Mitra, 2010).  
Moving away from a historical analysis and a general critique of the District Collector’s 
functioning, Sinha (2007) observes how states have used the District Collector’s office 
differently with respect to their relationship with local government, with some keeping the office 
at arm’s length and others maintaining a closer relationship, such as by making the District 
Collector the chairperson of the district-level local government unit. In either case, even as states 
continue to explore their relationship with local governments, they continually rely on the district 
collector’s office for “overall guidance, supervision, coordination and conflict resolution in the 
area of development administration” (p. 99). In the post-liberalization era, a district collector has 
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to coordinate the activities of a vibrant civil society that are providing social services and 
fighting for and representing human rights issues. In this context, we see that, even though new 
actors and institutional arrangements were created to reduce the centrality of the District 
Collector’s office, it has increased in relevance.  
 Sinha (2007) provides several examples of changes and adaptations at the district level 
as a result of privatization reforms. As a result of increasing demand for electricity, several small 
businesses in districts use privately manufactured power generators that run on diesel. The 
district collector’s job now includes collecting duties on the electricity consumption from such 
users in excess of their duty-free limit. Several internally conducted functions have been 
outsourced to private players; for example, the provision of photocopies in the district collector’s 
office, catering services, car maintenance and rental services. In some states, like Arunachal 
Pradesh, the rural health clinics have been given to a philanthropic charity for management under 
a public-private partnership. In all these instances, the role of the district collector continues to 
be relevant as a coordinator. Furthermore, a whole range of administrative reforms related to 
accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and simplification of services have been assigned 
to the district collector for implementation. An example is the implementation of the Right to 
Information Act, through which the district collector has the responsibility of “ensuring that the 
other offices in the district follow the law and arrange for provision of information as per rules” 
(A. K. S. Kumar et al., 2011, p. 116). The independent media further magnify the implications 
for accountability by keeping the district collector’s actions under constant surveillance. As an 
example of the district collector’s individual and institutional agency in providing for 
interlinkages between all reform efforts, Kumar discusses the role of a district collector who 
initiated the creation of a civil society organization comprising district officials, private citizens, 
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medical representatives, and local government members to assess the functioning of rural health 
clinics, suggest reforms, implement user fees and leverage the potential of the private sector 
where possible for specialized health services.   
In all these instances of change, the district collector’s office is “called upon increasingly 
to steer as well as to row” (Sinha 2007, p.125). While clearly there is evidence of a new 
orientation to the role of the district collector, it does not address the basic structural issues 
leading to diffused responsibility (Appleby, 1953; Caiden & Sundaram, 2004; Mitra, 2010). In 
fact, scholars have argued since the early planning era that any reform effort at the district 
collector level has only muddied the waters further:  
Experiment after experiment has been tried to reform it, but with every experiment, it has 
become more amorphous and functionally anomalous serving neither the cause of local 
democracy nor the traditional pattern of centralisation (Sadasivan, 1988, p. xx). 
Conclusion 
Before I proceed with discussing the prospects for engaging in collaborative goverance at 
the state and district level, a summary and implications of India’s administrative functioning as it 
evolved is in order. The basic administrative structure of India is one based on principles of 
centralized administration and on the basis of territorial administration, with a district as the 
basic unit of adminstration. It functions in a command and control mode that is rule-based, where 
responsibility moves vertically up the hierarchy, thus discouraging delegation of authority down 
the hierarchy. This basic administrative structure is ingrained in the Constitution of India to 
deliver on two key promises to its people: unity of the nation and equitable economic growth and 
democratic governance. Since the second promise cannot be delivered without assuring the first, 
the framers of the Constitution retained the administrative machinery that the British used to 
retain control over the vast, diverse and disparate Indian subcontinent. The British in turn 
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inherited a system of centralized and authoriratian territorial administration from the imperial 
rulers of the Indian subcontinent dating back to 323 B.C. Thus, unsurprisingly, any amount of 
candid discussion about the inability of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) to be flexible, 
democratic, or collaborative always circles back to its relevance for national unity.  
To the naked eye, India’s bureacuratic structures and their functioning look chaotic and 
even dysfunctional, but when seen through the lens of institutional evolution, this mesh of 
structures gains “legitimacy and strength by reducing uncertainity and providing a structure to 
everyday life” (Mitra, 2010 quoting North, 1990). Furthermore, the Constitution of India—an 
unalterable document of faith—further restricts and shapes bureacuratic interaction, and this 
provides added incentive for actors within these bureacuratic structures to adapt and evolve a 
system of certainity on a daily basis given the permanence of India’s basic administrative 
structures. In the next chapter, I introduce and operationalize the concept of a collaborative 
bureacurat. The collaborative bureacurat is the organizational actor within India’s civil service 
bureacuray (e.g., like the District Collector) who operates within rigid bureacuratic structures 
that are aimed strive toward centralization, while at the same time are mandated to operate in an 
environment which is committed to decentralization, devolution of power, and collaborative 
governance.   
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Chapter Three 
Era of the Collaborative Bureaucrat 
Introduction 
Examining the historical evolution of India’s forest and irrigation policy and their 
implementation regimes, Ebrahim (2004) argues that the “collaboration literature has only 
peripherally examined the institutional substructures that underlie cooperative endeavors” (p. 
210). To address this gap in the scholarship on collaboration in India, the previous chapter 
provided a historical context for the role of India’s civil service bureaucracy and what its 
implications are for democratic governance. From a historical perspective, I assessed the 
structural conditions underlying collaborative endeavors.  In this context, I posit that the 
historical evolution of India’s federal polity and democratic institutions has resulted in an 
interesting paradox: while the necessary structural pre-conditions to engage in collaborative 
governance have been created, the administrative structures upon which these institutions 
function make effective intergovernmental coordination and citizen participation a cumbersome 
bureaucratic exercise at best, and an elusive pursuit at worst. However, the reality of India’s 
public administration in the 21st century is that the civil service bureaucracy is being increasingly 
called upon to engage in boundary-spanning work to meet India’s development commitments to 
its people and the world. I refer to this as the era of the collaborative bureaucrat, a term that 
captures the inherent contradiction within India’s development administration.   
 Examining India’s commitment to and implementation of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) brings the above-described situation into sharp relief. At the turn of the 
millennium, the United Nations (UN) announced the commitment of its member states to 
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support, in a time-bound manner (2000-2015), the adoption and attainment of eight goals that 
came to be known as the MDGs. These goals address extreme poverty, HIV/AIDS, maternal and 
child health, primary education, and the environment. The UN and government of India 
recognize that “India remains home to one quarter of the world’s undernourished population, 
over a third of the world’s underweight children, and nearly a third of the world’s food-insecure 
people (2015, p. 6). India has played an active role in working with several global partnerships 
and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. Specifically, in the context of MDGs #4 and #5, while 
relate to reducing child mortality and improving maternal health, there is a focus on improving 
governance mechanisms, strengthening service delivery through better integration of services, 
and examining the management structures that deliver health services (Conseil, Mounier-Jack, & 
Coker, 2010; Grundy, 2010; Ryman, Dietz, & Cairns, 2008). In response, the government of 
India launched the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) with the aim of integrating all 
existing health and related programs onto one common implementation structure. In additon to 
providing an overarching implementation framework, the NRHM also provides financial 
asisstance to state governments to improve and strengthen health service delivery capacity. 
Effective implementation of NRHM is thus dependent on the extent to which state governments 
and, subsequently, district administrators within states adopt the implementation prescriptions of 
the central government.  
Implications for State-level Implementation of Collaborative Governance 
According to the Constitution of India, public health and health services (sanitation, 
hospitals, and clinics) are a state government’s prerogative in terms of policy legislation and 
administration, while overaching development goals of national importance (e.g., maternal and 
child health and disease control) are the central government’s prerogrative. As long as the state’s 
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laws on public health and health services are not directly in contradiction to the central 
government’s or against the spirit of the Constitution, they are valid.  
India’s aspirations to be a global power make it imperative for the central government to 
endorse the MDGs and commit state governments to their attainment through policy declarations 
and programs like the NRHM. At the same time, state-level health sector priorities are also valid. 
Additionally, health outcomes and service delivery at the state level are shaped by the unique 
cultural context and histories of each region. Thus, central and state government goals co-exist at 
the state level for bureaucrats to interpret and adapt to the local policy and administrative 
context. This is the starting point of the diffusion and confusion pervading the policy 
implementation environment. For example, in states like Andhra Pradesh (AP), tertiary health 
care has always been the focus of politicians and electoral campaigns, but the state lags behind in 
primary health care services, which is a sectoral focus of the NRHM. Thus, while senior 
bureaucrats from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) stationed in AP’s health ministry are 
implementing programs aimed at strengthening tertiary health care services, IAS officials 
heading other health departments within the same ministry are being called upon by the central 
government to improve primary health services in the context of the NRHM and MDGs.10 State-
level bureaucrats regularly attend meetings and conferences in the national capital to maintain 
their All-India focus, balance state needs with national priorities, and learn about what other state 
governments are doing.  
 
10 In principle, state governments will not object to the adoption and implementation of a program like the NRHM 
by bureaucrats who are inspired by the nationally championed program. This is because the NRHM provides a 
financial package to states, it helps in strengthening primary health care services in rural areas, and in return states 
cannot be held accountable for results or for the use of funds. This is a result of India’s federal system where states 
are seen as autonomous entities. Furthermore, the central government has always been benevolent with social sector 
funds to states, because it does not want to deprive the poor of resources just because the state government is unable 
to deliver on results. Thus, in this context, improved service delivery in desired, but not required.  
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The structural preconditions to collaborative governance inform us that the state health 
services bureaucracy will adopt NRHM’s basic principles and implementation prescriptions 
because: (a) the NRHM does not pose a threat to the authority of the lead agency at the state 
level; (b) NRHM does not question the basic administrative structure of the civil service 
bureacraucy, as the national program only  recommends the use or coordination of other 
institutions created for decentralized administration within the centrality of the department’s 
hierarchy; and (c) attaining NRHM goals further enhances the authority and legitimacy of the 
lead agency in the domain of of social sector development and decentralized administration. 
Thus, an enabling environment for agencies to engage in collaborative governance can be 
created. Similar to how a senior bureaucrat from the health department  attends conferences in 
the national capital, so do senior bureaucrats from other departments like Rural Development, 
Panchayati Raj (or Local Government), Women and Child Development, and Rural Water 
Works, to name a few. Here, everyone is exposed to the diffusion of ideas, information, and 
policy prescriptions about cross-sectoral partnerships and community engagement, which 
everybody gets exposed to. Thus, for the same reasons (as listed above) that the state 
government’s health department will adopt NRHM, other agencies will also embrace NRHM’s 
goals.  
 However, the extent to which an enabling environment at the state level can be translated 
into action at the district level is dependent on individual agency – that is, how a policy 
entreprenuer or a champion of collaboration can utilize the structural preconditions to their 
advantage. To the extent that a leader, particularly in a position of formal authority, can get 
senior bureacurats or fellow IAS colleagues on board with leverging the structural preconditions 
to collaborative governance, a new layer of institutional arrangements to enable coordination of 
65 
 
 
 
the collaborative initiatve are added to the existing mesh of structures at the state, district, and 
village levels. Such an arrangment brings into further relief how lines of responsibility and 
accountability cross agency boundaries at the state level. The structural preconditions 
demonstrate that senior state bureacurats have agreed to the coordination but not the 
administration of collaboration.  At the state level, this means the focus is not on decision 
making, action, assigning responsibility, or delegating authority, but on coordinating a 
laborious exercise of interministerial cross-referencing and consultation.  
Implications for District-level Implementation of Collaborative Governance 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, the centrality of the Disrict Collector’s role in 
deveopment administraiton has only increased in spite of efforts at decentralizing development 
administration.  District collectors are Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers in their mid-
career, and it is only for these two years of their potentially 30-year careers that they are the 
masters of all they survey. The role of a District Collector has evolved since independence; at 
present, it is that of a master coordinator. Several new institutions and actors have emerged at the 
district and village level, but all activities are coordinated through the authority vested with the 
Distirct Collector. . One reason why the District Collector remains the focus of development 
administratino is that state goverments have not fully transferred all administrative and fiscal 
powers to the local government institutions.11 Once a collaborative initiative is announced in the 
state capital through the issue of a Government Order (GO), the work of the District Collector 
begins. 
 
11 It should also be observed that senior state government bureaucrats are also IAS officers who have been through 
the phase of a district collector; a phase that is much cherished. The decision to transfer powers to local governments 
also has to be assessed and executed the very same senior IAS officers; why would they want to diminish the stature 
of such a beloved institution? 
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At the district level, no program can threaten the authority or centrality of the District 
Collector’s office. Even though field functionaires of various departments have their own 
hierarchy, they all come under the control of the District Collector—another source of diffused 
responsibility and confused accountability at the district and village level of administration. 
Given the District Collector’s position of formal authority, power, and respect, all programs pin 
their hopes on the District Collector to champion their cause.12 The word of the District Collector 
is sacrosanct; what the Collector cares about gets done (or at least appears to get done). A 
District Collector is expected to chair and coordinate several district-level committees 
comprising all departmental functionaries, local government representatives, and civil society. 
The report on State and District Administration (A. K. S. Kumar et al., 2011), examing the role 
of district collectors, finds that “many of them were not fully aware of how many committees 
they are required to preside over” (p. 70). 
The report finds that the collector is the chairperson for 50 committees in Andhra Pradesh 
and 43 in Assam. If, for example, in the context of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), 
there is a collaborative initiative between the Health, Rural Development, Panchayati Raj, and 
Women and Child Welfare departments to improve maternal and child health services with 
community participation and monitoring, the District Collector will be the de facto chairperson 
of that district-level committee as well. Thus, given these structural preconditions, it is possible 
for a collaborative initiative to exist at the district level as well. This is one way the institution 
seems to have responded to maintain the balance between championing the cause of 
 
12 Given that initiators of development programs are also IAS officers senior to the district collector, there is a 
certain level of collegiality that can be leveraged when it comes to policy implementation. 
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development programs (by coordinating institutions engaged in decentralized administration) 
and retaining its centrality and authority.  
During the two-year duration, the Collector has to understand the local context, politics, 
adhere to routine protocol, ensure law and order, collect tax revenue, attend to judicial matters, 
chair numerous committess, and champion development programs. Additionally, the role of the 
district collector is absolutely critical during times of communal violence, natural disasters, or 
national, state or local elections, when all other programs are relegated. It is no wonder that 
scholars since the time of Appleby (1953) have concluded that the District Collector is 
responsible for everything and to everybody; there is simply no mechanism to hold the Collector 
accountable for the time spent on a particular program, and all departmental heads in the state 
and ministerial heads in the central government (who have worked as district collectors 
themselves) are aware of this. Structurally, the collector is appointed by the central government 
of India, even though the collector is in charge of administering all state and local programs. 
Thus, the district collector’s office is the hub through which the lines of responsibility and 
accountability of every national, state and local program travel from the villages to the state or 
central government. This situation is the manifestation of diffused responsibility and confused 
accountability in full bloom.  
Nonetheless, such a mesh of structures can still accommodate a collaborative initiative, 
and such an initiative can actually be activitated if the collector decides to focus on it amongst 
the myriad programs that exist. Research about the district collector’s functioning stops at this 
point; how and why collectors aligns their goals to national or state programs, what trade-offs are 
considered and where the incentives lie are issues that have yet to be examined. No systematic 
research exists, but the general perception is that District Collectors focus on programs that are 
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championed by the state’s chief executive or pursue individual interests and passions. It is thus a 
foregone conclusion the District Collector cannot be held accountable for the results of a 
collaborative initiative, as their role is only that of a coordinator. As explained earlier, the 
situation is similar at the state level, where senior bureacurats are also only facilitators of 
coordinating arrangements. The structural preconditions to collaborative governance thus show 
that a collaborative initiative can be initiated at the state-level and brought to the district-level for 
operationalization only by the District Collector.  
Implications for Village-level Implementation of Collaborative Governance 
At the cutting edge of government (i.e., at the village level where services are delivered), 
the lines of responsibility and accountability are relatively clear, primarily because field 
functionaries are engaged in service delivery. There is little ambiguity as to where responsibility 
lies in the administrative structure of field functionaries (e.g., health, nutrition, sanitation, or 
water works or local government representatives). The field functionaries are recruited at the 
state level by individual departments, and they stay within those departments throughout their 
careers – completely the opposite situation of those who initiate, design, and operationalize 
development programs. However, the situation is not as clear as it appears, because the 
administrative structures of field functionaires share dual accountability to the District Collector 
and their departmental hierarchy. In this context, initiatives like Maarpu aims to bring about 
clarity at the village-level—by brining service delivery beneficiaries and their service providers 
on to the same platfrom, Maarpu aims to clearly establish lines of responsibility and 
accountability. On the other hand, it would be naïve to think that the administrative structures 
supporting field functionaries that have also existed since the time of independence have not 
evolved to adapt to such a situation. 
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When the entire administrative structure, from the central government to the state to the 
district, is enmeshed in diffused responsibility, why should the field functionaries be part of 
collaborative governance structures where lines of responsibility are clear? When it comes to the 
results of a collaborative initiative, it does not makes sense to say that the buck stops at the 
village-level functionary, when lines of responsibility upward in the hierarchy are diffused. 
Research on implementation of public programs in India has ignored this interaction between 
different levels of hierarchy and have not studied how village-level administrative structures and 
actors have adapted to such a situation or the implications of such adaptation for effective 
implementation of collaborative endeavors. Thus, if there is a collaborative initiative among field 
functionaries from Health, Rural Development, Panchayati Raj, and Women and Child Welfare 
to improve maternal and child health services with community participation and monitoring, 
village-level administrative structures will perceive this as a threat to their authority. At the 
cutting edge, then, implementation  is not about coordination but rather about administration, 
involving decisions, action, review, and evaluation—the analysis of the India’s administrative 
structures  indicate that the entire administrative structure is accustomed to avoiding action-
oriented administration. Engaging in action-oriented administration also disturbs the certainty 
that has been acquired over the years as a result of adapting to administrative structures that 
manifest with diffused responsibility.  
Conclusion: Key Propositions Regarding The Collaborative Bureaucrat 
Bureaucrats operating in a centralized, command-and-control mode of administration at 
all levels of government are being called upon to collaborate across departmental bounadaries 
and with citizens. Thus, India’s attainment of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and its 
own development goals is dependent on the extent to which the collaborative bureaucrat is able 
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to navigate through the basic administrative structures. The term collaborative bureaucrat refers 
to the current situation of government officials who are working within the “steel frame” of 
India’s administrative structures yet whose role has changed from ruling over to administering 
for the people. In this section, I have discussed the implications of diffused responsibility, which 
is a result of how India’s administrative structures evolved, for state, district and village 
administrative units to better contextualize the calls for intergovernmental coordination and 
citizen participation to effectively implement maternal and child health services. The historical 
evolution of India’s basic administrative structures and the creation of decentralized institutions 
form the preconditions to informing public administration scholars in understanding the extent to 
which, and under what conditions, collaborative governance can be implemented effectively. 
Based on my literature review and analysis, I form three key propositions, one at each level of 
the administrative hierarchy: 
1. State level: I expect department heads to facilitate collaborative initiatives, because 
lines of responsibility for senior officials are diffused and cannot be easily 
ascertained. 
2. District level: I expect formal authority to play a key role in the adoption of 
collaborative governance, but only to the extent that it is not perceived as a threat to 
historically acquired agency authority, and legitimacy. 
3. Village level: I expect the implementation of collaborative governance to be 
ineffective and problematic where participating administrative structures have, over 
the years, acquired the ability, legitimacy, and authority to operate in an environment 
of diffused responsibility. 
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At the state-level, departments like Health, Rural Development, Panchayati Raj, and 
Women and Child Development, which are engaged in improving maternal and child health 
services with community participation and monitoring, I expect that a collaborative initiative can 
easily be forged (on paper). This is different from our conventional understanding of 
bureaucracies as protective of their autonomy and thus naturally averse to adopting collaborative 
arrangements. However, the extent to which departments actually engage in collaboration will 
depend on the extent to which the administrative structures are formed based on centralized or 
decentralized authority. Since some departments, like Health and Women and Child 
Development, are based on a command-and-control mode of administration, while some 
departments within Rural Development, like the District Rural Development Agencies (DRDA) 
and Self-Help Groups (SHGs), are based on decentralized administration, I expect the quality of 
collaboration to be influenced by the forces of centralization and decentralization.  
At the district-level of administration, I expect to find that formal authority will play a 
key role in the adoption of collaborative governance, but only to the extent that it is not 
perceived as a threat to historically acquired agency, authority, and legitimacy. This means that 
district-level officials are ready to adopt a collaborative initiative only if they can continue 
working in their bureaucratic silos even as they play the role of coordinators. If departments have 
to share budgets and staff, there will be resistance, but if district officials are given the role of 
coordinators while sitting atop their administrative hierarchy, then they will adopt the 
collaborative initiative. A comparison with the government of India’s Joint Forest Management 
(JFM) initiative articulates this point better. Under JFM, forest officials are expected to hand 
over certain forest land to the communities to manage; an analogous example would be asking 
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Health to hand over or involve the community in the management of the village health clinics. 
Such an action would lead to resistance. 
Finaly, at the village-level, I expect the implementation of collaborative governance to be 
ineffective and problematic where participating administrative structures have over the years 
acquired the ability, legitimacy, and authority to operate in an environment of diffused 
responsibility. Using community participation to monitor and evaluate services as a governance 
mechanism enables policy makers to actually pin down responsibility and accountability in an 
administrative system in which these qualities are otherwise elusive. This is where the appeal of 
collaborative governance lies in the context of India and development administration. However, 
the analysis of structural preconditions informs us that such a mechanism will be seen by village-
level administrators as a threat to their authority and legitimacy for two reasons. First, it poses a 
threat to the existence of prevelant practices and creates uncertainity because responsibility and 
accountability can now be speedily ascertained by local communities – a practice that is alien to 
these administrative structures that have always looked up the hierarchy for evaluation. Second, 
it makes field functionaries question the fairness of such an arranagement wherein responsibility 
is clear down the hierarchy but diffused up the hierarchy. This issue is significant because 
community participation and decentralized administration, as tools of policy implementation in 
the context of India’s development agenda, are expected to improve the quality of governance. 
Thus, village-level collaborative governance is a direct threat to the acquired authority and 
legitimacy of these institutions, because at this level functionaries are engaged not in 
coordination but in the real work of implementation.  
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A common theme throughout the three propositions, ironically, is that collaboration is 
likely to be adopted where lines of responsibility are diffused but not where they are clear.13 
What is needed is a systematic examination of the implementation of a collaborative governance 
initiative in a subnational context—at the state, district and village levels of administration. 
Further research is needed to test the above propositions to explore the extent to which, and the 
circumstances under which, the collaborative bureaucrat causes a collaborative effort to be 
successful or unsuccesful. Indeed, the term collaborative bureaucrat is an oxymoron, suggesting 
that the Indian bureaucracy, based on its historical evolution and structural preconditons, is both 
a knight in shining armor and a rusted steel frame. The collaborative bureaucrat operates within 
administrative structures whose essential purpose is to ensure an indestructible union, wherein 
improved governance is desired but is not required.   
  
 
13 Ebrahim (2004) study on India’s forest and irrigation departments finds that where property rights are diffused and unclear, 
there is space for working with citizens. In the case of the irrigation department, water as a resource is a common resource 
property. However, in the case of the forest department, land rights are clearly allocated, and the department is protective of its 
property and unwilling to manage these lands with the community.  
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Chapter Four 
Nature of the Beast: What Type of Organization is India’s Government 
Bureaucracy? 
 
Since the maintenance dynamic is all-pervasive throughout the organization, why 
is it not sufficiently potent to result in highly rigid and unchanging structures? 
Without question there is considerable resulting stability, but there is also growth, 
expansion, and change in almost all social systems. In fact, one of the basic 
properties of social systems of the bureaucratic type is that they move toward 
maximization, toward growth and expansion (Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 97). 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter draws on organizational theory to develop an analytical framework to 
capture organizational influences across India’s decentralized administrative levels. This chapter 
is based on the premise that organization matters—that is, that a bureaucrat’s decision-making 
process is influenced by the nature of the organization and its structures. The central argument of 
this chapter is that organizational structures are paradoxical—they are rational, natural, open, and 
political at the same. The chapter begins by first understanding how organizations address this 
administrative paradox. I then articulate the organizational characteristics of administrative 
structures that are shaped by rational, natural, open, and political influences. The chapter then 
applies this explication of multiple perspectives from organization theory to the context of 
India’s civil service bureaucracy. I posit that the net effect of addressing the administrative 
paradox is that India’s public bureaucracies expand to adapt and strive to maintain stability; and 
this has profound implications for the implementation of collaborative governance initiatives. 
What emerges from this chapter is an analytical framework called the implementation scorecard 
that examines how the following functions: technical (rational system), managerial (natural 
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system), institutional (open system), and political (political theory of organization) unfold at each 
administrative-level within India’s bureaucracy organization: state, district and village.  
Understanding How Organizations Resolve the Administrative Paradox 
What emerges from Chapters 2, 3, and 4 is that the evolution of India’s federal polity and 
democratic institutions has resulted in an interesting paradox: while the necessary institutional 
pre-conditions to engage in collaborative governance have been created, the administrative 
structures upon which these institutions function make effective intergovernmental coordination 
and citizen participation a cumbersome bureaucratic exercise at best and an elusive pursuit at 
worst. However, the reality of India’s public administration in the 21st century is that the civil 
service bureaucracy is increasingly called upon to engage in boundary-spanning work to meet 
India’s development commitments to its people and the world. I refer to this as the era of the 
collaborative bureaucrat, a term that captures the inherent contradiction within India’s 
development administration. How can we make sense of such a contradiction? Is it possible for 
public bureaucracies to emerge as efficient and flexible institutions while at the same retaining 
their rigid organizational structures? How can we understand the influence of such paradoxical 
organizational structures on the bureaucrat? What is the nature of the organization within which 
India’s bureaucrats operate? To explicate the relationship between organizational structures and 
bureaucratic decision making, I situate the collaborative bureaucrat within the broader 
organizational theory literature to be view their decision making process from different vantage 
points.    
This analytical insight is aligned with the central thesis of James D. Thompson’s classic 
work Organizations in Action , which is that organizations are open systems, but they strive to be 
rational. Thompson (2008, p.148) refers to this as the paradox of administration:   
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If the basic function of administration involves shooting at a moving target of co-
alignment, in which the several components of that target are themselves moving, 
then we can expect the central characteristic of administrative process to be a 
search for flexibility. Yet our theme throughout has been one of reduction of 
uncertainty and its conversion into relative certainty. How do we meet this 
apparent paradox? (Thompson, 2008, p. 148) 
Thompson begins to address this paradox by acknowledging that all three perspectives 
(rational, natural and open systems) are applicable to a single organization. Next, Thompson 
(2008, p. 10) provides a framework (adapted from Parsons, 1960) to locate where these 
perspectives’ influences would be most likely felt in the organization. The three organizational 
locations “exhibit three distinct levels of responsibility and control—technical, managerial, and 
institutional” (p.10; emphasis in original). Each of these three levels is essentially “a 
suborganization” within the larger organization.  
The technical core deals with all the organizational activities (e.g., classes administered 
by teachers, passenger and freight trains being operated, administration and monitoring of 
vaccinations). The managerial core relates to the decision making processes involved in 
supplying the necessary inputs (i.e., resources) to deliver the outputs. The role of the managerial 
core is to administer the technical activities (e.g., preparing plans and supplying the needed 
materials to provide vaccinations for 100 villages). This work involves the full chain of 
administration: the supply side (inputs, activities, programs) and the demand side (monitoring 
services to ensure they are delivered). Lastly, the institutional core subsumes the technical and 
managerial core as it is “also part of a wider social system which is the source of the ‘meaning’, 
legitimation, or higher-level support which makes the implementation of the organization’s goals 
possible” (p. 11).  
Thus, in Thompsons’s analysis of the “complex organization as an open system subject to 
criteria of rationality” (p. 11), the technical core is closest to the closed system (where the 
77 
 
 
 
functions within this suborganization work toward reducing the number of variables affecting its 
operations, thereby reducing uncertainty); the institutional core is influenced by the open-system 
perspective (where the organization has little control over which environmental variables affect 
functioning, thus generating a high degree of uncertainty); and the managerial core’s function is 
to bring about an equilibrium between the technical and institutional cores (i.e., the natural 
system perspective, where the role of the executive is to understand the internal and external 
environment to work towards the organization’s goals). 
I now turn to how we might resolve the paradox of administration. For Thompson (2008, 
p. 150): 
…the dual searches of certainty and flexibility, to a large extent revolves around 
the dimension of time. In the short run, administration seeks the reduction or 
elimination of uncertainty in order to score well assessments of technical 
rationality. In the long run, however, we would expect administration to strive for 
flexibility through freedom from commitment 
While Thompson’s time dimension makes intuitive sense, in an empirical context it 
might need a high degree of translation. In Thompson’s analysis of the time dimension, long run 
organizational concerns will be prioritized at the institutional level or “at the upper reaches” of 
the organization, while at the technical core (presumably the lower levels of the hierarchy) short 
run concerns are prioritized. However, such a scheme does not suit the singularity of a 
government bureau, where senior executives are either political appointees (as in the US) or 
senior civil servants who occupy short-term senior positions (as in the Indian Administrative 
Service); thus, in both cases, given the short duration of their positions, political expediency or 
short-term goals to prove their credibility assume the highest priority. On the other hand, at the 
technical level, where career bureaucrats operate for a longer duration than their senior 
executives, long-run organizational concerns are likely to be given greater weight over reform 
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agendas instituted by senior executives with short-run agendas. In this study, I propose to resolve 
this paradox through the concept of stability, which is more germane than short run and long run 
goal prioritization to a government bureaucracy. I define stability as the organizational tendency 
towards formalization and institutionalization. In my view, the search for flexibility and the need 
to reduce uncertainty ultimately results in organizations looking for a compromise that ensures 
organizational stability and survival. In a later section, I return to explicating this notion of 
stability in the context of a bureaucratic organization that is rational, natural, open, and political. 
However, Thompson’s (2008) analytical framework synthesizing different organizational 
perspectives does not cover the political nature of organizational structures, which is singular to 
the government bureaucracy. Intuitively, a case can be made that the political core is most 
influential at the institutional level where political actors and senior officials operate. 
Alternatively, it can be argued that the political core is a function that runs through the 
organization across all functional locations but that its effect varies across the locations. 
Nevertheless, the addition of the political dimension further consolidates Thompson’s position 
that organizations are characterized by an administrative paradox of flexibility (new structures 
are created each time public authority or political power changes hands) and certainty (political 
actors encumber the organization with more structures to ensure certainty beyond their duration 
of power). What emerges from this discussion is that the bureaucratic organization’s structures 
are rational, natural, open, and political. In the following section, I briefly examine the use of 
organization theory in public administration and explain the characteristics of each of these 
organizational perspectives before synthesizing and contextualizing them to the study at hand.  
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Applying Organization Theory to Public Bureaucracies 
The use of organization theory to understand public bureaucracies is not new to public 
administration or political science, but it has waned over the years, leaving extant literature on 
public bureaucracies devoid of the perspectives of organization theory (Christensen 2014; Moe, 
1995). Tracing the emergence, decline and evolution of various traditions of organizational 
theory from the classical rational model (Weber, Gulick), to the natural systems approach 
(Chester Bernard), to bounded rationality (Simon and March), to open systems and population 
ecology models (Katz and Kahn, DiMaggio and Powell), Terry M. Moe Moe (1991) contends 
that “two relatively new schools of organizational thought now attract most of the attention—one 
economic, the other sociological” (p. 120). While the economic mode “is built around the 
rationality of organization and its theoretical trappings—goals, efficiency, the individual, the 
instrumental value of formal structure,” the sociological school of thought “has always taken 
delight in trashing all this: highlighting the nonrational and the downright irrational, insisting that 
goals and efficiency and formal structure have little to do with what really happens, and 
anchoring its explanations in the characteristics of society rather than the choices of the 
individuals” (p. 120). Insisting that neither mode fully captures the complexity of a bureaucratic 
organization, Terry M. Moe (1984, 1989, 1991, 1995, 2013) has been vocal about the integrating 
politics and administration into a political theory for public bureaucracies that is built on the 
economic theory of organization.  
 The purpose of this chapter is not to develop an integrated organizational theory of the 
public bureaucracy but rather to draw upon various streams of organization theory to understand 
the bureaucratic organization holistically and understand how organizational structures in a 
public bureaucracy emerge and influence the bureaucrat engaged in the implementation process. 
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Given that organizational actors’ “views and skills” are shaped by their “organizational positon” 
(Wilson 1989, p. 24), the exposition of multiple organizational perspectives also helps in 
understanding how organizational actors might engage in the implementation process. 
Thus, I situate the collaborative bureaucrat within these coexisting organizational influences. The 
collaborative bureaucrat of this study operates at the intersection of these organizational 
structures, which are shaped by concerns for efficiency and rationality, environmental pressures, 
and political interests; thus, essentially, these organizational structures are conceptually at odds 
with each other. To navigate this mess of structures, the collaborative bureaucrat is compelled to 
engage in bureaucratic politics during the implementation process.  
Given the long history of organizational theory literature, from the classical scholars of 
the progressive era to the more recent scholars examining the new institutional economics, 
several typologies and classifications of organizational theories exist (Christensen, 2014; Scott, 
2003; Tompkins, 2006). There is considerable overlap in the conceptual development of various 
schools of thought, and the classifications are not watertight. W. Richard Scott (2003) presents a 
“layered model” under two main categories: closed system models and open system models, 
each of which classify the organizational schools of thought chronologically from 1900-1970 as 
rational or natural models and further categorize these groups by the level of analysis (social-
psychological, structural, or ecological) (p. 109). Christensen (2014) provides an overview of the 
developments in organization theory by describing four broad categories of models: 1) those in 
which formal structure and the limited cognitive abilities of individuals making decisions 
matters; 2) those based on rational, self-interested, and utility-maximizing individuals; 3) those 
from the cultural-institutional perspective, which posits the adaptive nature of organizations with 
respect to their environment, where institutions eventually develop their own set of norms to 
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guide decision making, and 4) those in which the environment drives the decision making 
process.  
Tompkins (2005)  describes 11 schools of organizational thought classified by 
chronological development from the 1890s-1990s: bureaucracy, scientific management, 
administrative management, pre-human relations, human relations, natural systems, structural-
functional, open systems, human resources, quality management, and organizational culture and 
leadership. These schools of thought are broadly arranged under four categories of models based 
on the degree of flexibility, control, internal and external focus: open systems (flexible and 
external focus), human relations (flexible and internal focus), internal process (centralized and 
internal focus), and rational goal (centralized and external focus). In addition to these schools of 
thought, and relevant to the study at hand, I also examine Moe’s (1984; 1989; 1991; 1995; 2013) 
literature on developing a political theory of organization, because of its explicit focus on the 
political nature of organizational structures.  
  Figure 1 visually situates the collaborative bureaucrat at the intersection of multiple 
organizational influences. The collaborative bureaucrat and the organizational structures are 
placed within the larger context of a society, because a nation’s public administration systems 
are a reflection of the society in which they function. Given that multiple organizational 
influences act upon the collaborative bureaucrat, the following sections discuss attributes of 
administrative structures that are shaped by rational, natural, open, and political influences.  
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Figure 1: Organizationally Situating the Collaborative Bureaucrat (TCB)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rational Model 
Scott (2003) defines a rational organizations as “oriented to the pursuit of relatively 
specific goals and exhibiting relatively highly formalized social structures” (p. 27). The purpose 
of having specific goals is to “provide unambiguous criteria for selecting among alternative 
activities” and to guide “decisions about how the organizational structure itself is to be designed” 
(p. 34).  The key characteristic of a formal organization is that its structures are “formalized to 
the extent that the rules governing behavior are precisely and explicitly formulated and to the 
extent that role and role relations are prescribed independently of the personal attributes and 
relations of individuals occupying positions in the structure” (p. 35). In effect, the purpose of 
formal structures in an organization is to ensure predictable behavior among employees.  
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 Another important attribute of formal structures is that they are impersonal – that is, they 
are “rendered independent of the participation of any particular individual” (p. 37). Thus, it 
becomes less important to select talented or charismatic individuals, because the individuals 
derive their power, influence, and charisma from the formal structure or position they occupy 
within the organization. A consequence of clearly specified goals and formal structures is that 
they enable policy makers and planners to “diagram the social structures and the work flows, 
allowing them to depict relationships and processes with the possibility of consciously 
manipulating them—designing and redesigning the division of responsibilities, the flow of 
information or materials, or the ways in which participants report to one another” (p. 36). This 
aspect of formal organizations helps explain policy makers’ and planners’ many attempts to 
reform civil service bureaucracies across the world, including management by objectives 
(MBO); planning, programming, and budgeting systems (PPBS); outcome budgeting; and or 
performance-management-related reforms like PART (Program Assessment Rating Tool) in the 
US and RFD (Results Framework Document) in India.    
To further understand the attributes of public bureaucracies from a rational model 
perspective, it is instructive to examine Max Weber’s description of the ideal-type bureaucracy. 
According to Tompkins (2005), Weber considered the bureaucratic organization to be more 
rational than preceding administrative forms (e.g., chiefdoms and patriarchal/matriarchal 
systems) because of its focus on technical expertise and rules. Weber clearly articulated the role 
of power and authority in administration, stating that “the exercise of power is most effective 
when the authority of those exercising power is regarded as legitimate by the people who are 
expected to obey” (p. 43). Scott (2003) and Tompkins (2005) insist that Weber’s views on 
bureaucracy are misinterpreted out of context to underscore Weber’s view that the bureaucratic 
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organization was the perfect form of administration. Rather, Weber’s analysis of the historical 
evolution of Western societies from belief in traditional and spiritual systems to a system of law, 
rules, and scientific explanations led him to observe that, compared to previous governance 
regimes designed to ensure the dominance of an individual ruler or group, “the bureaucratic form 
is systematically organized to achieve specific purposes such as justice, economic prosperity, or 
social well-being” (Tompkins, 2005, p. 46). 
 The bureaucratic organization in modern societies is thus formed on the legal-rational 
principle, which is based on a system of laws, rules, obedience to positions of formal authority, 
and the legitimacy of those in such formal positions to exercise power and administer. Thus, 
compared to the charismatic leader or traditional groups, legal-rational authority is relatively 
impersonal. It is in this context that we need to understand Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy and 
its attributes, including fixed official duties, hierarchy of authority, system of rules, technical 
expertise, career service, and written documentation (Tompkins, 2005, p. 49). For Weber, these 
structural characteristics made the bureaucratic organization the most “technically efficient of the 
many historical forms of administration” (p. 48).  
Weber’s conceptualization of the ideal-type bureaucracy is, however, merely a concept; it 
does not provide a theoretical explanation as to why public bureaucracies today bear the brunt of 
criticism and are subjected to relentless pressures to be efficient, cut waste, and reform. In 
Weber’s descriptive analysis of the ideal-type bureaucracy, he purposefully omitted the 
“‘irrational elements’ affecting the performance of bureaucratic institutions, including politics, 
personalities and human emotions” (p. 54). While later advances in organization theory helped 
fill this gap, Weber’s isolation of the irrational elements to create the concept of an ideal-type 
bureaucracy is not only valuable but also a necessary starting point for any analysis of an 
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organization, its participants or its activities. The limitations associated with public bureaucracies 
are primarily focused on the three key aspects of Weber’s ideal-type conceptualization of a 
bureaucracy: centralization, specialization, and formalization. When these three aspects are taken 
to an extreme, the performance of a bureaucratic organization is undermined. Tompkins (2005, 
p. 55) refers to this as the Weberian orthodoxy – that is, the case in which managers adopt the 
doctrine that “the administratively efficient organization must be highly centralized, reflect a 
clear chain of command from top to bottom, place a heavy emphasis on accountability and 
control, and achieve a high degree of work routinization.” This orthodox frame of thinking is a 
useful explanation to understand why bureaucratic actors resist changes to alternate forms of 
administration that diverge from the model that reflects Weber’s ideal-type attributes.  
Weber’s bureaucratic organization is an abstraction. In reality, it is instructive to 
understand the bureaucratic nature of an organization as a variable, as the level of centralization, 
specialization, and formalization varies depending on the type of work in which an organization 
is involved and the societal-context in which it operates. A common criticism of the rational 
model of organizations is that it does not consider the influences and interactions with the 
environment (i.e., they are closed systems). Furthermore, the rational model of organizations 
examines the characteristics of the structure but not of its participants; that is, rational theorists 
only celebrate normative structure and ignore behavioral structure (Scott 2003, p. 55).  
The internal structures within the rational model (e.g., goal specificity, formalization, 
centralization, specialization, authority, power and allegiance to formal structures) are 
universally applicable to all bureaucratic organizations. While this is a necessary starting point in 
organizational analysis, it not sufficient to understand how bureaucratic actors behave or how 
organizations and their environments interact with each other. This gap is addressed by 
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organization theory, which explicitly incorporates environmental influences and interactions as 
part of its analysis to explain organizational performance. I now move from the rational model to 
the natural systems and open systems model, which explicitly acknowledge the external 
environment’s influence on shaping an individual’s behavior and organizational structures. The 
natural systems model gives greater emphasis to the role of the executive, while the open 
systems model gives greater emphasis to the external environment.          
Natural Systems Model 
The focus of the natural systems perspective is on behavioral rather than normative 
structure. The focus moves from the rational model’s emphasis on how employees ought to 
behave to how employees actually behave within an organizational setting. The natural systems 
view does not take for granted that employees (i.e., participants within an organization) will 
subscribe to organizational goals or behave in a predictable manner. Because organizational 
actors are assumed to pursue their own goals and interests, the goals here are more complex and 
diffused than in the rational model. From a natural systems perspective, participants within 
organizations “are pursuing multiple interests, both disparate and common, [but] recognize the 
value of perpetuating the organization as an important resource. The informal structure of 
relations that develops among participants is more influential in guiding the behavior of 
participants than is the formal structure” (W. Richard Scott, 2003, p. 28). 
 In this view, public bureaucracies are living organisms that seek to maintain themselves 
and survive in uncertain environments. The internal structures “are seen partly as products of 
rational planning and partly as spontaneous, adaptive responses to threats to the system’s 
equilibrium” (Tompkins, 2005, p. 184). In the context of this systems-mode of analysis, the 
organization is seen to be adaptive (i.e., seeking new goals and leaving behind old goals) to 
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survive and be relevant, as well as to be characterized by a high degree of interdependence 
between its component parts. Because the focus of social groups within the organization is to 
ensure their survival (and that of the organization), all their energies are directed towards 
‘maintenance’ of the organization. This process often involves adapting to changing 
circumstances both inside and outside the organization. For this reason, “there is frequently a 
disparity between the stated and the ‘real’ goals pursued by organizations” (Scott, 2003, p. 57). 
Natural system analysts devote much attention to the maintenance function within organizations; 
in fact, organizations spend resources not only on products and services but also to “create 
overhead staff agencies and install new management systems to promote system maintenance, 
only to have them become sources of friction and inefficiency themselves” (Tompkins, 2005, p. 
191). Thus, as a result of pursing the maintenance function, organizational participants diverge 
from the organization’s formal goals to pursue informal goals leading to overall goal complexity.  
 Another important attribute of organizations from a natural systems perspective is the 
existence of informal structures. Natural systems theorists acknowledge the presence of formal 
structures but consider their effectiveness limited for governing the behavior of individual actors 
within an organization. While it is true, as seen from the rational model perspective, that the role 
of formal structures is to ensure that organizations operate “independently of the characteristics 
of the individual actors,” informal structures are “based on the personal characteristics of the 
individual actors” (Scott, 2003, p. 59). In effect, a manager or supervisor in a formal structure 
exercises power and authority based on the position occupied, while power and authority in an 
informal structure is based on interpersonal relationships and individual charisma. According to 
this perspective, the informal structures co-exist with the formal structure, leading to a structured 
and ordered pattern of “informal norms and behavior patterns: status and power systems, 
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communication networks, sociometric structures, and working arrangements” (p. 59). These 
informal structures are prevalent at not only the lower but also the upper levels of bureaucratic 
organizational hierarchy.  
 In The Functions of the Executive Barnard (1968) traversed the formal and informal 
organization; internal and external environment; economic and organizational motives of 
organizational actors; and rational, natural systems, and population ecological models to present 
a comprehensive theory of organization and its actors (Williamson, 1994). From Barnard’s 
perspective, those occupying positions of formal authority and power in a public bureaucracy 
need to create incentives so that the net contribution of the organization’s participants, who are 
constantly engaged in a process of adapting to changes in their environment (i.e., by pursing 
multiple goals and interests), will be in favor of the organization. Thus, for Barnard, 
organization’s survival is the ultimate test of its success (Carroll, 1985). 
 Barnard believed that employees’ compliance to formal authority cannot be taken for 
granted and that certain conditions must be met for orders to be followed. For Barnard, 
compliance with formal institutional directions rests on legitimacy and consent. Employees will 
give their consent and perceive orders as legitimate under four conditions: they must “understand 
the directive, believe that it is consistent with the organization’s purpose, believe that it is 
compatible with [their] personal interests, and be able to comply with it mentally and physically” 
(Tompkins 2005, p. 195). Barnard believed that these conditions are generally met because most 
managers do not give orders that are inconsistent with organizational goals and because most 
organizational actors (managers and employees) do not wish to challenge authority and 
destabilize the organizational equilibrium (because it is not in their own interests if the 
organization’s survival is in jeopardy). However, if managers in positions of formal authority use 
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coercive mechanisms to ensure compliance, then the zone of indifference is reduced, and 
employees will withdraw from their contributions or participate in unpredictable ways if they 
feel the burden of compliance is more than the inducements being offered.  
Thus, for the most part, Barnard’s thesis on inducements and contributions suggests that 
organizational actors operate in structures that strategically evolve, adapt, and are designed by 
those in positions of formal authority to control outcomes. However, the natural systems 
perspective does not explain why the results of implementing programs vary widely from context 
to context. To understand this, I now turn to the open systems perspective, where the focus shifts 
to the external environment in shaping organizational structures and outcomes.  
Open System Model 
 From an open system perspective, managers do not control outcomes, and the focus is on 
the exchanges between the organization and its environment. “From an open system perspective, 
environments shape, support, and infiltrate organizations” (Scott, 2003, p. 29). External elements 
play a more critical role than internal elements in organizations that are viewed as open systems. 
From this perspective, organizations or social systems are open systems in which there is a 
constant exchange of “materials, energy, and information with their environments so that they 
can renew themselves and continue to grow” (Tompkins, 2005, p. 241). Because of this intimate 
relationship, organizations closely mirror the socio-cultural structures of their environments.  
According to Scott (2003), the component parts of an open system organization are 
loosely arranged or coupled (p. 83). An organizational implication of this loose arrangement is 
that normative structures (how employees ought to behave) differ from behavioral structures 
(how employees actually behave). From a natural systems perspective, Barnard’s organizational 
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theory is essentially aimed at guiding executives in positions of formal authority to ensure closer 
alignment between the normative and behavioral structures. From an open system perspective, 
the pervasive influence of the external environment means that this divergence is an 
organizational reality; there can be no efforts to bridge the gap, because this gap itself is seen as 
a mechanism of an organization’s survival. The divergence between normative and behavioral 
structures manifests when there is a “weak connection between ‘talk’ and ‘action’ in 
organizations” (Scott, 2003, p. 88). Another example of this divergence is observed when 
organizational charts of large bureaucratic organizations depict a highly interrelated hierarchical 
structure, tightly coupled and designed to ensure that a change in one component results in a 
predictable change in another component, but in reality the various component parts behave 
autonomously. This leads Scott (2003, p. 88) to conclude that open system theorists “propose to 
view the key participants in organizations not as a unitary hierarchy or as an organic entity, but 
as a loosely linked coalition of shifting interest groups.” 
The central premise of Katz and Kahn’s (1978) classic treatise The Social Psychology of 
Organizations is that once formal organizational structures are created, they “generate pressures 
of their own survival and enhancement” (p. 83). The technical structures, with their focus on 
organizational efficiency, are primarily responsible for task completion and, over the course of 
time, develop a certain set of skills, training, and methods to attain their goals. However, it 
cannot be taken for granted that these technical structures will move towards a higher level of 
efficiency or optimum functioning; factors such as motivational and loyalty issues might cause 
their development to plateau. At the same time, an organization develops maintenance structures 
for “maintaining stability and predictability in the organization” (Katz and Kahn 1978, p. 85; 
emphasis in original), resulting in organizational rigidity and desire to maintain status quo. If 
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changes are incorporated, this is done with a focus on ensuring the ratios of the adjusted parts 
remains same. The most common mechanism to ensure stability is the tendency “toward 
formalization or institutionalization” of organizational activities like employee selection, 
socialization, training, incentives, rules and regulations to control behavior and reward 
obedience, and decisions “made on the basis of precedence” (p. 86). 
Thus, in the short term, the easiest way to ensure organizational survival is to maintain 
the status quo – the key attribute of an organization’s maintenance structures. In the long term, 
however, there will be pressures to change, and the maintenance structures will respond in the 
interest of their own continuance and organizational survival. However, this change happens 
slowly within the maintenance structures, because these are the most inward-looking and 
insulated structures of an organization. The pressures to change is most directly and immediately 
felt by structures that are closest to the external environment (e.g., marketing, sales, and 
production departments). The insulated maintenance structures respond when they are threatened 
– that is, when their services and functions are no longer needed or when they do not have the 
resources or capacity to cope with the new demands. This is because demands for change are 
essentially targeted at changing the status quo or nature of the organizational activities. It is thus 
possible for maintenance structures to also engage or dawn the role of organizational change or 
adaptation and “find increased satisfaction in their expanded role” (p. 87). 
An organization’s adaptive structures understand the external environment and bring it 
into the control of the organization. This logic can be further extended to government 
bureaucracies that do not operate in an environment of competition and enjoy autonomy in their 
daily operations. Thus, government bureaucracies have not developed the necessary adaptive 
structures to understand, respond to, and control their external environment as quickly as their 
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private sector counterparts, which partially explains why society is often displeased with 
government functioning. However, even in the case of government, there are other mechanisms 
ensuring that external environmental pressures are heard (e.g., elections, political mandates, and 
protests). The functions of “planning, research, and development, which permit the organization 
to exploit a changing environment rather than to be exploited by it, are essentially the role 
responsibilities of the top leadership” (Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 88). While maintenance 
structures strive for internal equilibrium, adaptive structures strive for external environmental 
equilibrium. One method of ensuring consistency and predictability with the external 
environment is to control it by causing external elements to lose their independence. In private 
corporations, this is achieved through mergers and acquisitions. For the public sector, I argue 
that the mechanism of involving citizens in a participatory and deliberate manner in the decision 
making, governance, and service delivery processes is an adaptive strategy. As Katz and Kahn 
(1978, p. 89) note: 
Both [maintenance and adaptive structures] move in the direction of preserving 
constancy and predictability in the conditions of organizational life. The 
maintenance function moves toward a constant set of internal structures. The 
adaptive function tends to achieve environmental constancy by bringing the 
external world under control. One method is to extend the boundaries of the 
organization so that it incorporates more of the external world. 
 The net effect of this exchange between the dynamics of compromise and maintenance is, 
ironically, organizational growth and expansion. Katz and Kahn (1978: 96) refer to this 
phenomenon of organization growth and expansion as the maximization principle and identify 
five reasons the maximization principle will dominate the maintenance dynamic (p. 97): (i) 
technical structures lead to increase in organizational proficiency and capabilities; (ii) expansion 
is the easiest way to handle internal conflict; (iii) expansion is the easiest way to handle 
challenges in the external environment; (iv) bureaucratic structures by nature lend themselves to 
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elaborate procedures; and (v) it is part of the organization’s ideology to support aspirations for 
growth. This tendency to readily embark on increasing roles and rules is the quintessential 
characteristic of a government bureaucracy. Examples of such bureaucratic expansion can be 
seen in governments’ constant quest for increased budgets and the readiness with which laws and 
legislations are passed in response to any internal strain or external shock (p. 101). An 
implication of such growth is that it results in an increase in personnel without any structural 
changes, an increase in identical units doing the same work, and further differentiation and 
specialization of tasks leading to calls for integration, which is again met by the creation of “new 
administrative positions and other coordinative devices, which are sometimes successful but 
sometimes add to the managerial structure without performing an integrative function (p. 118). 
A further implication of the environmental influences on outcomes is that of equifinality, 
which means that an open system organization can reach its ultimate goals through multiple 
paths that have not been predefined. In effect, “not only are outcomes not predetermined, but 
there is no one best way of achieving success” (Tompkins, 2005, p. 241). Thus, through this 
cycle of interdependence, the environment effectively infiltrates the organization and shapes its 
formal and informal structures. However, organizations vary in their degrees of openness. As 
Scott (2003) reminds us, “organizations are open systems, but some are more open than others, 
and each is more open in some respects than others” (p. 147).  
In the final analysis, although all three perspectives – those of rational, natural, and open 
systems – differ in their ontological assessment of an organization, they commonly perceive a 
functioning organization and organizational actors who either obey orders towards rationally 
determined goals or adapt to pursue environmentally influenced organizational goals. Thus, the 
underlying assumption here under all three perspectives is that organizational structures are 
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functional to ensure organizational survival and relevance. However, what remains unclear is 
why public bureaucracies are constantly criticized for being unresponsive, ineffective, 
dysfunctional, and in a constant state of administrative paralysis.  
Political Theory of Organization 
To answer the question of why organizations seem dysfunctional if they are constantly 
adapting and striving to deliver goals, I now turn to a political theory of organizations focusing 
on rational actors specifically designing organizational structures to be dysfunctional to suit 
political interests. This political theory of organizations uses the new economics of organization 
(with its focus on contractual relationships and transaction costs) as its foundation but alters 
several basic assumptions to underscore the inherently political nature of bureaucratic 
organizations (Moe, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1995, 2013). Moe’s central thesis is that due to their 
political nature, bureaucratic structures are not designed to be effective. He explicates his logic 
through the concepts of public authority, political uncertainty, and the coercive power of the 
state. In this section, I briefly outline the theoretical tenets of the new economics of organization 
and the alterations made by Terry M. Moe to make it applicable to public bureaucracies to arrive 
at a political theory of the bureaucratic organization.    
The new economics of organization, or the positive theory of institutions, is economic in 
methodology; it is founded on the classical Weberian theory of rational organizations, strategic 
actors, rational structures, focus on goals, efficiency and individualism, contractual nature of 
organizations, markets versus hierarchies, and transaction costs. Indeed, this theory of the firm, 
with its simplistic assumptions, was never meant to explicate the micro-mechanisms of an 
organization, yet it has generated a diverse range of economic models and theories rooted in the 
neoclassical theory of the firm. This diverse set of economic theories shares common “analytical 
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foundations, chief among them: a focus on the individual as the unit of analysis; the assumption 
of rational, utility-maximizing behavior; a concern for efficiency, optimality, and equilibrium; 
and a preference for mathematical modeling over other approaches to theory construction” (p. 
741). Later development in this line of thinking took the shape of two paradigms – contractual 
and behavioral.  
Essentially, these concepts revolve around what is commonly known as the economics of 
information, and they are used to study the following critical issues: how to ensure a balance 
between inducements and contributions of organizational actors to organizational goals (i.e., to 
structure incentives to minimize shirking and goal displacement); how to account for the fact that 
information available is not perfect between manager and employees or between the agent and 
factors of production (information asymmetry); how to ensure that actors reveal their preferences 
so that managers know the right candidate is being selected (adverse selection); how to ensure 
that employees have the desired capabilities and qualifications post-employment (moral hazard); 
and finally under what conditions an organization should internalize voluntary market exchanges 
within its hierarchy (vertical integration under the transaction costs economics approach). All 
these concepts come together cogently in the principal-agent model, which addresses how to 
control subordinates, how to manage information asymmetry and how to structure incentives 
such that the agent’s interests are aligned with their principal’s.   
While there is much enthusiasm for using the principal-agent model and other concepts 
of the new economics of organization for the economic analysis of organizations, Moe contends 
that applying this new paradigm to public bureaucracies requires a “transition from economics to 
politics [that] is by no means straightforward” (Moe, 1984, p. 758). The central premise of 
Moe’s theoretical conception of a political organization is that politics is different (i.e. political 
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interests are different from business interests that centered on efficiency concerns) and that 
political concerns will yield organizational structures very different from those driven by 
efficiency concerns. Moe’s central argument that politics is different is intuitive, but he shows 
insight here in how he translates the core efficiency concerns from the new economics of 
organization paradigm to political concerns and integrates his theoretical framework with the 
fundamental attributes of public bureaucracies and political institutions to underscore the 
inherently political nature of bureaucratic structures and organizations and their resulting 
implications.   
Moe’s most important point is that, in the realm of public bureaucracies, where there is 
no market for public goods, where citizens’ preferences are not known, and where no suppliers 
exist for delivering the public goods, the politician plays the entrepreneurial role. The politician 
is a rational and strategic actor like the economic entrepreneur, but the politician’s decisions are 
motivated by constituent interests, reelection, interest groups, and campaign donors rather than 
by efficiency. Thus, while the contractual paradigm might lead us to believe that choosing 
between a public bureaucracy and contracting out is justified on efficiency grounds, Moe (1984, 
p.761) insists that: 
A contractor may be chosen because he is a major contributor to a subcommittee 
chairman’s campaign; a bureau is created because it opens opportunities for 
patronage; and the control structure may have less to do with the direction of 
policy than the funneling of expenditures to legislative districts. We would 
therefore be quite wrong to conclude that public bureaucracy exists “because it is 
efficient” without qualifying what we mean by “efficient.”  
The survival and sustenance of public bureaus also curiously diverge from the economic 
perspective, where market forces weed out inefficient firms. In the realm of public bureaus, 
survival is also inherently linked to political patronage, citizen perception, and environmental 
conditions. Because there are not multiple bureaus delivering the same services (and thus no 
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equivalent of market forces weeding out public bureaus), the minimum level of support needed 
to survive is quite low and easily achieved. This is why once a bureau is created, its long-term 
survival is relatively secure compared to firms in the private sector. However, citizen perceptions 
are similar to market forces, and politicians often response by reevaluating the survival and 
sustenance of public bureaus. Thus, instead of being weeded out, the bureaus are reinvented 
through reforms. However, as Moe (1984, p. 762) notes: 
Newer, ‘better’ organizational forms may emerge in the public sector, but they 
generally do not replace the older ones; they simply make an undisciplined 
population even more diverse. 
Thus we see that organizations emerging and surviving through political concerns in a 
public goods market look quite different from organizations emerging and surviving through 
efficiency concerns in a private goods market. Based on this insight, Moe (1991) begins to 
integrate politics and organization to transform the economic theory of organization into a 
political theory. Although the two theories share similar intuition—both see economic actors and 
political actors facing collective action problems and designing structures (incentives, selection, 
monitoring, enforcement mechanisms, and so forth) that overcome these barriers while ensuring 
gains from cooperation—Moe (1991) demonstrates that public authority and coercive power, 
political uncertainty, and political compromise gives rise to a very different type of organization.  
Political institutions and government bureaucracies are vested with power and legitimized 
by the State. Moe (1991) refers to this power as public authority, which is coercive in nature and 
can be exercised by whoever occupies the positions of formal authority. Public authority is no 
one’s exclusive right, and individuals and institutions constantly struggle for it. Those who have 
this power can enforce their choices on others through the creation of new policies, programs or 
structures. Unlike the realm of private sector markets, where economic actors transact based on 
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voluntary exchange and mutual benefit (i.e., the party that does not get what they want can walk 
away from the transaction), the realm of public authority works on coercion. This means that 
politics is a world of winners and losers rather than arriving at mutually beneficial outcomes, and 
the consequences of political victory and defeat are manifested in the organizational structures 
that emerge. As Moe (1991, p. 123) notes: 
The power of public authority is essentially coercive. People can be forced to 
accept outcomes that make them worse off, outcomes they would never agree to 
in a world of voluntary exchange. The upshot is that political institutions, most of 
which arise out of politics of structural choice, are means of legal coercion and 
redistribution. They are structures by which winners impose their will on 
everyone else.  
The struggle for public authority is a result of political uncertainty. The group that wins 
today can lose its power tomorrow; thus, its goals must be pursued while it retains public 
authority. Conversely, in the private markets, property rights are clearly defined, and once 
exchanged there is no uncertainty regarding ownership – a feature that favors exchange and 
cooperation. In the realm of political institutions and public bureaucracies, those occupying 
power must ensure their legacy but not only thinking only about programmatic effectiveness but 
also constraining or limiting the opportunities of the opposition to make changes when public 
authority changes hands. For this reason, public agencies are burdened with excessive 
procedures, rules and other structures to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the opposition to 
dismantle their structures when the opposition comes into power. Thus, Moe (1991, p. 124) notes 
that political institutions are, inconsistently, both structured for performance and protected 
against uncertainty, giving rise to a rather curious organization. It is difficult to dismantle public 
bureaucracies or political institutions because the winning group, in their efforts to protect their 
interests, insulates the newly created structure to protect it from the public authority of the State 
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itself. That is why, even if the resulting structure is a monstrosity, the victors and losers have no 
escape from the consequences of a dysfunctional bureaucratic organization.    
To limit the abuse of power by those vested with public authority, democratic 
governments have a system of separation of powers and checks and balances; as a result, while 
those in power can impose their will on others through new or existing structures, such power 
cannot be fully realized without the cooperation of the opposition. Moe (1991, p. 125) observes 
that, to claim victory, political winners often must meet the loser’s demands, which are often 
aimed at weakening the victory’s effect. There is no shortage of examples of such political 
compromise in the United States, as in the case of amendments that water down a law to satisfy 
the losing side’s demands. This implies that political organizations are “designed in part to fail.” 
In the final analysis, then, Moe’s (1991) political organization is one where political actors and 
public officials are “not in the business of building effective organizations, as they are in the 
private sector” (p. 126). However, this insight does not mean political actors and public officials 
are deliberately designing ineffective organizations; for their own interests, they have to create 
effective organizations that are designed to deliver on the promised mandates, but because of the 
nature of public authority, political uncertainty, and political compromise, the end result is that 
organizations are encumbered with structures aimed at isolating the organization from further 
external influence. As a result of these inconsistent goals, the bureaucratic organization’s design 
“should loom as structural nightmares that seem to deny all principles of reasoned judgment” 
(Moe, 1991, p. 126).  
Having explicated each of the organizational perspectives—rational, natural, open, and 
political as they apply to the bureaucratic organization, I now return to applying these 
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perspectives to understand how India’s bureaucratic organization resolves its administrative 
paradox. 
Resolving the Administrative Paradox within India’s Bureaucratic Organization 
 As explained in Chapter 2, the legacy of India’s modern civil service bureaucracy can be 
traced back to the colonial era of British India’s ICS (Indian Civil Service). The ICS in general, 
and the District Collector in particular, were based on centralization of authority and a command 
and control structure and were dictated by the need to maintain law and order at all costs. Post-
independence, the Indian civil service bureaucracy inherited the same structural characteristics: 
centralization of power (at the central and state Governments in the federal system of 
government), a clear hierarchy and chain of command, and the purpose of keeping the union 
indestructible (i.e., the concern for centrifugal forces) through law and order. Thus, India’s 
permanent civil service bureaucracy is structured to reduce uncertainties and ensure stability of 
the nation.  
Given that India’s bureaucracy operates like a “steel frame” and has ensured the stability 
of the union thus far, it is interesting to note the remarkable changes the Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS) has undergone in its demographic make-up over the last 30 years, becoming more 
reflective of its environment by changing from an elite service representing only those from 
urban educational, liberal arts, and upper class backgrounds to those from rural education, 
technical education (engineers and doctors), and all socio-economic groups. However, scholars 
who study India’s bureaucracy point to the fact that the IAS training curriculum does not reflect 
any changes in orientation but still reinforces the traditional administrative orientation (i.e., the 
Weberian orthodoxy). This aspect is less puzzling when viewed from an open system 
perspective, as selecting a more representative sample from the society, yet training them in the 
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Weberian orthodoxy is the way the IAS maintains an equilibrium and ensures that, even as 
environmental variables beyond its control are accommodated (i.e., displaying flexibility), it is 
still able to ensure the rational orientation of its bureaucratic structures (i.e., ensuring certainty). 
Since this change has taken 30 years, it is clear that, much like a living organism, the IAS first 
resisted, then assessed the reaction, adapted, incorporated the changes, gained legitimacy from its 
environment, and ultimately survived to continue to deliver its primary goals of national unity.  
The evolution of India’s Panchayati Raj Institutions (i.e. local government bodies) and its 
incorporation within India’s civil service bureaucracy is another example of how India’s civil 
service bureaucracy behaves like an open system.  As explained in Chapter 2, there is a long 
history related to the growth of local governments in India. While the evolution of local 
governments (or, to refer to their bureaucratic structure, the Panchayati Raj Institutions) can 
itself be seen from an open-system perspective, I will view its growth from the perspective of the 
IAS. The fact that, after decades of political struggle, local governments finally received 
constitutional recognition in 1992 in India is an example of the powerful influence of the 
external environment on rationally designed “steel frame” structures (i.e., enabling a 
constitutional legislation from centralization [IAS] to decentralization of power [Panchayati Raj 
Institutions]). By the same token, the fact that it took so many decades to achieve this illustrates 
the resilience of the rationally designed bureaucratic structures, particularly the IAS, because at 
the district level a fully functional and powerful Panchayati Raj Institution is in direct 
competition with the authority of the District Collector (the democracy versus bureaucracy 
tension). As the open system perspective predicts, the result of the maintenance, adaptation, and 
compromise function is maximization (or organizational growth or expansion); the consequence 
of Panchayati Raj emerging as a legitimate bureaucratic structure is that now every program 
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implementation requires all bureaucratic structures to coordinate and work together. At the 
district level, where programs are implemented, this has resulted in the expansion of the District 
Collector’s duty to oversee the regular development administration structures and local 
government structures. The net effect of these changes is that the IAS is seen as flexible to 
change; it has reduced uncertainty by ensuing the local government structures are under the 
purview of the District Collector, thus ensuring its stability and survival. 
But what explains the apparent dysfunction of the Panchayati Raj Institutions in light of 
their victory within India’s polity? Neither the rational nor the open systems perspective can 
provide an explanation, but the political theory of organizations provides valuable insights. As 
already noted, the emergence of Panchayati Raj Institutions is explained through the open system 
perspective, but post-emergence the analysis has to shift to the actions of those with the public 
authority; the IAS have the public authority to design structures that would not only 
accommodate local governments but also ensure the relevance of the IAS and seek a compromise 
from the victor (Panchayati Raj) for them to realize their full victory. Since the IAS help 
formulate and implement legislation on behalf of Parliament, the politics of bureaucratic 
structures related to Panchayati Raj Institutions is such that it is left to the state governments to 
transfer powers to their respective local governments. Given India’s federal structure and a 
centralized IAS cadre that rotates across state governments, it is almost assured that the transfer 
of administrative and financial powers to local governments will be so slow that it will render 
village-level local government bodies ineffective and thus the Panchayati Raj Institutions will 
lose legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents. Further, the politics of Panchayati Raj’s 
bureaucratic structures ensures that the District Collector maintains centrality over all their 
activities. Also, India’s social structure of caste also validated and legitimized such a structure, 
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because the village’s panchayat leader would be from the local village or even someone from a 
lower caste and thus would not match the socio-economic stature of the District Collector.  
Another example of the politics of bureaucratic structure in India can be seen in the 
separation of powers in India’ federal polity. To ensure India’s unity and the autonomy of its 
subnational regions, the compromise devised by India’s constitution planners was the separation 
of powers between the central and state governments. As explicated in Chapter 2, the separation 
of powers decidedly ensures that the central government is weaker than the state government in 
executing its work. However, from the perspective of the political theory of organization, the 
victors here (i.e., the state governments) had to compromise to fully realize their desire for 
subnational autonomy. The bureaucratic structure thus devised is a centralized cadre of IAS that 
rotates across India’s subnational governments and essentially serve as the executive heads of 
every state agency and State government’s bureaucratic machinery. This is a classic example of 
the politics of bureaucratic structure where those in public authority can design structures to 
ensure the continuance of their power, potentially resulting in a curiously (dys) functional 
organization. Thus, we see that at the state government level, it becomes totally unpredictable 
which agency can effectively implement policies, because those heading these agencies often 
assume positions of formal authority as a matter of routine or political patronage rather than to 
work towards organizational effectiveness. In all of these examples of the politics of bureaucratic 
structures, there are clear sets of winners and losers, and the net effect of these transactions is to 
ensure the stability of the system.  
In the final analysis, then, the administrative paradox within bureaucratic structures is 
resolved by striving towards stability. This conclusion not only casts the bureaucracy in a new 
light but also casts the bureaucratic organization and its actors in a favorable light. Bureaucratic 
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actors are not seen as resisting change, maintaining status quo, or being insensitive or 
incompetent, but rather are seen as valiant individuals operating in a highly complex and 
contradictory environment where bureaucratic structures are simultaneously rational, open, and 
political, and they are constantly striving to adapt, survive and ensure stability. Because 
organizational survival and stability also means individual survival and stability, organizational 
actors are seen as to be acting in their self-interest. At a conceptual level, the idea that 
bureaucratic structures finally strive for stability is almost universally applicable, but empirically 
it is intrinsically tied to the society in which these bureaucratic structures operate. This means 
that bureaucratic stability needs to be seen as a variable; in a society where social mobility is 
relatively easy (e.g., the US), we see bureaucratic structures are that much more flexible and 
ready to adapt to collaborative governance or network governance (i.e., the move from 
traditional top-down hierarchical administration to horizontal or more egalitarian forms of 
governance).  
The Implementation Scorecard 
Based on these organizational perspectives, I develop a context-specific analytical 
framework to capture India’s decentralized administrative set-up and implementation process. 
The advantage of such a tool is that at once it provides a bird’s view of the overall 
implementation and at the same time is able to provide a granular view of implementation at 
each administrative-level. The implementation scorecard (see Figure 2 below) is essentially an 
extended and contextualized version of Thompson’s (2008) synthesis of organizational 
perspectives and its three levels, to which I add a political perspective, and I posit that all four 
levels are present at every level of the implementation hierarchy within a single organization in 
varying degrees. In Thompson’s synthesis the institutional core relates to the work of senior 
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executives, the technical core to those engaged in delivering services, and the managerial core to 
managing the internal and external environment; however, this synthesis does not capture the 
complexity of a government bureaucracy.  
For example, at the state-level, senior executives are influenced by a particular set of 
external influences (i.e., institutional influences) to shape policies. Decisions (i.e., managerial 
influences) need to be made about how these policies can be implemented. These decisions often 
result in the design of rational program implementation models (i.e., the technical influences). In 
this process of converting institutional-level influences into rational models of program 
implementation, clear sets of winners and losers emerge (political influences) given the political 
nature of bureaucratic structures. For example, at the state-level institutional influences include 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), 
technical activities include converting NRHM’s policy prescriptions into initiatives like Maarpu, 
managerial activities include ensuring budgetary resources are available for Maarpu and as a 
result of this process the resultant program implementation regime benefits (i.e., program goals 
are aligned to departmental goals) some benefits while others are made to participate coercively 
(i.e. program goals are not well aligned to departmental goals).  
At the district-level, the District Collector is also engaged in a range of technical 
activities related to direct administration and monitoring, issuing administrative orders, procuring 
and disbursing budgets, and ensuring institutional ties to external stakeholders, and in these 
choices the District Collector is supporting certain groups (winners) over others (losers). At the 
village-level, bureaucrats are most obviously engaged in technical activities, but they also make 
decisions as to how to allocate scarce resources and are constantly striving to engage with their 
local village environments and seek legitimacy, and in this process of exercising discretion they 
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favor some groups over others; thus, at every level, as a result of top-level decisions winners are 
enforcing their decisions and structures upon others. Such an analytical framework is ideal to 
trace the implementation process through India’s intergovernmental structures and fully 
integrates politics and administration.   
I discuss the findings of Maarpu’s emergence and implementation process using this 
analytical framework in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Figure 2: The Implementation Scorecard 
Administrative- 
Levels 
Organizational Influences 
Institutional Managerial Technical Political 
  Winners Losers 
State      
District      
Village      
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Chapter Five 
Case Study Context, Research Design, & Methodology   
Working with minutiae is time-consuming, and I must concede that during the several 
years when I was toiling in the archives, doing interviews, making observations, talking 
with my informants, writing, and getting feedback, a nagging question kept resurfacing in 
my mind. This is a question bound to haunt many carrying out in-depth, dense case 
studies: “Who will want to learn about a case like this, and in this kind of detail?” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 237) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes an in-depth case study of implementing collaborative governance 
in Andhra Pradesh (AP); a subnational government in India. I begin with a description and 
research questions related to Maarpu, the collaborative governance initiative (CGI) aimed at 
improving maternal and child health services in AP. I then explain my use of the case study 
methodology by describing the global (Millennium Development Goals), national (National 
Rural Health Mission and India’s progress and challenges on MDGs) and subnational (AP’s 
progress and challenges on MDGs) context within which this initiative is being implemented. I 
then describe the research design elements by articulating how a single-case design (at the state 
and district level) is embedded with multiple cases (at the village level) to reflect India’s 
decentralized administrative structures. I then discuss the trade-offs involved, in the case 
selection strategy, between theoretical parsimony and contextually-rich narratives and between 
narrow and broad generalizations. I discuss the data collected during fieldwork in the Medak 
district. Finally, I address concerns regarding validity and reliability are addressed through the 
use of within-case, cross-case analysis and the use of NVivo 10, a qualitative data analysis 
software.  
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Case Study Context 
Overview of the Collaborative Initiative and Research Questions  
This study aims to examine the implementation process of a collaborative initiative at the 
subnational level in the context of the Government of India’s commitment to attaining the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A commitment to attaining the MDGs 
underscores the central government’s national priorities. However, as explained in Chapter 2, 
inspite of the constitutionally authorized power of the central government in India’s federal 
polity, the attainment of the MDGs depends on the ability of subnational governments to 
effectively implement centrally sponsored policies and programs. Inspite of political will, 
bureaucratic commitment, and allocation of resources, India’s progress on the MDGs has been 
unsatisfactory, with wide variations across and within regions. While gender discrimination, 
poverty, illiteracy, and caste have been acknowledged as causes of these variations, the role of 
bureaucratic organizations and actors in implementation – and specifically how bureaucrats in 
subnational governments engage in intergovernmental coordination and how constitutional 
arrangements and administrative structures shape the process and effectiveness of 
implementation – remains understudied. To this end, this study empirically examines the 
implementation of a collaborative governance initiative called Maarpu in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh, India.    
In Telugu, the language native to the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP), Maarpu means 
change. On September 24th, 2012, the Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) launched 
Maarpu14 through a Government Order (GO)15 with the stated objective of convergence to 
 
14 Government Order, G.O.Ms.No.249, Government of Andhra Pradesh, September 24, 2012 
15 A Government Order (GO) is an executive order that articulates an implementation strategy and sets the process in motion.  
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improve the health and nutrition status of women and children through interdepartmental 
coordination. As noted by the GoAP, two key indicators that address the health and nutrition 
status of women are the Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR). The 
GO underscores the “sense of urgency to adopt strategies that can significantly improve the pace 
of decline of MMR, IMR, and Malnutrition in Andhra Pradesh.”  
The MMR (per 100,000 live births) is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
as “the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, 
irrespective of the duration and site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by 
the pregnancy or its management but not from accidental or incidental causes.” The Infant 
Mortality Rate (IMR) (per 1000 live births) is defined by WHO as the risk of “a child dying 
before completing the first year of age.” In AP, the MRR declined from 220 in 1997 to 134 in 
2009, but this is still higher than the MMR of 81 in Kerala.16 The IMR in AP improved from 63 
in 1997 to 46 in 2010 but compares poorly to Kerala’s 13. The GO further notes that the 
following indicators are also alarming: low birth weight children (19.4%), underweight children 
under 3 years of age (37%), and pregnant women (in the 15-49 age group) with anemia (56%). 
The GO notes that the “current rate of decline in MMR & IMR is not up to the level expected 
and needs to improve significantly to achieve the MMR and IMR goals set as part of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).”  
In response to this situation, the GO affirms leadership commitment at the highest level 
within the state government to improve these indicators. This commitment underscores the 
 
16 India’s southern state of Kerala is held up as a model for doing well on human development indicators (Sen, 2001). Human 
development indicators relate to life expectancy, education, and status of women. In the discussion regarding the relationship 
between economic development and human development (Ranis, Stewart, & Ramirez, 2000), Kerala is used an example to 
demonstrate that human development indicators can only be achieved when given policy priority and are not a result of economic 
development benefits trickling down.  
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notion that “all the allied departments need to converge in order to have a synergistic effect and 
accelerate the improvement in the Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition indicators.” 
Furthermore, the commitment to improving the MMR and IMR indicators also articulates a role 
for community involvement. The GO notes that “a desired shift from programme-driven service 
delivery to demand driven mode would get an impetus through convergence efforts. The 
community would be involved not just in efforts to effect behavioral change but also in making 
the Health and Nutrition Plan for each village and monitoring the results using appropriate to 
such as Quantified Participatory Assessment (QPA).” In this context, the GoAP recognizes the 
role of Self-Help Groups (SHGs) of women, local government representatives, and other village-
level community organizations. Finally, the GO emphasizes the critical role of the District 
Collector, who “must drive the convergence effort in the district with a suitable administrative 
structure to guide and support this initiative.” The focus of the initiative are 20 interventions (see 
Table 1) that cater to maternal and child health services. It is the spirit of this joint action driving 
the implementation and attainment of MMR and IMR programs that is called Maarpu, rather 
than the actions of bureaucrats working in silos.  
 The GO further specifies four types of administrative structures aimed at 
institutionalizing convergence efforts. These are convergence committees at the village, district, 
and state level, each of which contains members from allied departments like Health, Women & 
Child Welfare, and Rural Development (and its constituent subunits like: Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (i.e., local government bodies), Rural Water Supply, Village Organizations (VOs), 
and Self-Help Groups (SHGs)). The district-level convergence committee, headed by the District 
Collector, is expected to “actively engage all the stakeholders in the process.” Furthermore, the 
District Collectors are “requested to convene district level workshops and disseminate the 
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objectives and the key interventions of the Programme.” These committees are expected to meet 
once a month to monitor progress and may, at their discretion, invite subject matter experts or 
representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to the meetings.  
As stated earlier, this study focuses on the instrumental value of collaborative 
governance—that is, its ability to facilitate cross-boundary work, address the concerns of 
accountability and transparency, and, thus, improve the overall quality of service delivery. The 
study aims to better understand the relationship between collaborative governance and service 
delivery. The overarching research question guiding this study is: How do bureaucrats in an 
intergovernmental setting shape the implementation processes of a collaborative governance 
initiative? This study empirically examines the implementation process of Maarpu to understand 
how it improves maternal and child health service delivery. The following subsidiary questions 
address this central question in further detail: 
1. How and why did the collaborative governance initiative emerge the way it did? 
2. To what extent and under what conditions do bureaucrats at multiple levels of the 
hierarchy engage in intergovernmental collaboration and involve citizens to improve 
service delivery? 
Government of India’s Priorities  
The ascendance of India as a major economic power on the world stage has provided the 
Government of India with not only the financial resources to invest in social sector development 
but also the incentive to live up to the prestige and expectations associated with being an 
economic power. However, the progress on MDGs #4 (reducing child mortality) and #5 
(improving maternal health) has been particularly varied and unsatisfactory. According to India’s 
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Country MDGs Report, 2015, the progress on MDG #4 is only “moderately on-track,” while the 
progress on MDG #5) is “slow or off-track.” The progress is impressive if seen historically – the 
number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births decreased from 437 in 1990 to 167 in 2011-13 
– but India will still miss the MDG target of no more than 140 deaths by the end of 2015. The 
goal of reducing child mortality has two key indicators: infant mortality and under-five mortality 
ratio (U5MR). Regarding infant mortality, India is likely to reach 39 per 1000 live births by the 
end of 2015, less than the 1990 rate of 80 but missing the MDG target of 27. As for U5MR, India 
will narrowly miss the MDG target of 42 by reaching 48 infant deaths per 1000 live births by the 
end of 2015 (compared to 125 in 1990).  
However, this overall progress hides the wide disparities that exist at the subnational 
level between rural and urban areas and by gender and socio-economic status. For example, the 
maternal mortality rate (MMR) ranges from 61 in the state of Kerala to 300 in the state of 
Assam, while the infant mortality ratio ranges from 12 in Kerala to 54 in the state of Madhya 
Pradesh. In 2013, at the country level, the IMR was 42 for female babies but 39 for male babies. 
Similarly, the U5MR ranges from 12 in Kerala to 73 in Assam and is higher in the case of rural 
areas and female children. In 2013, the U5MR in rural areas was for 59 for female children and 
51 for male children, while in urban areas it was 30 for female children and 28 for male children.  
While subnational governments have their own health sector priorities, given the nature 
of maternal and child health goals, the central government has some constitutional leverage over 
the state governments to insist on prioritizing these goals. As shown in Chapter 2, the central 
government lacks power but does have strong influence, as it provides large financial resources 
to state governments engaged in implementing the nationally sponsored health programs.  
Furthermore, senior bureaucrats who are responsible for formulating and implementing policies 
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at the subnational level are constitutionally responsible to the central government and thus feel a 
sense of duty to take up the implementation of national priorities.  
Although reducing child mortality (MDG #4) and improving maternal health (MDG #5) 
are listed as separate goals, a rich body of public health literature indicates a high degree of 
interaction between them and shows that their achievement is influenced by both contextual 
factors (e.g., lower levels of literacy among women, low levels of attention to public health and 
hygiene concerns, lack of sanitation facilities, and inadequate financial resources within national 
and local governments to plan and deliver health services) and environmental factors (like 
tropical climatic conditions, which are typically not within government control but still 
contribute to public health outcomes). Thus, beyond mere technical interventions, achieving 
MDGs #4 and #5 requires several actors and institutions to work together as part of a health 
system. The Government of India recognizes the boundary-spanning work that is imperative in 
the achievement of these goals:  
The MDGs are inter-linked. For instance, achievement of the health Targets [is] 
dependent on achievement of targets of sanitation, availability of safe drinking 
water, clean environment, reduction of poverty and malnutrition, spread of 
literacy and so on. Thus, an all-round development in related sectors is required to 
achieve a single Target (Government of India, 2015, p. 6)  
In this context, policies and programmes aimed at achieving MDGs #4 and #5, such as 
the Government of India’s National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) launched in 2005, highlight 
inter-governmental coordination, citizen participation, and the use of participatory institutional 
arrangements as cornerstone strategies for delivering integrated health services. Examples of 
such collaborative and participatory institutional arrangements include the Panchayati Raj (local 
government) institutions, Self-Help Groups, Village Health and Sanitation Committee, and 
District Level Vigilance and Monitoring Committees to name a few. Thus, my study of 
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Maarpu’s implementation at the subnational level can help to shed further light on the broader 
class or phenomenon of intergovernmental coordination, community participation, and the 
boundary-spanning imperative that bureaucratic actors are expected to embrace in order to 
achieve the MDGs.  
Thus, the dominant narrative for achieving and sustaining MDGs #4 and #5 at the global 
and national level in developing countries is one of service delivery integration, inter-
governmental collaboration, and strengthening governance mechanisms to support and deliver 
integrated health services (Coker et al., 2010; Grundy, 2010; Hanvoravongchai, Warakamin, & 
Coker, 2010). 
Methodological Strengths & Weaknesses of Case Study Research 
Methodological Strengths 
A case-oriented research design is ideal for this study for the following reasons: the focus 
of the study is to understand how collaboration is implemented within a subnational government 
rather than to explain variation (Porta, 2008; Ragin, 1999); the aim is to conduct an in-depth of 
study of a single instance (i.e., Maarpu in AP) of a broader class or phenomenon (i.e., 
collaborative governance or bureaucrats engaged in boundary-spanning work) (George & 
Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2004); and, lastly, the investigation of the phenomenon (i.e., the 
collaborative governance initiative) is contemporary and cannot be easily disentangled from its 
historical context or external environment (Yin, 2009). In this section, I discuss the trade-offs 
related to choosing a case study methodology to this study.  
Case studies “allow a researcher to achieve high levels of conceptual validity, or to 
identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher 
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intends to measure” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). This is particularly true when the 
theoretical concepts being studied are “notoriously difficult to measure” (p. 19) or may vary in 
meaning according to context, as is the case with collaborative governance (or “convergence,” as 
it is often called by Indian governmental officials), as well as administrative accountability and 
responsibility within India’s bureaucracies, bureaucratic politics within intergovernmental 
arrangements, and social hierarchy between bureaucratic actors. 
Another strength of case study research is its emergent nature, which allows the 
researcher in the field to document causally relevant variables that need further study. For 
example, because there is very little research on the subject of intergovernmental collaborative 
governance implementation at the village level in India, it is possible that important variables are 
waiting to be uncovered.  
Uncovering casual mechanisms i.e., the pathways, processes or factors, both observable 
and unobservable, that play a role in shaping the relationship between the cause and effect 
variables is a core strength of in-depth case studies (George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2011) 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) quoted in W. Olsen (2011) define a causal mechanism as the particular 
circumstance that makes an outcome more likely to occur or to have a tendency to occur 
(operationalized as: context + mechanism = outcome). For example, in the context of my study, 
we know that leadership (a cause) drives collaboration (an effect). Even if this correlation is 
strong, it is not sufficient to say that collaboration will occur at the village level in India if it is 
driven by top-level leadership; rather, it is necessary to establish and construct a chain of events 
and gather evidence to support how specific contextual factors or processes lead top-level 
leadership to facilitate collaboration. Intuitively, collaborative governance and improved service 
delivery seem positively correlated, but what factors or circumstances activate the causal 
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pathway between the two? The methodological strength of case-study research is that it enables 
uncovering what mechanism is at work; in this case, how does collaborative governance (X) 
generate improved service delivery (Y)? What are the causal mechanisms (M)? (Gerring, 2011). 
Finally, George and Bennett (2005) posits that a strength of case studies is “their ability 
to accommodate complex causal relations such as equifinality, complex interactions effects, and 
path dependency” (p. 22). The assumption of equifinality, or “the concept of multiple paths to a 
common end state” (David Carroll Jacobs, 2010, p. 3) is that the casual mechanism connecting X 
and Y may be complex, “involving long causal chains, diverse routes travelling from X to Y” or 
several factors combining simultaneously to produce an effect (Gerring, 2011, p. 216). Thus, this 
study may show that the relationship between collaborative governance and improving maternal 
and child health services delivery is less intuitive and more complex than it seems.  
Another strength of case studies is that they can account for path dependency, which is 
used to “explain how certain outcomes are the result of a particular sequence of events and how 
that unique sequence constrains future options” (Slagter, 2004, p. 3). An outcome situated in a 
path-dependent trajectory is susceptible to unpredictability, minor events, and getting locked in 
to decisions made along the trajectory. This implies that, despite rational planning, the outcomes 
of certain processes will be unforeseen and contingent on the historical context. Seemingly 
insignificant events or decisions made along the way becoming binding as they are constantly 
“reinvented and reinforced,” until they become impossible to revert due to the increased cost of 
change (p. 3).  
The outcome of Maarpu is also on the path-dependent trajectory. In the previous chapter, 
I examined the structural preconditions for collaborative governance in India, tracing the 
historical evolution of India’s administrative systems and discussing the strengths and limitations 
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of the decisions made at various points. For example, the institution of the District Collector and 
the ambiguity regarding the official’s responsibility to a specific program make it almost 
impossible to predict which program will be prioritized at the district and village levels of 
administration. Moreover, the District Collector’s role does not change, despite any reform 
efforts, because it is locked-in due to the costs and uncertainty associated with altering it.  
Methodological Weaknesses  
Arguments on the weaknesses of the case study approach primarily stem from 
misconceptions about the scientific value of case study methodology, comparisons to statistical 
methods, and careless implementation of case study methods (Flyvbjerg, 2006; George & 
Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2009).  In this section, I will briefly discuss the case study methodology’s 
weaknesses as it relates to my study in the following two categories: concerns regarding its 
capabilities and concerns regarding its design.  
 Three common capability issues are as follows: case studies are generally considered to 
be capable of only hypothesis testing and not hypothesis generation or theory development; case 
studies use only a single case or a small number of cases and thus lack the ability to generate 
findings with broader applicability or relevance; and case studies are not capable of generating 
theoretical knowledge, only context-specific knowledge. Dyer and Wilkins (1991), Eisenhardt 
(1989, 1991), George and Bennet (2005), and Pentland (1999) have all discussed trade-offs 
inherent within the case study design: single case versus multiple cases, constructs versus stories, 
descriptive richness versus parsimony, and narrow versus broad theory. While it is true that a 
researcher has to carefully examine these trade-offs, it is useful to view these concerns in light of 
the following question: is the purpose of the research to explain variation or to understand an 
instance of a phenomenon? (Ragin, 1999).  
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The most serious capability issue arises when the methodology and purpose are 
misaligned. For example, if I were trying to explain variation in the extent to which District 
Collectors in Andhra Pradesh (AP’s) adopted the collaborative governance initiative, then 
selecting only the Medak district as a case for in-depth study would have serious weaknesses, as 
the findings from Medak alone will be incapable of shedding light on the broader population of 
AP’s District Collectors. A case study about the implementation of Maarpu within AP’s Medak 
district is better able to assess “whether and how a variable [e.g., formal authority and perception 
among bureaucrats toward the initiative] mattered to the outcome than… how much it mattered” 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 25). Articulating the causal pathway of the combined causal 
variables is the contribution of the case study, not assigning weights or relative importance to the 
variables. The contextually rich narratives and identification of relevant theoretical constructs 
leads to inductively generated theory that is interesting, testable, and intimately connected with 
the phenomenon; it is thus “a natural complement to mainstream deductive research” (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007).      
 The starting point for addressing concerns regarding a case study’s research design 
begins with case selection. The researcher selects cases based on their potential to shed light on 
the phenomenon-of-interest. Such a selection strategy invariably results in a small or sometimes 
single case study, thereby posing the small N problem, which in turn has implications for the 
power of a research design and ultimately its ability to generalize broadly. The first implication 
of selecting a limited or single case of interest is that there is inevitably no variation in the 
outcome across the cases (i.e., those particular cases were selected because they had the potential 
to enable to researcher to study that outcome). This is tantamount to selecting on the dependent 
variable in statistical studies, resulting in a selection bias that “always understates the strength of 
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the relationship between the independent and dependent variables” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 
23). However, for case-oriented research that is attempting to understand an instance of a 
phenomenon, selecting on the outcome is not only legitimate; it is the only way to achieve the 
full potential of case study research (Porta, 2008). The key distinction to understand here is that 
studying a single event or an instance of a larger phenomenon is not the same as N=1. The 
argument here is that because case studies usually study an instance before, during, and after, 
there are invariably several units of analysis with the potential to increase the number of 
observations substantially Gerring (2004).  
Case study research is also often charged with having a ‘degrees of freedom’ problem, 
suggesting that it lacks sufficient explanatory power. While statistical methods aggregate 
variables to increase the degrees of freedom, case study methods engage with all the complexity 
and diversity within variables of interest. George and Bennet (2005) argue that process tracing, 
or identifying a sequence of events connecting the variables resulting in a particular outcome, is 
a useful mechanism to identify multiple observations along a particular causal path, effectively 
increasing the number of observable implications of a theoretical proposition and thereby 
addressing the degrees of freedom problem (p. 29).   
  Another common weakness associated with case study research is that of subjectivity 
bias on the part of the researcher. To this Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that a common theme across 
all researchers who engage in in-depth case study work is that they were compelled to reject their 
initial hypothesis based on their intimate proximity to the data (p. 235). Geertz (1995, quoted in 
Flyvbjerg, 2006) underscores the “assertive, demanding, even coercive” nature of fieldwork as 
an effective counter to verification and subjective bias. Indeed, fieldwork compelled me to re-
examine the historical explanation for my observations and dispel my initial notions that 
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bureaucrats are power-hungry, self-serving, and manipulative actors. What emerged from the 
historical analysis of the role of India’s civil service bureaucracy is the concept of a 
collaborative bureaucrat, a term I have coined to analyze the efforts of bureaucrats who 
genuinely believe in the benefits of collaborating but operate within administrative structures that 
are not conducive to collaboration.    
Research Design 
Case-Study Design: Single Case Embedded with Multiple Cases 
Yin (2009) describes four types of case study designs that fall under two categories: 
single-case and multiple-case designs, both of which can have either a single unit of analysis 
(holistic) or multiple (embedded) units of analysis. To conduct an in-depth examination of the 
implementation process at the subnational level in India, the case study design calls for data 
collection and analysis at the state, district, and village levels. I use a single-case design at the 
state and district levels and a multiple-case design at the village level. At the state level, I select 
Hyderabad, the state capital of Andhra Pradesh (AP), where the headquarters of all the state’s 
agencies are located. At the district and village levels, I select 28 villages in the Medak district, 
one of the 23 districts in the state.  
Yin (2009) justifies the use of revelatory (rather than unique, critical, deviant, or extreme) 
cases for single-case studies because it provides “an opportunity to observe and analyze a 
phenomenon previously inaccessible” (p. 48). I justify selecting AP and Medak as revelatory 
cases because they provide an opportunity to examine the implementation of collaborative 
governance to improve maternal and child health services in a live context. I had two reasons for 
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selecting AP. First, AP has always actively pursued governance reforms within its social sector,17 
and I felt it this was an interesting opportunity to document internal bureaucratic reforms as they 
happened. I was convinced that AP would work as a revelatory case that would inform me about 
how collaborative governance reforms unfold within Indian bureaucracies at the subnational 
level and that it could be studied in the context of the MDGs and NRHM.  
During my initial field visit in May 2013 I was informed a particular District Collector 
who had taken up the implementation of Maarpu as a key programmatic priority of the district 
administration. The same District Collector during my second and final wave field work 
(January-June 2014) was posted at Medak district and I had received overwhelming feedback 
from subject matter experts and state-level officials that Medak would be an ideal case to study 
Maarpu’s district and village-level implementation, Thus, Medak district had the theoretical 
potential to reveal the implementation processes and outcomes.  
The purpose of selecting 28 villages within the Medak district to serve as multiple cases 
within the single-case study was based on a replication logic, where each village site works like a 
laboratory experiment (Yin, 2009, p. 53). A replication design is used to either predict similar 
results for a literal replication or predict contrasting results that can be anticipated for a 
theoretical replication (p. 54). This sort of laboratory experiment needs a contextually rich 
theoretical framework, which I discuss later in this chapter. Thus, in each case, the replication 
logic will help validate the theory-generation process by answering these questions: Does the 
 
17 The Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) has always been actively involved with the World Bank and the Department of 
International Development, the United Kingdom’s Development agency, and projects on social- and health-sector reforms. 
Furthermore, since 1995, the World Bank has actively supported the Self-Helps Groups (SHGs) and holds Andhra Pradesh as a 
model state for successfully institutionalizing SHGs. 
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theory guiding the case study hold true in each of the cases? If it does not hold true, what 
modifications need to be made? What contextual factors shape the need for modifications? 
 The criteria for selecting these villages were based on the potential to be revelatory. 
After in-depth discussions with my key informants in the state capital and district headquarters, I 
was able to identify village-level administrative jurisdictions that satisfy both criteria.  
Furthermore, while selecting the cases or villages, care was taken to ensure they are situated 
within a contiguous geographic area to control for socio-cultural, economic, and terrain 
differences (see Map 1 for sites of data collection). 
Implicit in this selection strategy is the goal of a comparative case study of 
commonalities “to identify common causal conditions linked to a specific outcome across a 
relatively small number of purposefully selected cases” (Ragin, 1999, p. 1141). The central focus 
of the district and village selection is the potential to observe collaborative processes. In effect, I 
expected the chosen sites to demonstrate a certain set of characteristics that fit the focus of the 
research: namely, they are implementing Maarpu and I could document their implementation 
process and outcomes. This is significant because each case, site, or village in the study has its 
own identity shaped by its contextual factors. As Ragin Ragin (1999) reminds us, unlike 
variable-oriented research, where the cases or observations are fixed at the outset and the 
variables become prominent later, in case-oriented research the selection of cases is kept flexible. 
This was an important consideration while I was conducting fieldwork, as I needed to be 
continuously aware of which cases, sites or villages did and did not fit into what I was 
examining. It is also important to maintain this flexibility because, during the course of 
fieldwork, the research focus may undergo modifications as a result of what is uncovered in the 
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field. For example, the focus could change from how Maarpu is being implemented to 
examining case where Maarpu was not being implemented at all.   
While the cases vary with respect to their own unique identities, a key feature of case-
oriented research is that the outcome does not vary substantially across the cases (Ragin, 1999). 
Indeed, it would have been convenient, from a research design perspective, if the district 
administration had a list of exemplary villages that were successfully implementing collaboration 
to improve maternal and child health service delivery in their villages. If the research could focus 
on the success of such a group of villages, the dependent variable or outcome could be specified 
with greater detail (i.e., how are these particular villages effectively implementing Maarpu?) and 
the outcome would not vary here as the effective implementation would clearly be common 
across selected cases and the purpose of the comparative case study would be to identify all 
common causal conditions enabling effective implementation.   
However, no such list of exemplary villages exists; at best, key informants are able to 
identify which individuals share the goals and aspirations of Maarpu and, on that basis, conclude 
that the program is being implemented within that individual’s jurisdiction. Since there is no 
empirical basis for such a conclusion, my study must address a more holistic outcome by asking 
how these villages are implementing Maarpu. Based on the information from my key informants, 
I identified certain areas where implementation was taken seriously (and thus where all villages 
could theoretically be expected to be engaged in implementing the collaborative initiative). 
Ragin (1999) Ragin (1999) (p. 1142). states that, while all outcomes might not be identical 
across all cases, “the researcher must demonstrate that the outcomes in the cases selected are in 
fact enough alike to be treated as instances of the same thing.” Thus, in my study, even though 
outcomes vary across the cases, they are still relevant as instances of Maarpu’s implementation.   
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Unlike variable-based research, where variables are considered to be independent and 
compete for explanatory power over the outcome, in case-oriented research several causal 
conditions converge to explain how the outcome came about; i.e., causation is conjectural, 
implying equifinality (Dirk Berg-Schlosser, 2009). Here, in-depth fieldwork and knowledge of 
the case and context help to identify which combination of causal conditions led to a certain 
outcome. In this study, my initial expectation was that I would be able to study causal pathways 
leading to effective implementation in all 28 villages; after beginning fieldwork, however, I 
uncovered three broad categories of outcomes to which villages (or cases) can be assigned: 
villages where Maarpu was happening, villages where no Maarpu was happening (but the 
monthly village meeting (of the Village Organization (VO) and Shelf-Help Groups (SHGs) was 
happening), and finally where there was no meeting at all (neither the monthly VO and SHGs 
meeting nor Maarpu).18 As a result, the study’s aim is to understand the various causal 
combinations and contextual factors contributing to each of these outcomes through the limited 
number of cases in each outcome category.   
Unit of Analysis  
 It seems intuitive that a case study researcher would know at the outset the nature of the 
case under study, but given the complexity inherent in case-study research, the process of 
determining what constitutes a case and what it represents remains a critical challenge 
throughout the research process (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2013; Ragin & 
Becker, 1992; S. M. Wilson & Gudmundsdottir, 1987; Yin, 2009). In this section, I briefly 
 
18 On an assigned day each month the Village Organization (VO) and the Shelf-Help Groups (SHGs) meet to discuss money 
matters (savings and loans). The idea of Maarpu was to have village-level functionaries from all departments “converge” or meet 
at this venue to discuss Maarpu-related agenda; monitor maternal and health services, question field staff, identify gaps in service 
delivery, inform field staff of individuals who might not be aware of maternal and child health services being provided by the 
government. 
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review the literature on what constitutes a case and then discuss how I address this question for 
my study.  
 Both Yin (2009) and Miles et al. (2013) present a simplified version of how to answer the 
question “what is this a case of?” even as they acknowledge the complexity inherent in this task. 
Miles et al. (2013) define a case “as a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” 
(p. 28) and use the words ‘case’ and ‘site’ interchangeably to remind researchers that the 
bounded context is a “social and physical setting” (p. 30). Yin (2009) equates the definition of 
the unit of analysis to the definition of a ‘case.’ Thus, a case can be an individual, an event, a 
process or an organization. Implicit in these definitions is the sampling strategy that determines 
which sources of data to select, thus establishing the boundary of the case study. While, in 
keeping with Yin’s (2009) definition the unit of analysis may be easy to identify, when collecting 
and analyzing the data the invariable question of “what is this a case of?” calls for a more 
sophisticated framework that can help the researcher traverse the theoretical and empirical 
domains of the study.  
 In the typology by Ragin and Becker (1992), cases can be understood as either empirical 
units that exist externally or theoretical constructs conceived during the research process. In 
general, the author assert that “cases of qualitative research tend to coalesce as specific 
categories in the course of research” (p. 9). In practice, researchers use the combination of 
theoretical and empirical entities that best suits their research questions. Critical to the 
identification of cases as theoretical or empirical is the acknowledgement that casing is a process 
involving iterative interpretation as the researcher combs through and refines his understanding 
of the data. In their study of how teachers accumulate knowledge, S. M. Wilson and 
Gudmundsdottir (1987) acknowledge the various stages through which their data interpretation 
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moved across theoretical and empirical domains, often working synergistically, and urge 
researchers not to view case boundaries as fixed and immovable.  
 Thus, I situate my case study design within the framework suggested by Yin (2009) and 
Ragin and Becker (1992). Such a design entails a firm starting point with regard to the unit of 
analysis and case boundary, as well as the necessary flexibility to traverse the theoretical and 
empirical domains of the cases as I process my data. The primary unit of analysis for my study is 
the implementation process, within which are embedded multiple units of analysis that need to 
be examined (i.e., state, district, and village levels of administration). At each level of analysis, 
several units are analyzed: bureaucrats (within different participating departments), meetings 
(administrative, program review, and collaborative), documents (archival documents, program 
documents, monitoring and reporting formats), and service delivery beneficiaries (at different 
service delivery points). These embedded units are linked to the primary and secondary research 
questions. According to Yin (2009), an advantage of an embedded case-study design is that it 
forces the researcher to focus on specific units of research interest. The embedded design also 
has the advantage of drawing the case study boundary around the main unit of analysis (Miles et 
al., 2013). Thus, in my study, I will not collect data about other medical and health services (e.g., 
cardiovascular care or HIV/AIDS and TB prevention services), other rural development 
programs (e.g., road construction and livelihood enhancement programs), or the income level 
and occupational data of service delivery recipients.  
 On the other hand, a shortcoming of such an embedded design is that the researcher must 
constantly return to the basic unit of analysis and not get lost at the level of the subunits (Yin, 
2009, p. 52). For example, in my study, although bureaucrats at all levels of the implementation 
hierarchy across different departments are a major unit of analysis, the evidence collected from 
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the bureaucrats must be studied only from the perspective of how Maarpu is being implemented 
rather than in terms of the bureaucrats themselves or their satisfaction with collaborative 
governance. Similarly, at the subunit level, the evidence gathered from documents, meetings, and 
service delivery recipients must be analyzed in light of how it relates to the implementation of 
Maarpu.   
Ragin and Becker’s (1992) framework is useful here, as it allows different instances to 
coalesce around a specific theoretical concept (i.e., Maarpu’s implementation). While some of 
these constructs are pre-determined as a result of the literature under review (e.g., bureaucratic 
politics, turf protection, diffused responsibility, or institutional histories), other constructs might 
emerge as the process of data analysis continues.  
Role of Theory, Theoretical Propositions and Rival Explanations 
Another aspect of case-study research in which there is ambiguity is related to the 
appropriate role of theory, which depends on which tradition of inquiry (positivist or 
interpretivist) is followed and what approach (deductive or inductive) is used. In this section, I 
will situate the role of theory within the case-study approach and in relation to my study.  
Case studies can be used for theory testing, refining, or development (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2009). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 25) define the inductive 
theory generation process as “emergent in the sense that it is situated in and developed by 
recognizing patterns of relationships among constructs within and across cases and their 
underlying logical arguments”. Because case studies are used to study phenomena we know little 
about, the methodology focuses on the emergent and inductive nature of theory building. If, for 
example, a well-articulated theory about collaborative governance among India’s social service 
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bureaucracies already exists, then a case study approach can still be used to confirm, disconfirm, 
or modify such a theory.  
Scholars differ on the purpose of inductive theory generation. While Eisenhardt (1989) 
focuses on the development of testable hypothesis and measureable constructs through inductive 
theory generation, others like Dyer and Wilkins (1991) and Pentland (1999) have focused on the 
importance of context-rich narratives to further theory development. At the heart of this debate is 
the question of whether researchers should seek to generate widely generalizable findings 
through a broad theory or to develop a context-rich narrative through narrowly focused or mid-
range theories. If the goal is generalizable findings, importance must be given to defining clear 
and measurable constructs (Eisenhardt, 1991); on the other hand, if the goal is to generate 
context-specific and descriptively rich narratives that will allow other researchers to see “the 
same phenomenon in their own experience and research” (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991, p. 617), then 
single-case studies without measurable constructs are valid research design elements. Pentland 
(1999) argues that context-rich stories and constructs are not mutually exclusive, stating that the 
dichotomy stems from the association of the term “construct” with variance and variable-based 
research. Using narrative theory he argues that stories actually are: “abstract conceptual models 
[i.e., constructs] used in explanations of observed data” (p. 711).  
The central focus of my study will be on context-rich descriptions and the generation of 
narrowly defined rather than broadly generalizable theory. My reason for choosing the case study 
approach is that it is notoriously difficult to measure certain constructs in the extant literature, 
such as diffused responsibility, social hierarchy within bureaucratic arrangements, and fear for 
institutional authority in the Indian context. Pentland’s (1999) assertion that stories are constructs 
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is applicable to my research, as constructs can be clarified or newly generated through 
descriptive contextual narratives. 
Case study research must decide whether to develop theory before, during, or after the 
research process. For Eisenhardt (1989), who recommends that researchers avoid thinking about 
relationships between variables and theories while beginning their research, “theory-building 
research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no 
hypothesis to test” (p. 536). On the other hand, Yin (2009) asserts that the development of theory 
prior to data collection differentiates case study research from other methodologies (e.g., 
ethnography or a grounded theory approach). For Yin (2009), “the complete research design 
embodies a ‘theory’ of what is being studied” (p. 36), which connects all constituent parts of the 
research design (questions, propositions, unit of analysis, data collection, and analysis) to keep 
the study structured and focused.  To help with the generation of theory, Yin (2009) suggests the 
use of exemplary works in the researcher’s relevant field as a starting point during the literature 
review process. Such works offer rich theoretical insights and provide opportunities to think 
about different units of analysis. In this context, I conducted archival research on India’s 
administration (Appleby, 1953, 1956), along with relevant literature about public sector reforms 
and the constitutional arrangements shaping India’s federal polity (as discussed in Chapter 2), as 
a starting point to generate theoretical propositions. Appleby’s reports are widely considered to 
be the most relevant and theoretically insightful studies on India’s administrative systems 
(Caiden & Sundaram, 2004; Dwivedi et al., 1989; Reddy et al., 2004).  
According to Yin (2009), it is important to state specific study propositions before data 
collection to direct attention to the specific issues that will be studied (p. 28). Based on the 
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research questions and units of analysis, I present propositions for the three levels of analysis in 
my study:  
1. State level: I expect department heads to facilitate collaborative initiatives, 
because lines of responsibility for senior officials are diffused and cannot be 
easily ascertained. 
2. District level: I expect formal authority to play a key role in the adoption of 
collaborative governance, but only to the extent that it is not perceived as a threat 
to historically acquired agency authority, legitimacy. 
3. Village level: I expect the implementation of collaborative governance to be 
ineffective and problematic where participating administrative structures have, 
over the years, acquired the ability, legitimacy, and authority to operate in an 
environment of diffused responsibility. 
A common theme throughout these propositions is that, ironically, collaboration is more 
likely to be adopted where lines of responsibility are diffused than where they are clear. Based 
on these study propositions, I propose a theory encompassing the constituent parts of the 
research design to guide the case study research of Maarpu’s implementation: 
The case study will show why implementation can succeed only when the organization’s 
administrative structures are changed, and not when collaborative governance reforms are 
super-imposed on existing administrative structures. 
 
In addition to enabling data collection in a structured and focused manner, specifying a 
theory helps in “analytic generalization, in which a previously developed theory is used as a 
template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin, 2009, p. 38). In a 
case study approach, cases are chosen on the basis of their potential to provide theoretical 
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insights rather than their representativeness; thus, the focus is on generalizing not to the level of 
an entire population but to the level of the theory-of-interest (George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 
2009).  
 Finally, a critical component of a case-study research design is the articulation of rival 
explanations for interpreting the study’s findings. Yin (2011) categorizes rival explanations into 
craft and substantive rivals (p. 148). Craft rivals, which are basic issues that are usually 
addressed in a well-designed study, include the null hypothesis (i.e., the outcome is explained by 
pure chance) and threats to internal validity (i.e., selection bias, response bias, and researcher-
induced bias, which are discussed in the section on validity and reliability). Substantive rivals, 
which are more serious alternative explanations that “will compete with the main interpretation 
of your study’s findings and, therefore, can dramatically affect your study’s conclusions” (p. 
150), include mutually exclusive explanations and explanations that overlap (p. 151). Although 
case study designs attempt to emulate the experimental design’s logic, they do not sufficiently 
control for all variables to be able to completely rule out a rival explanation. Thus, overlapping 
substantive rival explanations are commonly encountered in case study research. I provide below 
a theory regarding the possible substantive rival explanations for my study: 
The case study will also show why the creation of institutional arrangements and the 
presence of policy entrepreneurs or charismatic leaders was insufficient for successful 
implementation. 
 
The above statement addresses the rival theory that implementation of collaborative 
governance fails because the necessary institutional arrangements are not in place or because 
charismatic leadership is absent and that having these two components is required for 
implementation to succeed. Several substantive rival explanations can be derived from 
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elaboration of this theory, which can be analyzed along with the findings during the data analysis 
stage. Yin (2009) notes that specifying rival explanations at the research design stage it will 
enable the researcher to be cognizant of, and collect relevant data about, these explanations. 
Below, I present a few possible findings along with potential explanations and rival explanations: 
 First, Social hierarchy (i.e., village-level government officials do not like to be 
questioned by illiterate citizens from socially and economically disadvantaged communities) is 
commonly understood to be the reason why government officials are not responsive to local 
communities. A rival explanation is that if village-level government representatives actually 
started participating in meetings and became responsive, then those responsible for poor service 
delivery will be held accountable to the people, possibly leading to a chain of unforeseen events 
and mutual blame for services not rendered and for engaging in corrupt practices, absenteeism, 
or nepotism, which could ultimately travel higher up the hierarchy. Given that most policy 
entrepreneurs who drive such collaborative initiatives occupy positions of power for short 
durations (for example, the District Collector’s duration is two years), it is not in the long-term 
interest of village-level government officials (who in stay in their posts for the duration of their 
thirty year careers) to engage in this type of blame game, and this results in their lack of 
community responsiveness.  
 Second, the central idea behind all development programs in India is to make programs 
demand-driven; the idea that when a community is aware of their rights and services, they 
will demand for them and will know whom to hold accountable. The idea behind Maarpu is 
that local women of each village will demand maternal and child health services and thus 
village health workers will be become responsive. If indeed village health workers are have 
become responsive then one possible explanation is because of local community’s 
133 
 
 
 
participation in Maarpu. A rival explanation is that village health workers are participating in 
the village-level collaborative meetings out of fear for the District Collector’s formal 
authority. Similarly, if village health clinics are witnessing an increase in maternal deliveries, 
one explanation is that Maarpu has generated this demand from the community, while a rival 
explanation is that the village health workers are working more diligently because the 
District Collector closely monitors institutional deliveries.  
 Third, In spite of the institutional arrangements, training, and senior leadership 
commitment to engage in collaboration, there is a lack of uptake within the organizations at 
the district level to work across departmental boundaries. The most common explanation for 
this is that bureaucrats are generally resistant to change and that, typically, only charismatic 
leadership can help break that resistance. Another common explanation is that mid-level 
bureaucrats have typically seen similar enthusiastic reforms in the past and are simply 
waiting for the next leadership change to come with a new set of reforms. A rival explanation 
is that, at the district level, bureaucrats who are responsible for leading the implementation of 
the collaborative initiative are only attuned to coordination activities, which differ from the 
actual act of implementation. If these bureaucrats have to engage in real implementation 
work of the collaborative initiative, then quick decisions need to be made and followed up on 
during interactions with local communities. However, because the lines of responsibility are 
unclear, these bureaucrats resort to coordination activities, means generating voluminous 
paperwork while making few actionable decisions.  
 In all the above instances, both rival explanations are plausible, but “the ultimately 
satisfying explanation may involve some of both” (Yin, 2011, p. 151). In line with the emergent 
nature of case study research, the theoretical propositions and rival explanations will be constantly 
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tested, modified, and refined in light of evidence collected from multiple units of analysis. Thus, 
the findings from the case study will be generalized up to the level of the theory rather than to the 
level of a population (e.g., Indian bureaucrats or health clinics).  
Data Collection 
Fieldwork involved two visits to India in May 2013 and between January-June 2014. 
During phase one, fieldwork involved interview state-level officials and subject matter experts, 
while phase two involved fieldwork at the district and village-level. See Figure 2 for a map of the 
field work sites. 
In total, I interviewed 86 government officials: 18 at the state-level, 8 at the district-level, 
and 60 at the village-level. Of these, 40 interviews were from the Health department, 36 from 
Rural Development, 9 from Women & Child Welfare, and only one informant from Panchayati 
Raj Institutions. The distribution of informants from each department across administrative is 
represented in the Table below. 
Table 3: Distribution of Interviews across Departments 
Administrative-level Health Women & Child 
Development 
Rural Development 
State 8 4 6 
District 4 - 4 
Village 28 4 27 
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In general, there are more informants at the village level because of the multiple cases. 
Across departments, there are more informants the Health department followed by the Rural 
Development department. This distribution speaks to the structure of Maarpu where a majority of 
the indicators to be monitored were health related and Maarpu meetings were anchored along 
with the VO-SHGs meetings. The distribution also is consistent with the hour-glass structure of 
bureaucracies where the district officials are fewer in number. An important reason why the 
distribution varies is because my sampling strategy was purposive—in that I wanted to interview 
those individuals who had an in-depth knowledge about Maarpu. Secondly, none of my visits 
where pre-announced, so I could only meet those who were already there at the site. In other 
cases, the relevant officials were unable to meet on that day and I was not able to track them 
down later. Lastly, for a certain period during my field work the field staff from Women & Child 
Welfare were on strike so I could not interview many of them.  
In addition, I visited 28 villages to observe Maarpu meetings. I made one village-visit 
during my May 2013 fieldwork at a different district where the same District Collector was 
posted, but that visit was accompanied by a district official. I analyze that meeting in my findings 
chapters along with the other 28 I observed during January-June 2014. Of these 28, only 6 had 
some discussion about Maarpu, 12 had no discussion of Maarpu, but the regular VO-SHGs 
meeting took place, and 11 had no meeting at all (either Maarpu or VO-SHGs). Furthermore, I 
attended one review meeting (for the preparation of the state’s health sector project 
implementation plan where officials from all districts had come) and one training program at the 
state level (where I documented the speeches of 9 state-level officials and program managers), 
observed one district-level review meeting of Maarpu conducted by the District Collector and 
other officials, and observed one review meeting at the village level at a Primary Health Center. I 
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was only able to attend those meetings that happened during my fieldwork and those that I was 
informed off.  
Furthermore, I interviewed nine subject matter experts. Five of them were from 
Management Research and Training Institutions based in India (MRTI-India), one informant was 
affiliated to an international-based research organization working in Medak, one informant was 
from a multilateral aid agency who has been working extensively with Andhra Pradesh’s 
development sector, and two retired government officials. I also collected data from 43 different 
instances of interactions I had with citizens. These are citizens I group them as service delivery 
beneficiaries as they are women from the village, pregnant women, and lactating mothers. In 
some instances, I interacted with one person, while in others I interacted with a group (no, these 
were not focus groups). I strategically visited the following service delivery points or events to 
visit this group of informants: five interactions at Nutrition-Health Days (NH-Days), nine 
interactions at Primary Health Centers, 11 interactions at villages (while I was visiting and just 
sitting at a place writing my field notes), 12 interactions at village meetings, and 6 interactions 
during inspection visits I made with a district official. In addition, I reviewed 15 Government 
Orders (GOs) and numerous newspaper articles.  
Addressing Concerns of Validity and Reliability 
 The aforementioned weaknesses of case study research can be grouped into concerns 
regarding construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 2009). Each 
of these concerns can be effectively addressed while crafting the research design (external 
validity), during data collection (construct validity and reliability), and while analyzing data 
(internal validity) (p. 41). I this section, I address each of these concerns in relation to my study.  
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External Validity 
External validity is related to generalizability beyond the particular case under study (Yin, 2009). 
Here, it is important to clearly distinguish between statistical generalization (i.e., studying a 
sample and generalizing the findings to the level of a wider population) and analytic 
generalization in case studies (i.e., studying specific cases selected for theoretical relevance and 
generalizing the findings to the level of the theory). As explained earlier, I am not generalizing to 
the level of the population (i.e., all districts, bureaucrats, or health clinics in Andhra Pradesh), 
but to the level of theory (i.e., implementation of collaborative governance can only succeed 
when the organization’s structural issues are addressed and not when collaborative initiatives are 
super-imposed on existing administrative structures). Thus, the findings are applicable to the 
extent that other cases also share similar contextual factors – in this case, decentralized 
administrative structures, but characterized by centralized authority.  
Construct Validity 
Construct validity is related to whether the case study researcher is able to adequately 
demonstrate that the data collected accurately reflect the units of analysis under study and is not 
biased by subjective impressions (Yin, 2009, p. 49).  
Because there is very limited literature documenting how the implementation process of a 
collaborative governance initiative moves through India’s decentralized administrative systems, 
it is best to view the development of constructs in an emergent manner. To ensure this inductive 
process is systematic, I use the integrative framework for collaborative governance (Emerson et 
al., 2012) to guide data collection. Accordingly, I collect data about the context, external 
environment, drivers, operational dynamics, institutional arrangements, shared goals, 
collaborative actions, outcomes, impact and adaptation. The use of contextually rich stories and 
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narratives emerging as a result of collecting data around component parts of the integrative 
framework for collaborative governance can be used as constructs or from which specific 
theoretical and empirical constructs can emerge (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Pentland, 1999; Ragin, 
1999).  
To generate such narratives, the research design draws primarily on data from interviews 
and observations. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest the use of retrospective and real-time 
cases to minimize the bias arising out of collecting data through interviews, where “impression 
management and retrospective sensemaking are deemed the prime culprits” (p. 28).  I achieve 
this by interviewing participants who were either previously associated with Maarpu (during its 
planning phase) and those who are currently involved with its implementation.   
Furthermore, another source of real-time data is from observing village-level meetings.  
Another strategy suggested by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) to minimize the bias from 
interview data is to interview “numerous and highly knowledgeable informants who view the 
focal phenomenon from diverse perspectives” by selecting informants from different levels of 
the hierarchy, from functional and programmatic areas, and from both within and outside the 
organization. I achieve this by interviewing elites (Tansey, 2007), bureaucrats at all three levels 
of the hierarchy and across different departments, and subject matter experts who have intimate 
knowledge of the programmatic area and organizational dynamics but are external to the 
organization (e.g., consultants or retired government officials). Thus, I triangulate and converge 
multiple sources of data to ensure construct validity.  
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Reliability 
Reliability relates to using proper documentation, keeping an audit trail, and operationalizing as 
many data collection and analysis procedures as possible so that another researcher following the 
same procedures for the same cases would find the same set of results. Yin (2009) suggests 
several strategies for ensuring proper documentation of the case study, including the use of a 
case study database that can systematically organize all the data related to the study. Flyvbjerg 
(2006) echoes Charles Darwin’s (1958) suggestion to make notes or memos of all the thoughts 
that come to mind during data collection or analysis. Often these memos will include thoughts 
and observations that could also run counter to the general findings and, thus, are useful as 
documentation to demonstrate that researcher bias has been minimized, since such bias is a 
critical threat to the study’s reliability.  
In my study, I created a case study database using NVivo 10, a qualitative data analysis 
software program, to organize my data and also create analytical memos. Although NVivo 10 is 
used for data analysis, its basic architecture is a database that allows researchers to manage and 
visualize data and ideas, run queries, and generate reports (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013).. The 
NVivo 10 also allows for the creation of journal entries (with date and time stamps), memos, and 
annotations. Thoughts and reflections while reading an interview can be instantly documented by 
using these tools. Over the course of data collection and analysis, these notes reflect the process 
of how a conclusion was reached or how a competing explanation was analyzed. Miles et al. 
(2013) suggest that keeping analytical memos is an exercise in creating conceptual clarity that 
can be used in the theory generation process. Analytical memos “don’t just report data; they tie 
together different pieces of data into a recognizable cluster, often to show that those data are 
instances of a general concept” (p. 96).  
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Internal Validity 
    The failure to fully exhaust all possible explanations before explaining a finding will lead 
to spurious conclusions and hurt the internal validity of the study. For example, if I incorrectly 
conclude that maternal and child health services improved because of departmental 
collaboration, when in fact services improved because the District Collector closely monitors the 
services, the internal validity of my study will suffer. The focus of this study is to uncover the 
causal mechanisms between collaborative governance and service delivery; thus, my data 
analysis methods must be focused on exhaustively uncovering the causal mechanisms. Yin 
(2009) strongly recommends the use of rival explanations, as discussed earlier. George and 
Bennet (2005) and Vennesson (2008) underscore the use of process tracing as a method to 
uncover causal mechanisms. Additional methodological strategies aimed at systematically and 
rigorously arriving at conclusions are thematic coding, within-case analysis, and cross-case 
patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles et al., 2013; Yin, 2009). These methods are not mutually 
exclusive but rather interconnected, leveraging each tool’s analytical capabilities to finally 
identify the causal mechanisms.  
The above-mentioned analytical tools are easily integrated into NVivo 10’s functioning, 
which allows for coding, querying, and finding patterns across different sources of data through 
matrix-coding queries and framework matrices (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). The first step in data 
analysis is to code all documented evidence. Miles et al. (2013)p.72 define a code as a 
“researcher-generated construct that symbolizes and thus attributes interpreted meaning to each 
individual datum for later purposes of pattern detection, categorization, theory building, and 
other analytic process.” Thus, one fully-coded interview shows how different themes or codes 
are assigned to different parts of the interview, demonstrating the theoretical and conceptual 
141 
 
 
 
contribution of this particular case to the study. The process of coding each case is essentially a 
within-case analysis, which refers to the process of becoming “intimately familiar with each case 
as a stand-alone entity” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540). All cases within a particular data source can 
then be compared across different thematic codes.  
Once other data sources (e.g., documents, observations from village meetings and 
administrative review meetings, field notes, and interviews of service delivery beneficiaries) are 
coded, comparisons can be made across these sources based on certain thematic codes to observe 
patterns across cases and sources by looking for “within-group similarities coupled with 
intergroup differences” across a range of dimensions (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540). For example, 
responses from all sources of data can be queried and we can compare what different sources are 
discussing about turf battles or perception or how discretion was exercised. In effect, we can 
compare within the Health department responses to certain themes or codes across the state, 
district and village levels and compare this with other sources of data for effective triangulation. 
Thus, the analysis allows data to be viewed from different vantage points.  
The advantage of using NVivo 10 for data analysis is that it allows for the systematic 
processing of voluminous data and also enables the development of an audit trail, thereby 
serving the purpose of enhancing internal validity and reliability. However, a potential pitfall of 
using NVivo 10 is that the researcher may spend too much time coding or create too many codes, 
thus frustrating the analysis. Finally, NVivo 10 is no substitute for theoretical and analytical 
thinking, as the software’s analytical prowess is only as good the commands it receives.      
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Conclusion 
 This chapter provided a detailed overview of the case study context, research design and 
methodology. It discussed the research questions and theoretical propositions that guide the case 
study. It also discussed how various trade-offs of the methodological choice were carefully 
considered in terms of strengths and weaknesses and explained the study’s case selection, 
research design, unit of analysis, theory development and rival explanations. The chapter also 
provided a detailed description of the data collected, addressed concerns related to the study’s 
validity and reliability, and briefly discussed the analytical tools used to address the theoretical 
propositions and research questions.  
Further details regarding the analysis process and findings will be discussed in the 
chapter 6 and 7. The findings are organized by the two subsidiary questions and, thus, are 
divided into two chapters. The first research question (Chapter 6) uncovers the antecedents and 
narratives leading up to the formulation of the CGI. The second research question (Chapter 7) 
examines how the actual implementation process unfolded at the district and village level. The 
overarching finding is that, while the policy of implementation is one of collective action, 
implementation of the policy was skewed towards programmatic indicators dominated by the 
health department’s agenda. The findings shed light on the underlying politics within the upper 
echelons of the bureaucracies that shaped the formulation of the CGI and how mid- and street-
level bureaucrats perceived the CGI as essentially a health department initiative that was being 
thrust upon them. Ultimately, even as bureaucrats at all levels of the implementation hierarchy 
(i.e., the state, district, and village-levels of administration) professed to the spirit of 
collaboration, they continued to work in their bureaucratic silos creating what can be best 
described as an illusion of collaboration. Data were collected from in-depth interviews of 
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bureaucrats, government-issued executive orders available in the public domain, and 
observations from a range of implementation processes (e.g., review meetings and village-level 
collaborative meetings), and these findings were further verified by interactions with citizens 
(i.e., service delivery beneficiaries in the villages) who were purported to be participating in the 
CGI. Multiple perspectives from organization theory were used to understand the findings, and 
NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software program, was used to analyze the data. 
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Table 4: List of 20 Interventions as part of Maarpu [as described in Government Order No. 
249, Government of Andhra Pradesh, September 29, 2012] 
 
1 Early Registration of Pregnancy 
2 Ante Natal Checkups (ANCs) 
3 Maternal Nutrition 
4 Identification of high-risk pregnancies 
5 Birth Planning 
6 Institutional delivery 
7 Early initiation of breastfeeding 
8 Exclusive breastfeeding for six months 
9 Post Natal Care and Newborn Care 
10 Immunization 
11 Growth Monitoring 
12 Complementary feeding & Child Nutrition 
13 Management of ARI & Diarrhoea 
14 Strengthening of referral system 
15 Family Planning 
16 Maternal & Infant Death Reviews 
17 Sanitation & Hygiene 
18 Age at Marriage 
19 Adolescent Girls 
20 Gender Sensitization 
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Figure 5: State and District Map of Data Collection Sites 
 
 
 
 
To the left: Map of India, with the 
state of Andhra Pradesh in focus. Also 
highlighted is Medak district where 
fieldwork was conducted.   
Below: Detailed map of Medak district 
showing the areas where fieldwork was 
conducted. Hyderabad is the state 
capital.  
District and Village-level fieldwork sites 
State-level fieldwork sites 
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Chapter Six 
The Policy of Implementation 
[A conversation from the popular TV show Yes, Minister] 
Member of Parliamentary Select Committee: Whatever we ask you, you say it is a policy matter 
for the Minister, and whatever we ask the Minister, he says it is an administrative matter to ask 
you… [so] how do we know what is going on? 
Sir Humphrey: Yes…yes…yes…I see that there is a real dilemma here, in that while it is 
government policy to regard policy as the responsibility of Ministers and administration as the 
responsibility of officials, the questions of administrative policy can cause confusion between the 
policy of administration and the administration of policy…especially when responsibility for the 
administration of the policy of administration conflicts or overlaps with responsibility for the 
policy of the administration of the policy… 
Member of Parliamentary Select Committee: Well, that’s a load of meaningless drivel, isn’t it? 
Sir Humphrey: It’s not for me to comment on government policy; you must ask the Minister. 
 
Emergence of the Collaborative Governance Initiative (CGI) 
In this chapter, I trace the antecedents of the CGI through two sources of data: a review of 
the Government Orders (GOs) and an analysis of in-depth interviews with bureaucrats. In total, 
15 GOs issued between 2010-2012 that were specifically aimed at strengthening health service 
delivery and improving maternal and child health outcomes were reviewed. In the context of 
India’s government bureaucracies, these GOs are the first step in the implementation process. 
They spell out, rationally, how a program needs to be implemented at the state, district, and 
village-level of administration. Furthermore, a total of 27 interviews (18 state-level and 9 
district-level) from senior bureaucrats and program managers (representing the upper echelons of 
the bureaucracy) and the district administration were used to understand the underlying 
bureaucratic politics that are not apparent in the GOs. In various capacities, the 18 state-level 
bureaucrats were involved in the initial discussions of Maarpu and the meetings held between 
departmental heads that led to the drafting of GO #249. The distribution of interviews across 
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departments is as follows: 15 interviews from the Health department (eight state-level and seven 
district-level), eight from Rural Development (six state-level and two district-level), and four 
from the department of Women & Child Development.    
Maarpu’s Programmatic Focus 
The Government of Andhra Pradesh launched Maarpu on September 12, 2012, through 
Government Order (GO) #249, with the stated goal of “Convergence to Improve Health and 
Nutrition Status of Women and Children—Interdepartmental Coordination for Effective 
Convergence” between the following key departments: Health, Rural Development, Panchayati 
Raj (i.e., local governments in villages), the Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty 
(SERP), Rural Water Supply, and Women & Child Development. The Rural Development 
department consists of several subunits: Panchayati Raj (i.e., local village governments), the 
Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP), and Rural Water Supply. Specifically, 
SERP oversees the functioning of the Self-Help Groups (SHGs), consisting of village women 
who organize themselves into collectives. GO #249 situates the need for Maarpu in the context 
of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and underscores how the state of 
Andhra Pradesh is lagging behind the MDGs and underperforming on the Human Development 
Index. This GO was issued by the Chief Secretary on behalf of all other departmental heads.  
Two key programmatic goals – “strengthening of health care services and nutritional 
services” and “behavioral change in the community” – were identified to address issues 
including age of marriage, early initiation of breast feeding, complementary feeding, high 
anemia levels, early registration of pregnancy, institutional deliveries, and newborn care. These 
goals are to be implemented through a focus on “20 key interventions to reduce MMR, IMR & 
Malnutrition.”  The GO specifies four levels of administrative structures for convergence: State 
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Level Convergence Committee, District Level Convergence Committee, Cluster Level 
Convergence Committee, and Village Level Convergence Committee. Each committee 
comprises about 5-10 members who are all government functionaries from the corresponding 
levels in the administrative hierarchy and represent community organizations19 at the district, 
cluster, and village levels. 
A subsequent GO, issued seven months later by the same Chief Secretary on April 30th, 
2013, further articulated the policy of implementing Maarpu: “as the convergence efforts by the 
Health, Women & Child Development, Panchayati Raj and Rural Development Departments, 
working along with the Self-Help Groups (SHGs) and their federations, to bring about a quick 
decline in Infant Mortality Rate (IMR), Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) and Malnutrition in the 
State of Andhra Pradesh.” Furthermore, the GO articulates the theory behind this policy, which 
is that “close involvement of the SHGs and community-led effort to effect behavioral change 
will, at the same time, stimulate the demand for health and nutrition services.” GO #57 provides 
“operational guidelines” based on Maarpu’s implementation experience during the past few 
months. In total, the GO provides ten monitoring and reporting formats for the different field-
level functionaries involved in the initiative from the different departments, including one format 
for the Village Level Convergence Committee Meeting, four for the Health department’s field 
worker, one for the field worker from the department of Women & Child Development, one for 
the field worker from the Rural Water Supply department, one for the Village Organization (i.e., 
representatives or leaders from each SHG), one for the medical doctor at the village-level health 
 
19 These community organizations have been created as per the guidelines of either the Government of India or Government of 
Andhra Pradesh. For example, the Village Health, Sanitation & Nutrition Committee (VHSNC) is prescribed by the Government 
of India, while Zilla Mahila Samakhyaaas (District-level Women’s Federation) is prescribed by the state government. 
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clinic (called Primary Health Centers (PHCs), and one for the cluster-level coordinator (note that 
a group of PHCs form a cluster).  
These two GOs illustrate that Maarpu is seen a convergence tool that creates a set of 
institutional arrangements for effective coordination of services related to maternal and child 
health outcomes. It seeks to identify commonalities among different programs operating in silos 
across departments aimed at improving health and nutritional outcomes. In effect, at a structural 
and functional level, Maarpu aims to break through the culture of working in bureaucratic silos. 
In addition to providing a platform for inter-governmental coordination, Maarpu also provides 
for citizen participation through village Self-Help Groups (SHGs) and their organizational 
structures consisting of the Village Organizations (VOs). It is also clear that the ultimate aim of 
Maarpu is to attain the MDGs related to maternal and child health outcomes. However, a review 
of earlier GOs reveals that the initial efforts led by the Health department to attain MDGs and the 
objectives of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) were focused on reforms within the 
Health department and did not involve citizen participation.  
Early Structural and Functional Reforms  
The initial state government efforts to implement the NRHM-related reforms were, naturally, 
led by the Health department. The NRHM is a Government of India initiative launched in 2005 
in relation to India’s commitment on the world stage to attain the MDGs. Specifically, NRHM 
was aimed at bringing about structural and functional reforms within India’s health service 
delivery structures through greater integration of programs and a focus on citizen participation. 
Funds from NRHM have benefitted several state governments in improving the infrastructure 
related to health service delivery, such as through construction of new rural health clinics, 
hospitals, hiring of new health personnel, and purchase of equipment. NRHM provided the 
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incentives for state governments to revitalize their stagnant rural health service delivery 
facilities. However, the use of NRHM funds was not tied to any structural or functional reforms 
at the subnational level, which is the necessary component to attain the goals of integrating 
health service delivery across the numerous health interventions that were being implemented. 
Furthermore, each subnational government’s health sector policy is influenced by political 
mandates and priorities. At the time (2004-2009) in Andhra Pradesh, the focus of the state’s 
Chief Minister was on a government-sponsored health insurance scheme that provided for health 
care services to the rural poor in urban hospitals. This was a popular program with the rural 
people, but a consequence of this policy was that rural health care services (also referred to as 
primary health care services) were adversely affected. A changing of the guard in the state 
government following the untimely death of the Chief Minister in September 2009 returned the 
state government’s focus to improving rural health care services. This was the result of key 
bureaucratic elites’ leveraging of their inter-personal relationships, past experience with the 
health sector, and close relations with the new political dispensation to change the course of the 
state’s health sector focus.   
All 17 participants interviewed at the state level across departments and 4 participants from 
the Health department at the district level referred to Mr. P. V. Ramesh, who served as the head 
of Health department for two years (2010-2012), as the key person behind changing the state 
government’s health-sector focus back to rural health services and aligning it with the goals set 
forth by the National Rural Health Mission. I had the opportunity to conduct an in-depth 
interview with Mr. Ramesh, who not only validated the above story but also was the only person 
in the study who expressly stated that I could use his name. For the first time in the history of the 
state’s Health department, an Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer who was a medical 
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doctor had been posted as its departmental head. At the time, he was also the personal doctor to 
the new Chief Minister, and he used his goodwill to embark on structural and functional reforms 
within the Health department and focus on improving maternal and child care services in rural 
areas, which he believed would revitalize the overall primary health care services. Prior to P. V. 
Ramesh’s tenure, the state government, as a matter of routine, had created the positions 
recommended by NRHM guidelines, but they were either not filled or, if filled, were being 
undermined. NRHM provided for recruitment via lateral entry and not through the state civil 
service system; thus, all NRHM-related personnel are not career bureaucrats in the district 
administration but are hired as consultants but who work alongside the regular bureaucratic 
structures of district administration. A key informant from the Health department who was 
heading the NRHM unit at the time of my field interviews described the situation prior to P. V. 
Ramesh as follows: 
The District Programme Management Units (DPMUs), as recommended by the NRHM, 
were set up in each district in the year 2008. But their roles was diminished because the 
regular administration system [the career bureaucrats in the district] did not want to lose 
control and money, so they kept this unit idle…you see, this DPMU has the District 
Programme Officer, Accounts officer, MIS officer, and one data entry operator at the unit 
and the other data entry operator at the immunization section…these five constitute the 
DPMUs [in 2009].  
So they [the district’s health department] are utilizing the data entry operator for their 
regular work and the MIS officer as another data entry operator and not as the Monitoring 
and Evaluation office. The Accounts Officer is simply sitting idle…and they expected me 
also to sit like that. 
Then…everything took a drastic shift when P. V. Ramesh came and issued GO no. 339, 
where he articulated the role of the district health administration and the DPMU. 
In fact, 10 of the 15 Government Orders (GOs) I reviewed were issued by P. V. Ramesh 
during his tenure as the Principal Secretary of the Health department. In all his GOs, he clearly 
articulated the need for the state government’s health sector focus to be aligned with NRHM 
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objectives, MDGs, and effective coordination of health service delivery at the field level. The 
focus of his structural reforms was to create a new hierarchy between the district and village 
called a ‘cluster,’ with the goal of bringing about functional reforms aimed at better coordination, 
supervision, and monitoring between village-level health clinics. In my interview with P. V. 
Ramesh, he talked about the multiple superfluous, overlapping, and uncoordinated departmental 
units, subunits and institutions that existed within the Health department when he came to office: 
So this was a paradise for fragmentation…I mean [raising his voice], this was completely 
structured for total non-performance! So when people say that governance is poor…the 
fundamental reason is institutional infirmity…forget about functioning…first of all, 
institutions are structured to be dysfunctional.  
 The Health department’s top-down administrative hierarchy consists of a state-level 
headquarters and a district-level health administrative machinery headed by a District Medical 
and Health Officer (DMHO), which is a position occupied by a career bureaucrat who moves up 
the ranks of the state government’s civil service machinery. This is one of the most coveted 
positions of power and formal authority in a district and is generally attained towards the end of 
an individual’s career. The DMHO oversees all the Primary Health Clinics (PHCs), which are 
headed by a Medical Officer (MO) (who is also from the state’s civil service machinery). The 
MO of the PHC in turn oversees the PHC’s staff and the Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM), who 
is the field-level health worker primarily responsible for all maternal and child-related health 
services. The ANM is stationed at Health Sub-Centers, which are village-level health posts. Each 
ANM and sub-center services a group of nearby villages. Furthermore, as a result of NRHM’s 
focus on improving access to maternal and child health services, funds were made available to 
hire an additional ANM on a contractual basis (while the first ANM is a regular health 
department employee). In addition, each village has been given an ASHA (Accredited Social 
Health Activist) worker who is paid on the basis of her activities. For example, each time an 
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ASHA brings a pregnant mother from her village to the government hospital for a birth delivery 
(referred to as an institutional delivery), she gets paid an incentive.  Based on the guidelines of 
the Government of India, a PHC should cover a population of 20-25 thousand people; thus, there 
are approximately 1,892 PHCs in the state. In effect, therefore, one DMHO has administrative 
power and functional control over 1,892 MOs.  
 The DMHO’s administrative hierarchy, consisting of PHCs and sub-centers, is one part 
of a messy web of departmental structures within the Health department that is mandated to 
deliver primary health care services. Two other powerful departmental structures exist: 
institutions mandated to deliver secondary and tertiary health care services and institutions 
mandated to provide medical teaching and training. These are replete with their own set of top-
down hierarchical structures, all headed by medical doctors from the state’s civil service 
machinery. These three sets of institutions are headed by the Commissioner of Health & Family 
Welfare; a post reserved for the IAS officer who may or may not be from the medical profession 
or from the state’s civil service machinery. This is the “paradise of fragmentation” that P. V 
Ramesh, an IAS officer from the central government’s civil service machinery, headed as the 
Principal Secretary of the Health department (a position reserved for the IAS cadre).  
 To bring about better coordination between these myriad institutions at the district and 
village level, P. V. Ramesh proposed to create a new level of hierarchy between the DMHOs and 
the PHCs called Community Health and Nutrition Clusters (CHNCs). The CHNCs would cover a 
network of PHCs, would have their own medical and para-medical staff, and would be headed by 
a Senior Public Health Officer (SPHO) from the state government’s civil service machinery. 
Given the respect he commanded within the department and within the new political 
dispensation, P. V. Ramesh moved quickly to announce and execute these structural and 
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functional reforms. As articulated in GO #209 titled “Public Health Strengthening–Revitalization 
of the Primary Health System:”  
In continuation of the process of primary health institutions’ rationalization, the 
Government has decided to establish Three Hundred Sixty (360) Community Health and 
Nutrition Centers (CHNCs) across the state with a view to provide comprehensive health 
services to population ranging from one to three lakhs (i.e., 1-3 hundred thousand) 
through a network of four to ten proximate PHCs and a Referral Hospital.   
Subsequent memos and GOs from P. V. Ramesh articulated a further devolution of power from 
the district to the clusters; in effect, from the DMHO to the CHNCs and the SPHO.  
The PHC MOs will report to the Deputy DMHO/DMHO only through the CH Cluster 
Coordinators. The government in due course will empower the CHCC to perform all 
functions of the department in the cluster (Memo No. 12231). 
The principal responsibilities of the CHNC—which will be an integrated Mini-
Directorate of Health and Family Welfare closest to the people it serves—are to 
[decrease] maternal and infant mortality and morbidity, reduce the burden of both 
communicable and non-communicable diseases, facilitate integration of health, nutrition 
and economic empowerment interventions and strengthen professional relationship and 
referral between health institutions, especially between the village, sub-centre and the 
PHC, and the PHC with the CHC/Area and District Hospitals (GO #15) 
 Another of P. V. Ramesh’s major contributions during his tenure as Principal Secretary 
of the Health department was designing an MCP (Mother and Child Protection) card that lists 20 
indicators that need to be monitored from conception till the time of delivery to ensure safe 
deliveries. The MCP card and the 20 indicators are at the heart of what later emerged as Maarpu: 
the programmatic focus of the initiative was that the community, along with field-level 
functionaries, should monitor these 20 indicators to improve maternal and child health outcomes. 
During the interview, I asked P. V. Ramesh why he wanted to focus on MCH (Mother and Child 
Health) activities and whether too much focus on MCH activities would distort other health 
services. He replied: 
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Our IMR [Infant Mortality Rate] at 46 is close to Bihar…Bihar is 48…and MMR 
[Maternal Mortality Rate] is 137, but it is much closer to the northern states compared to 
southern states. The only way I could move the entire health machinery out of the 
obsession with tubectomy [i.e., family-planning surgeries] was to get them into the MCH 
mission. You see, MCH is a good entry point to strengthen the health system because it 
involves a lot of monitoring….I can strengthen 60% of the system. 
 The capacity of the department functionaries to conceptualize and internalize this 
sort of a multifaceted task is limited, so that is why I felt that, you know, if you can focus 
on maternal health, child health and nutrition…everything was reduced to 20 points…if 
you can do these 20 things…now you go anywhere in the state, and everybody will be 
able to tell you what these 20 things are….If you ask people to do 100 things, they do 
nothing. 
While the MCP card continues to exist and is used extensively by both mothers and health 
workers (as I observed during my fieldwork), the structures of the Community Health and 
Nutrition Clusters (CHNCs) and the Senior Public Health Officer (SPHO) remain effectively 
dysfunctional.  
Not Devolution, but Demolition of Power  
 Only eight of the participants I interviewed spoke in depth about the practical usefulness 
of the newly created hierarchy for supervision and better coordination between field workers. 
The remaining 19 maintained that, while it is an excellent idea in theory, it will take time to be 
fully effective. All 27 participants agreed that the devolution of power was not completed. The 
following conversation with a district-level health official captures the reality of how the SPHOs 
function: 
District Official: While the concept is excellent, the implementation is the problem. For 
example, whether to give powers to SPHOs or not was left hanging. 
 
Researcher: Why? When these institutions were created, didn’t the planners think about 
whether to give powers to them or not? 
District Official: They were given service powers, but not administrative powers. 
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Researcher: For example? 
District Official: Service powers mean they can monitor whatever programs are currently 
being delivered, but they cannot control the staff [i.e., administrative powers]. 
  In concept, P.V Ramesh wanted to attain geographic and functional synchronization at 
the cluster level between field functionaries (or line staff) across the departments (Health, 
Women & Child Development, Rural Water Supply, and Panchayati Raj, which is responsible 
for sanitation). In effect, the idea behind the CHNCs was to make health and nutrition related 
functionaries’ co-terminus for improved coordination. However, without administrative powers 
or control over line staff, this is not possible. Furthermore, as one district official replied when 
asked if the SPHO can hold line staff from other departments accountable:  
No, no…the SPHO cannot do that, because then these front line staff will say that they 
have their bosses to be accountable to…so this kind of synchronization could not be 
achieved.  
 Given that administrative powers (e.g., the power to sanction leave or suspend staff) have 
been not transferred from the District Medical and Health Officer (DMHO) to the Senior Public 
Health Officer (SPHO), the SPHO cannot even hold their own department’s line staff 
accountable. During my fieldwork, the only one SPHO I interviewed did confirm that the powers 
have not been devolved, as P.V. Ramesh, the key bureaucrat championing these reforms, was 
transferred before this could occur. Two of my participants (one from Health and the other from 
Rural Development) stated that the DMHOs lobbied hard to get P.V. Ramesh transferred. In the 
early days of NRHM’s implementation, the District Programme Management Unit (DPMU), as 
part of the NRHM reforms, was also left dysfunctional by the DMHO’s institution. One of the 
first tasks that P.V. Ramesh took up was to make the DPMU responsible for NRHM funds; 
perhaps the reason he was able to do so was that there was no real devolution or loss of 
administrative power for the DMHO. Thus, with strong resistance from the DMHOs over 
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devolution of administrative powers to the SPHO, the matter was delayed to the point at which 
Ramesh was inevitably transferred. At the time of my interview with him, he was heading the 
state Finance department. The quotes below aptly capture the uselessness of the CHNC and 
SPHO reforms.  
 Women & Child Development (state level): 
In government, a front line worker of one department cannot be held accountable to 
another department’s supervisor—as you said, every department has its own hierarchy. 
Now, working together means just that, working together…you cannot demand 
accountability, for example [by saying] I called you for a meeting so you have to come. In 
general, information is shared and they work together. 
 Rural Development (district level):  
SPHOs were created to provide supportive supervision and coordination to field-level 
workers. In order to fill the posts, they transferred existing doctors from other facilities to 
CHNCs as SPHOs. In my view, it [the SPHO position] is useless. At least they were 
doing some work when they were in medical services…now they do nothing in 
supervisory roles. 
 Health (village level):  
The SPHOs…are a new cadre at the cluster to provide specialty services and supportive 
supervision—but what is really happening now? This new cadre is behaving the same 
way as the DMHO and additional DMHO—that is, they have become administrators. 
Emergence of Maarpu  
The last GO issued by P. V. Ramesh and related to CHNCs or SPHOs that I identified 
was from March 3, 2011. The GOs issued by P. V. Ramesh had an internal focus on the 
department’s functioning and made no mention of working with the community, despite the fact 
that the motivation of the reforms was to improve services for the community. Prior to Maarpu’s 
GO #249, two other GOs are worth considering to understand the process that finally culminated 
in the formulation of Maarpu: GO #55, issued on November 16, 2010, by then-Chief Secretary 
Mr. S.V. Prasad, and GO #102, issued on May 15, 2012, by then-Chief Secretary Mr. Pankaj 
Dwivedi. In GO #55, the Chief Secretary refers to a letter of January 9, 2007 from the Prime 
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Minister of India to the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh “expressing concerns on qualitative 
aspects of the ICDS programme, calling for universalization of ICDS with quality.” The GO 
calls for better convergence between programs run by the Women & Child Development and 
Rural Development departments, both of which operate village-level programs focused on 
improving the nutritional status of women. 
The Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) was launched in 1975 as a flagship 
development scheme of the Government of India and is implemented by the department of 
Women & Child Development in Andhra Pradesh. The field worker associated with this program 
is the Anganwadi Worker (AWW) who manages the Anganwadi Center in the village; 
essentially, this center serves a pre-school for children and provides them with meals, and 
services have now also been extended to providing meals for pregnant women and lactating 
mothers. The center is run by a woman from the local village; in total, there are more than 
80,423 Anganwadi Centers in the state. The ICDS program also has a state, district, and cluster 
level hierarchy to monitor the implementation of the program. The Society for the Elimination of 
Rural Poverty (SERP), under the Rural Development department, implements a similar program 
called NDCCs (Nutrition and Day Care Centers) for pregnant and nursing mothers along with 
Childhood Education Centers (CECs) for children aged 3-6 years. Unlike the Anganwadi Center 
and the Anganwadi Teacher, which are respectively sponsored by and employed by the 
government, the NDCCs and CECs are financed and operated by Self-Help Groups (SHGs) that 
are organized into a Village Organization (VO). SERP also has a state, district, and village-level 
administrative hierarchy that oversees the functioning of these community-based organizations 
(i.e., SHGs and VOs). There are Anganwadi Centers in every village, but the NDCCs are limited 
in number (approximately 4000) and cater specifically to socially and economically 
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disenfranchised communities.  Thus, GO #55 calls on the SERP and Women & Child 
Development department heads to identify villages where both can work together to improve 
nutrition outcomes in the state. 
GO #102 calls for convergence efforts, not only between ICDS and SERP programs but 
also to include all the departments and functionaries (at the state, district and village levels), 
including community-based organizations like the SHGs and VOs. The programmatic focus of 
GO #102 is to strengthen the Nutrition and Health Days (NHDs), a joint effort between the 
Health department’s immunization program and the Women & Child Development department’s 
ICDS program. On one assigned day of the month at the Aaganwadi Center, the Health 
department’s field worker—the ANM (Auxiliary Nurse Midwife)—and the ICDS program’s 
field worker—the AWW (the Anganwadi Worker) meet to provide services jointly. The goal of 
the NHD is to “provide one stop essential and comprehensive health & nutrition services to 
pregnant women, lactating mothers, children (0-6 years) and adolescent girls.” The GO 
underscores the dire reality of malnutrition in the state of Andhra Pradesh, which is seen as a 
major contributing factor to poor maternal and child health outcomes: 
As per the National Family Health Surveys (NFHS), Government of India, 42.5% [of 
children under five in Andhra Pradesh are] underweight; 38% are stunted, indicating that 
they have been malnourished for a while; and 15% are wasted, indicating recent lack of 
food/illness. The prevalence of anemia in women (63%), pregnant women (59%), and 
children (71%) is also high.  
Finally, it was Chief Secretary Minnie Mathew who provided a formal structure and 
combined all the aforementioned efforts into a programmatic focus called Maarpu (change). 
Like P. V. Ramesh, Mathew was a policy entrepreneur, having previously worked in the 
department of Women & Child Welfare in Andhra Pradesh was well acquainted with with the 
state’s bureaucratic machinery and needs of the social sector. Her term in office was brief, 
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lasting only eight months (she assumed her post as Chief Secretary in July 2012 and retired from 
service in February 2013). During her 36 years career as a civil servant, her special areas of 
interest were health, nutrition, and development of women and children. She expressed her 
commitment to social welfare initiatives when she issued the following statement upon assuming 
office “Governance should deal with small things too besides grandiose matters. I will try to 
consolidate various welfare and developmental schemes” (The Hindu, June 30th, 2012). In effect, 
she brought the 20 indicators of the MCP (Mother and Child Protection Card) created by P. V. 
Ramesh into the platform in which SHGs and VOs operate. 
On August 23, 2012, she organized a review meeting titled “Social sector flagship 
programmes for improvement in Human Development Index (HDI) and achievement of 
Millennium Development Goals MDGs)” involving a Group of Secretaries (GoS) at the state 
level. In GO #983, the Chief Secretary clearly articulates the imperative to strengthen 
implementation of existing social-sector programs: 
The review of Human Development Index (HDI) and Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) indicates the scope and areas of improvement in the service delivery of the 
programmes. These programmes have strong inter-linkages and a common denominator 
of target population. Convergence of inputs of these programmes for an individual would 
assist in focused targeting of mothers during pregnancy, mother and child health at 0-6 
years and child health and education at 6-14 years. Monitoring of outcomes like HDI and 
MDG through a Result Framework Document (RFD) is recognized as a key 
implementation requirement during the 12th five-year plan and synchronized with five-
year plans thereafter.  
The following flagship programs sponsored by the Government of India, but 
implemented by the state government, were reviewed: National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), 
Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS), Mid-day meal (MDM), National Rural Drinking 
Water Programme (NRDWP), Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC), Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY; a 
rural housing scheme) and Nutrition and Day Care Centers (NDCC). What becomes clear from 
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her message is the influence of the central government. Specifically, the mention of the Results 
Framework Document (RFD) is an effort by the Prime Minister’s Office to encourage 
departments to engage in strategic planning and performance management. It was also decided 
that the eight-member GoS would meet once a month to review progress and hold discussions 
with the district administration. One month later, on September 24, 2013, GO #249 launched 
Maarpu as a convergence effort to improve the health and nutrition status of women and children 
through inter-departmental coordination. Thus, Minnie Mathews brought community-based 
organizations to the center stage.  
By reviewing the GOs that were aimed at reducing maternal and infant mortality, 
attaining NRHM objectives and MDGs, and improving coordination between departments, I was 
able to identify what is at the core of Maarpu’s rational model of implementation: the 20 key 
indicators of the Mother and Child Protection (MCP) card that will be monitored by SHGs and 
VOs at the village level. Lastly, instead of using the Community Health and Nutrition Clusters 
(CHNCs) to bring about geographic and functional synchronization between allied services, a 
four-tier (village, cluster, district, and state) structure of convergence committees was created, 
with each committee comprising 6-10 functionaries from government departments and 
community-based organizations). I now turn my attention to interviews of senior bureaucrats at 
the state level to uncover underlying bureaucratic politics behind the formulation of Maarpu.  
Bureaucratic Politics Underlying Maarpu  
The interviews were analyzed using three thematic codes in NVivo 10: macro-context, 
rhetoric of collaboration, and politics. The theme of macro-context captures the broader reform 
context (e.g., NRHM, MDGs, and health indicators). In effect, these factors work as drivers in 
the external environment that might shape the collaborative governance initiative. The thematic 
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code of rhetoric of collaboration captures all the narratives about working together, joint action, 
and the spirit of collective action. The logic behind using such a thematic code is that it is well 
understood in organization theory, from an open systems and natural systems perspective, that 
what organizational actors profess to do often diverges from what is actually done. The thematic 
code of politics is intended to capture any such divergence, with reference to internal 
bureaucratic politics like departmental rivalries or turf protection. While coding using these 
theme, it surfaced that three types of politics resulted in Maarpu’s emergence: the politics of 
interpersonal relationships (i.e., bureaucrats coming together of their own volition or because of 
their camaraderie), the politics of public authority (i.e., bureaucrats with the public authority to 
impose their will on others), and the politics of rivalry (i.e., professional rivalries stemming out 
of institutional mandates and histories).  
Macro-context 
The interviews confirm that several factors provide the necessary impetus for key 
bureaucratic actors to situate programs within a multi-sectoral, participatory, collaborative, and 
inter-governmental framework: an enabling external environment, India’s commitment to the 
UN MDGs, the financial resources provided to state governments through NRHM, and 
constitutional requirements to strengthen local bodies for democratic and accountable 
governance. The following two quotes from informants interviewed in the Health department 
reflect the influence of the macro-context on senior-level bureaucrats at the state level.       
My understanding was that what operated at a global level as MDG was actually brought 
into NRHM’s framework, and I think Government of India was funding various states in 
their efforts to achieve those milestones (Informant #22; Health). 
So the funds of NRHM are to be used towards maternal and child health; that’s the main 
idea, [while] keeping in mind broadly the Millennium Development Goals (Informant 
#23; Health). 
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The influence of central government’s policy priorities regarding senior state-level bureaucrats 
who are officers of the IAS cadre (i.e., who are recruited and controlled by the central 
government but serve the state governments in rotations) is well understood in the Indian 
context. The emergence of Maarpu in Andhra Pradesh is one of several empirical examples of 
how central government’s influence manifests at the subnational level through its agents, the 
IAS. This is particularly significant given that, at the time in Andhra Pradesh, the political 
regime had prioritized tertiary health services over rural primary health care. The quote below 
from informant #5, program manager, is interesting because of its focus on the 73rd and 74th 
amendments to the constitution, which give constitutional status to local bodies—yet another 
institution that political parties in Andhra Pradesh have systematically neutralized.  
Every time we go to a forum in Delhi, there is always some discussion about MDGs and 
indicators, and AP is not able to show good performance in this sector …change needs to 
happen at the village level. We have a very good Village Organizations network…so it 
was thought that it is important to use these strengths and include them in the process of 
achieving the MDGs or improving the health indicators…but even beyond MDGs 2015, 
we need to think about…how the village or community can think about their own needs 
and their own plans and then how to monitor it and how to achieve this…that is the 
whole idea of Maarpu (Informant #37; Rural Development). 
The 73rd and 74th amendments to our Constitution require strengthening of local 
bodies…now what are we saying? Because the Village Organization [VO] structures are 
strong in our state…we are believing the local women and giving them the programs. 
You see…if local bodies in our state, the VOs…take ownership of the programs, then at 
least they will question them…. Right now, from the top-down hierarchy, some officials 
will ask questions and some just don’t bother (Informant #5; Women & Child 
Development; Program Manager, not an IAS officer). 
 
Finally, an interesting factor that emerged within the macro-context that seemed to provide an 
impetus to Maarpu was a sort of performance benchmarking with other states; in particular, 
within the four southern states (Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala, although 
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Kerala is considered the outlier in terms of its favorable maternal and child health indicators and 
exceptional levels of literacy among women). 
The Economic Indicators which resulted in the rapid dissolution of poverty in Andhra 
Pradesh have not translated into health and social outcomes. As a result, the IMR and 
MMR and then the malnutrition levels are still at a very high level compared to states that 
are of comparative levels of development (Informant #41; Rural Development).  
Andhra Pradesh is much better than central or north India, but compared to the Southern 
states we are very poor. So we asked why, being part of South India, AP is doing so 
poorly. (Informant #6; Women & Child Development). 
 Rhetoric of Collaboration 
 Two themes emerge as a result of coding the interviews. The first theme resonates with 
the notion of collaborative advantage, which suggests that what can be achieved together cannot 
be achieved by just one entity, specifically in the case of complex or wicked problems like 
malnutrition, maternal and infant mortality. The second theme that emerges is one of holding the 
service providers accountable by making the community demand services and accountability in 
order to improve service delivery. In effect, Maarpu is seen as an instrument to make disparate 
bureaucratic structures talk to each other. Furthermore, it is also seen as a way to spur citizen-
driven and citizen-demanded accountability. What hides behind this rhetoric is the politics of 
shifting the blame away from one department’s failures to a collective failure or collective 
responsibility and then, finally, onto the citizens who are not demanding accountability. 
Regarding the collaborative advantage: 
No single department can achieve this (i.e. maternal and child health outcomes)….that is 
the first thing (Informant #22; Health). 
Maarpu is not a program. It is basically a convergence effort to bring [together] various 
departments associated with health and nutrition, because in government most of the 
programs are done in silos, and at the cutting edge, particularly when people have to 
access services, you can’t have the departments working in silos because health and 
nutrition…require a holistic approach (Informant #36; Rural Development).  
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Typically, when we talk about maternal and child health or health in general we think of 
the Health Department. But health is not only about medicine. It is also about nutrition, 
sanitation, water facilities, better environment…unless all these are addressed, maternal 
and child health is not possible (Informant #14; Women & Child Development). 
Regarding accountability and demand-side mechanisms:  
We want [first] to make the community accountable to all the health parameters[; 
second,] to involve all the local bodies, because under the chairmanship of the Sarpanch 
we want the entire activity to be taken up [and third,] that the village-level functionaries 
will also feel a little bit alert the moment it is reviewed in the village, and somebody will 
question whether you [i.e. the street-level bureaucrat] are doing this or that and why you 
are not doing this…that accountability as far as these people’s performance is 
concerned…is some sort of a social audit (Informant #23; Health). 
The key player will be the VO, the village organization. The VO comes under the 
structures of Rural Development. You see, the VO organizes all the poor people and 
gives them an institutional structure, and it is for the other departments to make use of 
them. The new paradigm of development talks about a receiving mechanism…however 
efficient your service delivery is, you will always operate at a low equilibrium unless 
your recipients are also empowered. So you may have everything in place, but if your 
beneficiaries are illiterate then nothing will happen. So the SHGs and the VO are all 
about bringing about this sort of awareness amongst the receiving mechanism to 
empower the poor (Informant #36; Rural Development). 
At the state or district administration level, the focus suddenly moves from one 
intervention to another…it does not have a holistic approach. That’s why Maarpu was 
brought about. We will work with Self-Help Groups (SHGs), and they will have a role to 
play in monitoring all the key points, and we will train them as to how to access those 
services (Informant #40; Women & Child Development). 
 While the theme of collective action and joint responsibility was the overarching rhetoric 
behind formulating Maarpu and did not reflect any tensions between the bureaucracies involved, 
the theme of community-driven accountability or demand-side governance mechanisms evoked 
deep-seated rivalries between the Rural Development department on one side and the Health and 
Women & Child Development departments on the other. I identify three variants of bureaucratic 
politics behind the formulation of Maarpu: politics of inter-personal relationships, politics of 
institutional rivalries, and politics of public authority.  
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 Politics of Inter-Personal Relationships  
 A key factor in the story of Maarpu’s emergence is the role played by key bureaucratic 
actors in positions of public authority who assumed the role of policy entrepreneurs, including P. 
V. Ramesh, who revitalized and jump-started structural and functional reforms under the aegis of 
the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), and Minnie Mathews, who initiated Maarpu as a 
formal and structured intervention. As my interviews reveal, there were other like-minded IAS 
officers during this time who worked in the Health and Women & Child Development. At the 
time that Maarpu was being given a formal shape by Chief Secretary Minnie Mathews, the 
Principal Secretaries of the Health and Women & Child Development departments were husband 
and wife, which simplified coordination between them. Furthermore, even after Minnie Mathews 
left, the husband and wife duo stayed on (I was able to interview the latter). The following two 
quotes aptly capture the politics of inter-personal relationships: 
Luckily, what happened is that the agency heads for Health and Women-Child Welfare 
are husband and wife. So these two played a key role in not letting go for SERP…and 
have brought the initiative a certain shape and up to the point of conducting training 
(Informant #23; Health). 
Incidentally, last year, what happened is the Principal Secretary of Women and Child 
Welfare and the Principal Secretary of Health are wife and husband. So, you see, what 
happens in government inter-departmental coordination is always the toughest job. 
Another advantage I can tell you is that the current Principal Secretary of Women and 
Child Welfare had earlier worked as Commissioner Health and Family Welfare 
(Informant #6; Women & Child Development).  
 Politics of Institutional Rivalry   
 Inter-personal relationships aside, the interviews revealed deep-seated institutional 
rivalries stemming from the formal mandates of the bureaucratic organization and how they 
assume prestige through the informal mandates bestowed upon them by their constituent 
supporters. Although the three departments are traditional bureaucracies, in that they are 
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hierarchically organized with a formal chain of command, there is a fundamental difference in 
their institutional origins. The departments of Health and Women & Child Development are 
traditional top-down bureaucracies, where, historically, the bureaucratic structures are wired to 
deliver services to their constituents. In effect, the government decides that immunization 
coverage needs to improve or malnutrition needs to be addressed; accordingly, programs are 
planned, funds are allocated and services are delivered by front line staff. Within the social 
sector, bureaucrats refer to these as supply-side governance mechanisms.  
 On the other hand, the Society of Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP) is not a traditional 
government bureaucracy because, in the state of Andhra Pradesh, it emerged as a result of the 
World Bank’s funding to create Self-Help Groups (SHGs). Thus, in effect, SERP’s bureaucratic 
structures (Self-help Groups and Village Organizations) are considered a bottom-up approach or 
demand-side mechanism, where the citizens plan and operate their own programs, although they 
receive supervisory and managerial support from SERP’s state, district, and village-level 
administrative structures. Similarly, the Panchayati Raj Institutions or local government bodies 
have a constitutional status as institutions of democratic governance, under the assumption that 
local government bodies will be further empowered to question bureaucrats and manage their 
own needs in a bottom-up approach. In spite of these fundamental differences in their formal and 
informal mandates, however, all these institutions function similarly.  
 What emerged from the data is that key bureaucratic actors, with their affinity towards 
health and nutrition-related services, built a narrative suggesting that what ails the system is the 
under-utilization of demand-side structures like the SHGs. The formal mandate of the SHGs is to 
organize village women (especially those from economically and socially disadvantaged groups) 
into collectives, to contribute regularly towards a savings account, and in turn to take loans or 
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receive credit as a group for individual business ventures or agriculture-related investments. 
SERP’s bureaucratic structures are seen to be more in alignment with contemporary discourse of 
development, i.e., community-driven and focused on sustainability and accountability. It was 
originally funded by the  World Bank and is a favorite favorability for politicians (as they can 
directly reach their constituents), whereas Health and Women & Child Development are 
traditional, monolithic government bureaucracies that seem seen to be out of sync with the 
modern paradigm of development. Below, I provide quotes capturing in greater detail the politics 
of institutional rivalry, because it is the basis on which I construct the politics of public authority.  
The World Bank prodded them along…otherwise they would never step down from their 
pedestal. They think they are all big bosses…. Another thing is that…I am sorry to say 
this, but…traditionally, the heads of SERP consider themselves to be the blue-eyed boys 
of development, so there are four or five of them up there who think they are doing all the 
work through SHGs while nothing is being done by Health and Women & Child 
Welfare….“they keep on talking with laptops and all that,” so they move only with the 
Chief Minister whenever any dignitary arrives….So that is how they were in the 
limelight, but they have since lost their air, because World Bank is now talking about 
social indicators and performance indicators and MDGs (Informant #23; Health). 
Why Maarpu was coined because most of our health department activities were supply-
side issues; there was nothing from the demand-side. There is no demand from the public 
that ‘I want this service and that.’ Why was there no demand? Then we thought that the 
SHGs should also focus on health, education and other social issues. So all these things 
converged, and at the higher level it was decided that we should all work together. So 
now, the VO is a body that should demand…initially there will be push from the 
administration, but later the VOs and SHGs should demand the services. Then the supply 
side capacity will be optimally put to use. Now, it is under-utilized (Informant #43; 
Health). 
Even here everybody questioned the same, and finally the blame was put on SERP. Now, 
these groups began 20 years back in the form of podupu sangalu [savings groups]; they 
did also highlight social responsibilities like education and health [and] maternal health. 
But over a period of time, money matters dominated the groups (Informant #5; Women’s 
Development & Child Welfare). 
Both at the national and state level…we started questioning the SERP and IKP group: 
even though there is so much empowerment, why isn’t there any demand for toilets [or] 
services at the Aaganwadi center; now, if citizens don’t demand, use or question, then the 
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service providers are happy being lazy…they will not work (Informant #14; Women & 
Child Development). 
 Politics of Public Authority  
 In this case study, a majority of those with public authority (i.e., departmental heads), 
including the individual with the highest level of public authority, the Chief Secretary, were 
closely aligned to these traditional bureaucracies and were able to successfully build a narrative 
suggesting that because the SHGs focused too much on financial matters and not enough on 
social issues, Andhra Pradesh has not achieved its MDGs despite heavy investments and services 
delivered by other departments. In other words, health and nutrition-related services are not 
reaching those who need them because there is no demand for them despite adequate supply. 
Moreover, because SERP’s SHGs and VOs are the go-to structures when it comes to demand-
side governance, SHGs and VOs became the centerpiece of Maarpu even though it was 
essentially about improving health and nutrition-related services and outcomes.  
 How did this narrative become a reality? It was well understood that the Chief Secretary, 
Minnie Mathews, had in interest in health and nutrition-related issues and had also worked as 
Principal Secretary of Women & Child Development. Even though several like-minded 
departmental heads discussed the need for joint action, it took the Chief Secretary using the 
position of formal authority and power to formalize Maarpu. Finally, when Maarpu emerged it, 
had two key components: the 20 key indicators related to maternal and child health and Village 
Organizations (VOs) and SHGs as the central structure, which will anchor the convergence 
initiative.  The quotes below capture the politics of public authority, which suggests that 
underlying the rhetoric of collaboration is the fact that a collaborative governance initiative can 
be thrust upon unwilling partners. 
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Minnie Mathews had worked as Principal Secretary of Women & Child Development. 
She too was very passionate about health and child health indicators (Informant #14; 
Women & Child Development). 
All this was anchored by the Chief Secretary, and by force they were all pulled together 
[laughs] and this concept was evolved. (Informant #43; Health) 
This is an initiative that has been pushed from the top of the bureaucratic structure…the 
Chief Secretary (Informant #36; Rural Development). 
We have identified the 20 key interventions. The idea is that those 20 key interventions, 
if they are the focus points, then the mortality rates will go down, but…what each 
department had to do is to see that the convergence forums takes place. Unless the 
convergence meetings takes place at the village level, there is nothing, so the village level 
convergence committee [i.e., the VOs and SHGs] [is] the most crucial thing. The whole 
thing hinges on the committee meeting (Informant #40; Women’s Development & Child 
Welfare). 
  All 18 state-level bureaucrats I interviewed attested to the use of coercion to get different 
departments’ heads and administrators to talk to each other. In the context of Maarpu, all 
informants acknowledged that Maarpu’s emergence came about only because a certain set of 
policy entrepreneurs in positions of public authority used their coercive power to initiate and 
facilitate discussions about improving maternal and child health outcomes through community 
participation. This is not only true at the state, but also at the district-level of administration. The 
following quote by a senior state-level bureaucrat is representative of what other informants 
discussed about the politics of public authority: “at the district-level, whether one likes it or 
not…convergence can be forced and brought about because of the strong nature of the institution 
of District Collector in the state” (Informant #36; Rural Development).  
  Similarly, the strong institution of the Chief Secretary in the state brought about the 
initiation of Maarpu at the state-level of administration. However, as noted in Chapter 2 and 3, as 
a consequence of India’s federal polity and constitutional mandates the bureaucratic structures 
are characterized by diffused responsibility. This attribute makes the politics of public authority 
all the more interesting because it allows unwilling participants to come on board as they know 
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they cannot be held responsible because of the diffused lines of responsibility at the state-level of 
administration. Thus, it is this combination of the politics of public authority and diffused 
responsibility that creates an illusion of collaboration. Thus, effectively, the policy entrepreneurs 
in this case study used their position of public authority to weave a narrative that the critical 
reason why maternal and child health outcomes are lagging behind in the state is because there is 
no demand from the village-level community groups like the Village Organization (VOs) and 
Self-Help Groups (SHGs). The politics of this narrative suggested that VOs and SHGs have only 
been involved in discussing savings and loans and have ignored public health issues.  
  On the other hand, departmental heads operating within bureaucratic structures 
characterized by diffused responsibility were able to play politics of their own kind. To whom 
are the policy entrepreneurs and department heads really responsible and accountable? Are they 
responsible to the state’s health sector priorities or the central government’s? This case study 
shows that the policy entrepreneurs were actually implementing the central government’s 
commitment to improve rural health care. As we have seen, Maarpu was not a flagship program 
of the political party in power in the state; if it were, the lines of responsibility and accountability 
would be different, as they were for Arogyasree, the very popular insurance scheme that Andhra 
Pradesh was implementing at the time. Thus, we are left with the question of where to situate 
Maarpu. It is neither a central nor a state government initiative—it is an initiative of a key group 
of individuals. Once these policy entrepreneurs leave or are transferred and another set comes 
with a different focus, the question of Maarpu’s sustainability becomes questionable.  
 Thus, in this particular case, because of the diffused lines of responsibility and accountability, 
senior officials readily came onboard when asked by an individuals in a position of public 
authority. In effect, the politics of public authority resulted in a health-related agenda to be thrust 
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upon community-based organizations whose institutional roots and bureaucratic structures have 
no orientation towards addressing maternal and child health issues. The following quote from a 
senior bureaucrat at the state-level aptly captures the political environment that gets created as a 
result of the politics of public authority.    
You need not resist it openly, you can silently kill it…so possibilities are there (Informant 
#43; Health). 
Discussion 
Maarpu’s policy of implementation has three key elements: first, that the improvement of 
maternal and child health outcomes is necessarily a joint effort; second, that the SHGs and VOs 
would be made integral to the monitoring of service delivery and will be made aware of 20 key 
indicators essential for improving maternal and child health indicators; and third, that unless the 
communities themselves take responsibility for their own outcomes and do not monitor or 
question service providers, the service delivery mechanisms will not improve and will not be 
sustainable.  However, underlying this rhetoric were the politics of interpersonal relationships, 
institutional rivalry, and public authority; essentially, an agenda to improve maternal and child 
health through 20 key indicators was thrust upon SHGs, VOs and Panchayati Raj Institutions in 
name of collaborative governance.  
I now discuss these findings using the implementation scorecard. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the  institutional-level is where the organization is most exposed to the external environment 
and thus behaves like an open system; the managerial-level refers to natural systems perspective 
where individuals in positons of public authority navigate through the internal and external 
environments, the technical-level refers to the organization working like a rational and closed 
system, and the political-level is where a clear set of winners and losers emerge as a result of the 
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decision making process and the resulting rational model of program implementation. Refer to 
Figure 1 for the implementation scorecard at the state-level.  
As shown in Figure 1, at the institutional-level, there are a set of influences on senior 
bureaucrats, e.g., the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the central 
government’s health sector priorities like the National Rural Health Mission, and pressure from 
peer-group of states. At the institutional-level, the organization behaves like an open system. 
What the open systems perspective informs us is that environmental influences infiltrates the 
organization forcing it to make changes and resemble the external environment. In my view, this 
insight from the open systems perspective is instructive in understanding why traditional and 
deeply hierarchical bureaucracies like Health and Women and Child Development speak the 
language of multi-lateral aid agencies: inter-sectoral collaboration, citizen participation, 
intergovernmental coordination, and community-drive accountability. Another aspect that makes 
senior bureaucrats readily accept collaborative initiatives, especially in the social sector and for 
issues like maternal and child health, is that of legitimacy and the senior bureaucrats’ proximity 
to the external environment—both the central government and the global development 
community. The open systems perspective also teaches us that even as organizations reflect their 
environments they are constantly “maintaining stability and predictability in the organization” 
(Katz and Kahn 1978, p. 85). Organizations achieve this by formalizing and institutionalizing 
organizational activities (p. 86).   
In a public bureaucracy, the responsibility of maintaining stability, predictability, 
formalizing, and institutionalizing policies falls on individuals in managerial positions with 
public authority. At the managerial-level, in the state-level of administration, senior bureaucrats 
can make decisions that can be coercive. The natural systems perspective that I use to provide 
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insights into the managerial-level informs us that an organization has both formal and informal 
structures. While formal structures are aimed at ensuring that organizations operate 
“independently of the characteristics of the individual actors,” informal structures are “based on 
the personal characteristics of the individual actors” (Scott, 2003, p. 59). Thus, an implication of 
this insight is that while an administrator in a formal structure exercises power and authority 
based on the positon occupied, power and authority can also be drawn from interpersonal 
relationships and individual charisma because informal structures co-exist along with formal 
structures (Scott, 2003, p. 59). In Maarpu’s case, policy entrepreneurs drew upon both the 
sources for their power: their positons as department heads and Chief Secretary, and the 
interpersonal relationships that existed between them. Thus, using the power vested in both 
formal and informal structures, policy entrepreneurs designed an initiative titled Maarpu. The 
natural systems perspective also teaches us that organizations strive towards survival and 
stability, and thus maintenance is the key function of the organization. Seen from this 
perspective, Maarpu is not a radical departure from what the departments are already doing. In 
fact, several components (for example, immunizations, nutritional supplements, sanitation 
services) of Maarpu were already in existence and Maarpu only added the dimension of 
community participation to monitor these services.  
Thus, at the institutional and managerial-levels what we see happening is that a certain 
set of external environment influences were converted by senior state-level bureaucrats using 
their power vested in formal and informal organizational structures to design Maarpu. However, 
given the tendency of the organization to maintain itself for survival, follow precedence, ensure 
stability, and predictability the key aspects of MDGs and NRHM (inter-sectoral collaboration, 
175 
 
 
 
citizen engagement, and intergovernmental coordination) were converted and reduced to a 
formal set of instructions in the form of 20 key indicators that was presented as Maarpu.  
The technical-level of the organization functions like a rational system where the focus is 
on goal specificity and alignment, and reducing the number of variables that need to be managed 
so as to increase predicable behavior among employees. In effect, Maarpu is designed to function 
as a formal organization where its structures are “formalized to the extent that the rules 
governing behavior are precisely and explicitly formulated and to the extent that role and role 
relations are prescribed independently of the personal attributes and relations of individuals 
occupying positons in the structure” (Scott, 2003, p. 35). In effect, a collaborative governance 
initiative like Maarpu that should have been implemented like an open system (with its focus on 
environmental influences, diffused power, shared values, inter-dependence, responsive to varied 
citizen needs, and managing multiple and uncertain variables), is converted into a formal, 
rational, and closed system by the bureaucratic organization. In this process of conversion, all the 
elements that are central to collaborative governance are lost. However, the illusion is that all the 
bureaucratic actors involved espouse the values of collaboration and believe that Maarpu is an 
initiative to facilitate collaborative governance to improve inter-departmental coordination and 
engage the community.  
The natural systems perspective informs us that employees will give their consent and 
perceive orders as legitimate under four conditions: they must “understand the directive, believe 
that it is consistent with the organization’s purpose, believe that it is compatible with [their] 
personal interests, and be able to comply with it mentally and physically” (Tompkins, 2005, p. 
195). The question pertinent to Maarpu is that: can these four conditions be met by Maarpu’s 
directives? Insights from the from the political theory of the organization (Moe 1991) which 
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views bureaucratic structures as a result of the politics of public authority informs us that it is 
highly unlikely that all employees would give their consent to Maarpu and view it as legitimate. 
The reason for this is the coercive nature of decisions taken by those individuals (at the 
managerial-level) in positions vested with public authority. As Moe (1991, p. 123) notes:  
The power of public authority is essentially coercive. People can be forced to accept 
outcomes that make them worse off, outcomes they would never agree to in a world of 
voluntary exchange. The upshot is that political institutions, most of which arise out of 
politics of structural choice, are means of legal coercion and redistribution. They are 
structures by which winners impose their will on everyone else.  
As articulated in the findings above, Maarpu emerged as a result of policy entrepreneurs 
in positions of public authority with close affinity to health and nutrition effectively thrusting a 
health-related agenda on to the community-based organizations—the idea that community-based 
organizations need to be made aware of health and nutritional services so that they can demand 
for these services, which in turn will improve service delivery. However, those in the Rural 
Development department that oversee Village Organizations (VOs) and Self Help Groups 
(SHGs) never viewed this to be their departmental mandate, but because of the coercive power of 
public authority they [Rural Development] were forced to accept the outcome. Thus, in this case, 
the VOs and SHGs are the losers as they have become unwilling participants into Maarpu and 
the Health and Women and Child Development are winners as they have been able to 
incorporate an additional partner and resource to fulfill their mission. As a result, we see that 15 
out of the 20 indicators are directly related to the Health department’s activities, which now have 
to be supported by the bureaucratic structures of Rural Development even though Maarpu has 
little alignment with Rural Development’s departmental activities.  
This is only one side of the story in the politics of public authority. Moe (1991, p.125) 
observes that, to claim victory, political winners often must meet the loser’s demands, which are 
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often aimed at weakening the victory’s effect. An implication of Moe’s central argument (that 
the resulting structures are a result of political compromise) is that political actors (in this case 
the policy entrepreneurs and department heads) are “not in the business of building effective 
organizations, as they are in the private sector” (Moe, 1991, p. 126). In effect, Maarpu is 
designed to be ineffective and destined to fail. In chapter 7, I will examine how the losers work 
to reducing the victory’s effect, what factors help them [the losers] in this process, and what is 
the net effect on the winners.    
 Based on these findings and analysis, I find sufficient evidence to support this 
dissertation’s first research proposition that departmental heads will facilitate collaborative 
initiatives because of diffused lines of responsibility at the state-level of administration. 
However, based on the evidence gather and analysis, several qualifications are necessary to this 
research proposition. First, the initiating factor here was policy entrepreneurs in positions of 
public authority; thus, charismatic leadership is necessary, but not sufficient—the key is 
leadership in a positon of formal power and authority. Second, diffused lines of responsibility at 
the state-level of administration certainly helped the policy entrepreneurs in Maarpu’s case to 
officially forge a collaborative governance initiative. Because the lines of responsibility at the 
state-level for an initiative like Maarpu (which is neither a central or state government initiative) 
will always be diffused, it is difficult to think of the counterfactual—what would have happened 
if responsibility was not diffused? How would the influence of public authority have worked 
then? Thus, based on the evidence and analysis, it would suffice to say that at the state-level of 
administration it is relatively easier to initiate and facilitate collaborative governance initiatives if 
there exist policy entrepreneurs who want to champion collaboration and are vested with the 
power of coercion.   
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Figure 6: State-level Implementation Scorecard 
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Chapter Seven 
Implementation of Policy 
Implementation of the Collaborative Governance Initiative 
In this section, I examine the implementation of Maarpu’s policy by drawing on 
interviews and field notes from the following sources: district and village level functionaries 
from all three departments, administrative review meetings, and village-level Maarpu meetings. I 
further validate these findings by drawing on data from interactions with service delivery 
beneficiaries (i.e., the purported target group of pregnant women, nursing mothers, and other 
women in villages), subject matter experts who have been working closely with the government 
on social-sector-related development projects in India, and newspaper articles. The following 
thematic codes were used for analysis: authority (actions of dynamic individuals in positions of 
formal authority and power), bottom-up narrative (data about local adaptation, attendance at 
meetings, and typical biased responses that I received during fieldwork), bureaucratic politics 
(interpersonal relationships, rivalries, imposition of public authority, turf protection, and 
perception), implementation (data based on actual observations on the field), and implementation 
rhetoric (data about how implementation ought to happen). In NVivo 10, I created 24 sets 
comprising different combinations of data (e.g., Health_State_Interviews, 
Review_Meetings_District), then queried the coded data within these sets for cross-comparisons 
across themes for effective triangulation of multiple sources of data onto the findings.      
 Four key themes emerge as contributing to the way Maarpu’s implementation was shaped 
across the intergovernmental structure: the District Collector as an administrative entrepreneur 
focusing on institutional deliveries in government hospitals, the perception this created among 
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district officials, the power balances, turf protection, and institutional histories that help 
maintain the perception, and, finally, the adaptation by street-level bureaucrats in response to the 
perception of Maarpu as a Health department initiative.  
Administrative Entrepreneur 
 The term policy entrepreneur is used for senior bureaucrats who can shape, influence or 
even formulate policy because of their close proximity to external sources of power (i.e., 
politicians, donor organizations, or the legislature). I use the term administrative entrepreneur to 
describe India’s District Collectors because they inherit myriad policies originating in the state 
capital, with the expectation that the Collector will leverage the power of this position to 
implement these policies. Compared to the state and village levels of administration, which 
interact greatly with their external environment (the state level with politicians, donor 
organizations, and other policy-making bodies; the village level with the complex and culturally 
varied socio-economic and ethnic groups of the local rural environment), the district 
administration in India is relatively more isolated from external pressures and instead performs 
the maintenance function of the bureaucratic organization (i.e., implementing programs of 
change and development without radically disturbing organizational stability or the status quo.  
Although the District Collector is a position of public authority, it is located on 
bureaucratic structures that have diffused lines of responsibility and accountability. The District 
Health & Medical Officer (DMHO) and the District Project Development Officer of the Rural 
Development department have to balance their loyalties between the Collector and their state-
level superiors. While the Collector can control them at an operational level, district officials 
know that the Collector’s sectoral priorities (e.g., a multi-sectoral initiative like Maarpu) are of 
short-term duration compared to their parent departments’ sectoral priorities (e.g., the Health 
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department’s priorities on immunizations or Rural Development’s priorities on building rural 
houses). Thus, to the extent that an IAS cadre officer, as a District Collector, selects an inherited 
policy by leveraging his or her sectoral preferences and technical skill sets and governs the 
messy administrative structures using the power vested in the institution to create a lasting 
bureaucratic legacy, a District Collector is essentially an administrative entrepreneur, navigating 
through the administrative structures with their diffused lines of responsibility and accountability 
to deliver a tangible result by the end of his or her term. Thus, an administrative entrepreneur 
inherits a policy from the external environment and converts it into a rational model of 
implementation, while using the position of public authority to make disparate administrative 
structures communicate and implement programs; in this process decisions are made that benefit 
some groups and burden other groups.   
Maarpu’s implementation in the Medak district was thus shaped by District Collector 
Smita Sabharwal, a quintessential administrative entrepreneur. During my fieldwork in May 
2013, all my state-level informants told me to visit the Karimnagar district to see how Sabharwal 
was effectively implementing convergence across different departments to improve maternal and 
child health indicators. She was well known for her drive to increase institutional deliveries in 
government maternity hospitals and rural primary health centers through the use of text messages 
to mobile phones informing pregnant mothers about their next appointment (The Hindu, August 
10, 2011). She further linked poor maternal mortality rates and infant mortality rates in the 
district to “poor nutrition” and got the Women & Child Development department’s front-line 
workers to work closely with the Health department’s front-line workers (The Hindu, September 
9, 2011). She named this initiative “Amma Lalana” (mother’s nurture) and ensured it received 
local media coverage. She also focused on high incidence of anemia among adolescent 
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schoolgirls and got the Health department’s medical doctors to work closely with the Education 
department (The Hindu, January 2, 2012). Moreover, she was widely popular for her crusade 
against private hospitals for “conducting [unnecessary and exploitative] caesarean deliveries and 
causing serious health problems to mothers” (The Hindu, August 17, 2012). According to all of 
my interviewees’ at all administrative levels, Sabharwal achieved celebrity status for her 
dedication to improving maternal and child health services.  
Smita Sabharwal’s tenure as District Collector of Karimnagar and the administrative 
entrepreneurship she displayed (essentially tailoring all elements of the National Rural Health 
Mission to the local context) happened under an enabling environment at the state level, when 
several policy entrepreneurs (like P. V. Ramesh, Minnie Mathews, and Praveen Prakash) were 
prioritizing rural health care and shaping policies and programs to improve maternal and child 
health services. My interviews confirmed that Sabharwal’s Karimnagar experiments shaped the 
emergence of Maarpu. In May 2013, I was only able to speak with Collector Sabharwal over the 
phone, as she was awaiting transfer orders and unable to meet with me. However, when my field 
work began in February 2014, she had been posted to the Medak district, and she allowed me to 
interview her over the phone and face-to-face. She also instructed her key official overseeing 
Maarpu’s implementation to extend all support to my dissertation research.  
On February 4, 2014, she invited me to attend the district-level Maarpu review meeting to 
understand how Maarpu is being implemented. This review meeting was attended by all key 
district officials and field staff from all departments involved in Maarpu’s implementation, 
including a group of leaders and women from villages who were invited to the district 
headquarters in recognition of their work in implementing Maarpu in their villages. This four-
hour meeting revealed that the implementation of Maarpu retained its rhetoric of collaboration 
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and kept the focus on the 20 indicators at a functional level, but in terms of its rational model of 
implementation, the entire emphasis of the review meeting was increasing institutional deliveries 
in government facilities—an area of focus where the Collector was nothing short of a celebrity.  
The meeting began with a district official providing an overview of Maarpu’s 
implementation thus far in the district: 
In November we began this program, provided training to all village-level functionaries 
from the five concerned departments: Health, ICDS, PRI…and those departments at the 
receiving end like IKP…we have arranged a host of activities since November. And since 
December we have been implementing and executing these meetings, where we have 
been discussing for 2 hours the MAARPU agenda that covers the 20 point interventions. 
At the village meetings, the Sarpanch as the head of the village has formed a committee 
and is making sure that all representatives are present. 
While the above statement reflects the implementation rhetoric describing collaboration, the 
review meeting quickly turned to its real focus on monitoring the number of delivery points 
through the Mother and Child Tracking System (MCTS), a nationally sponsored and supported 
database that tracks all pregnancy-related progress and allows the data to be accessed from any 
governmental medical facility with internet access. However, the MCTS was not customized to 
meet Maarpu’s requirements and so there is no opportunity to make notes about how village-
level collaborative meetings actually happened. Given that the village-level collaborative 
meetings that Maarpu envisages are local to the subnational government’s context, it would 
require tailoring the MCTS to suit the state’s needs, which was never attempted. The following 
statement from the district official conducting the review meeting clarifies how Maarpu’s 
performance will be measured by the district headquarters: 
Today, the Collector wants to take feedback from the best motivators and to identify gaps 
at the ground level and ascertain any weaknesses. The Collector also wants know about 
the progress made in December and January through this MAARPU program. Which 
indicators have improved? Have the human development indicators improved? The data 
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are available online through the Health department via the MCTS portal. Only these 
MCTS data will be used to review progress. 
  According to my estimates, approximately 75% of the meeting was spent reviewing the 
MCTS data, with no discussion of the challenges being faced on the ground in conducting the 
convergence meetings. The idea that the village’s women, local leaders, and government 
functionaries might identify gaps and monitor service delivery was never even discussed, in spite 
of the Collector recognizing individual efforts by village leaders to motivate women in their 
villages to get tested for anemia or encourage them to deliver at a government hospital or at the 
Primary Health Center (PHC) in the nearest village. The message from the Collector was clear: if 
we educate villagers about the exploitative practices of private hospitals and encourage 
government hospital deliveries through village-level convergence meetings, we will begin to see 
positive spillover effects on government service delivery. This message was so well articulated at 
the district headquarters that it was aptly reflected by this health worker at a PHC: “the 
Collector’s orders are that more deliveries should happen at the government institutions” 
(Informant #31). The review meeting then proceeded to focus further on institutional deliveries 
with another Health department official opening his presentation with the following statement: 
Good morning to all officers. After the last meeting…in the last 2 months, we have 
added 20 delivery points…What is the improvement in the last three months? Out of 66 
PHCs [in this district], deliveries are now conducted in 62 PHCs.  So almost all PHCs 
are delivery points….Identification of high-risk cases has also increased where the PHC-
Medical Officer [MO] is able to recommend them to other facilities. Also, deliveries in 
non-24-hours PHCs have increased…have all shown good progress. Home deliveries 
have come down from 4-5% to 2% [emphasis added to indicate where the speaker 
raised his voice to highlight the achievement]. 
           Finally, the District Collector, in her review of the progress, announced the rankings of all 
66 PHCs based on how many deliveries they conducted. She then highlighted her efforts to 
convince the state government officials to open a special maternity hospital and underscored the 
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need for such centers to cater to “high-risk patients” because of poor nutrition levels in the local 
communities. Toward the end of the meeting, she asked the village leaders and other 
representatives from the villages (i.e., not government functionaries) to speak about their 
experiences. These were mostly success stories; for example: 
Madam, there is a pregnant woman in our village who had very low iron and hemoglobin. 
So we as a group adopted her and ensured she was taken to the government hospital for 
daily injections, and she is having food daily at the Aaganwadi center….Now she is 
looking healthy, and her vital blood counts have improved [Leader of a Village 
Organization].  
 Soon after this meeting, I was given the opportunity to interview the District Collector. 
One of the first things she said to me was that what I had just seen was not representative of 
Maarpu’s success in the district and that in many places there were no such meetings. With a 
smile on her face, she encouraged me to use my research to identify the gaps. Her responses to 
my initial general questions about Maarpu were similar to what I expected; she said that its 
purpose was to stimulate demand for government health services where there are identified 
service delivery gaps and thus to create an environment where service delivery providers can be 
held accountable. She explained to me that because a Collector comes and goes, there is a need 
to look for more sustainable mechanisms, and that the Self-help Groups (SHGs) are the key 
instruments of sustainability at the village-level administration. Every village has SHGs, and 
these women are connected in an integral way to maternal and child health services. Thus, the 
idea is to use the SHGs and their Village Organization meetings to discuss maternal and child 
health issues.  
 Beyond the program theory, I next asked about the internal dynamics of implementation 
and the associated bureaucratic politics that impact program performance. I asked her if Maarpu 
was something all departments readily accepted. Her response was intense, and I could see that 
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she was quite passionate on this subject. “Maarpu is nobody’s baby!” she stated emphatically. 
“The question is who owns it? The District Collector? Health department? Panchayati Raj? Rural 
Development? Or Women & Child Development? It seems that everybody is for the 
programmatic goals, but nobody is ready to take ownership!” She finished the interview by 
saying that her experience as Collector had taught her that no matter how much you try to 
institutionalize, the role of the individual is the key driving force.  
Perception  
The formal authority and power vested in the institution of the District Collector can be 
used to bring isolated officials to the same table, as the Chief Secretary can at the state-level of 
administration. However, what these positions of public authority cannot do, at least in the short 
duration of their tenure, is to change the power balances of district-level bureaucratic structures 
and their institutional histories. Policy and administrative entrepreneurs also cannot change the 
perception that individuals in these bureaucratic positions develop in order to maintain the 
balance of power and act according to the institution’s historical roots. Such bureaucratic politics 
are at play within the corridors of district administration because, as the most insulated 
administrative component of the bureaucratic organization, it is responsible for the maintenance 
function of the organization. Thus, we can expect a high degree of rigidity here in terms of 
functioning, but given the nature of powerful institutions and diffused lines of responsibility 
within bureaucratic structures, individuals in district administration will also acknowledge new 
ideas and changes even as they adjust to maintain the status quo. In this section, I first discuss 
how key district officials perceived Maarpu as a health-related initiative and thus under the 
purview of the Health department. Next, I discuss inter-departmental politics at the district and 
village levels that also exist at an institutional level.  
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The starting point of the perception that Maarpu is a Health department initiative is the 
legacy, celebrity, and programmatic focus of the Collector regarding the improvement of 
maternal and child health outcomes—specifically, her crusade against private hospitals and her 
campaign to increase deliveries in government institutions. While the rhetoric may be about 
identifying gaps in service delivery mechanisms through community involvement, the rational 
model of implementing this rhetoric was monitoring the institutional deliveries in government 
facilities. While Maarpu’s GO (#249) focused on 20 key indicators and underscored the need for 
community planning, at the district level the programmatic focus was on institutional deliveries, 
which was one of the 20 key indicators but is also considered an important proxy indicator to 
ensure that the other 19 are being monitored and delivered. The following quote from a district-
level official speaks to this perception problem: 
Even after three months of implementation, nobody in our office knew who should be 
sent, or who should collect, the reports. Because the Maarpu program is using NRHM 
funds, the NRHM office says that reports should be sent to NRHM office. And 
initially…between December 2012 and March 2013…the perception among district 
officials was that this was a health program. Okay, let’s move along and do something, 
but nobody had the view of the village woman who is a member of the Village 
Organization that it will benefit that entity ultimately. I remember officers from other 
district administrative departments would come and say mockingly: ‘we are coming for 
your department’s program!’ (Informant #1; Health-District). 
While the most prominent source of this perception stems from the Collector’s programmatic 
focus and the programmatic focus on institutional deliveries, the 20 indicators themselves, which 
are skewed towards health, also further this perception.  
The other guys [i.e., from other departments] will come, but the thinking will be that it is 
the Health Department’s program and they are just there as a formality. True, out of the 
20 indicators, 18 are Health department related…one is related to Rural Development and 
the other is Sanitation, which is with Rural Water Supply, and there are some related to 
Women and Child Welfare…4 or 5 indicators. So because there are more health 
indicators are on the agenda, it does come across as the Health department’s initiative 
(Informant #1; Health-District). 
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 This perception is manifested in other implementation processes, such as training. While 
district-level implementation involves actual program administration and village-level 
implementation involves service delivery, state-level implementation processes primarily involve 
training in the form of orientation or sensitization programs. I observed a two day training 
program at the state level, where district-level officials from all departments engaged in Maarpu 
were being “sensitized” towards this convergence initiative. However, the material covered 
through presentations and printed material focused on maternal and child health issues at a very 
technical level, with no content related to managing conflicts, inter-departmental politics, or how 
to engage the community. Thus, the training material would only be appreciated by those with 
traditional medical training, like those in the Health department.  
 During an interview, the faculty member overseeing the training program at the state-
level training institute, which provided the Maarpu-related training for district-level officials, 
confirmed that the representation from Rural Development was poor as only the senior officials 
from that department came, but not the district officials: “nobody came from the Panchayati Raj 
department, and Rural Development, the people who came from these departments were the 
senior officials at the opening of the training program” (Subject Matter Expert #1; Management 
Research and Training Institutions-India).   
 The issue field staff having expertise in the related area of program implementation 
definitely exacerbates the perception that Maarpu is a Health department initiative. This is 
particularly true at the village level, where services are actually delivered. One of the village-
level Health department functionaries boldly proclaimed to me that “Maarpu is a failure!” and 
faulted the Collector at the time for coming up with such an impracticable idea. He said that 
“nobody who is supposed to show up ever shows up, as it [maternal and child health] is not their 
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area of responsibility or expertise.” He also said that the “guys [from Rural Development] who 
oversee the Village Organizations (VOs) and Self-Help Groups (SHGs) come to me every month 
for the data, and they write whatever I give them!” He said this was ironic, because it is Rural 
Development functionaries who need to get inputs from the VOs and SHGs about services 
related to maternal and child health (Informant #95; Health-Village).  
 Another factor that directly fuels the perception that Maarpu is not a collaborative effort 
is the lack of signaling from bureaucrats at the upper echelons of the bureaucracies. An example 
of signaling can be department-specific executive orders mandating participation in Maarpu or 
hosting departmental review meetings to send a message that the top leadership wants district 
and village staff to participate in Maarpu. In the context of this case study, while examining how 
Maarpu emerged, I concluded that an inherently Health department-related agenda was thrust 
upon other departments (particularly those within the purview of the Rural Development and 
Panchayati Raj). It is a case of quintessential bureaucratic politics when an initiative can be 
killed silently without open rebellion; all it takes is for senior bureaucrats to not send specific 
orders or signals down the hierarchy that involvement in this program is necessary. This can be 
seen in the fact that participation from these two departments (Rural Development and 
Panchayati Raj) was absent during the state-level training program. The following quotes also 
validate this inference that when field-level staff are not instructed by their superiors to take the 
collaborative initiative seriously, priority is given to departmental activities.   
A strong signal about strengthening the initiative should come from the state level, and it 
should not just depend on the strong intention of the Collector. The strong intentions 
should reach the stakeholders (IB#3; Health-District). 
Yes…if there is pressure from above, then the Sarpanch (the locally elected leader of the 
village; part of the Panchayati Raj Institutions) will also participate in the 
meetings…otherwise they will not….There is no seriousness towards Maarpu from those 
higher-up in the hierarchy (Informant #85; Rural Development-Village). 
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 My interview with a subject matter expert who is a faculty member at the Management, 
Research, and Training Institute in the state capital further validates how the perception that 
Maarpu is a Health department initiative is antithetical to the idea of collaboration. This faculty 
member had been the Principal Investigator on a UNICEF-funded project commissioned by the 
Health Ministry of the Government of India to study the service delivery gaps in five districts 
across the state of Andhra Pradesh. During their study, the team also looked at Maarpu’s 
implementation, although it was not the focus of their study.  
The interpretation is with the 20 key indicators of Maarpu coming in…so what happened 
is the monitoring became intensive on Maarpu components—third-trimester ANC, 
institutional deliveries, immunizations, booster dose…all these are components of 
Maarpu. So monitoring of Maarpu components became intensive all along the 
administrative line from district administration to the state level—Managing Director of 
NRHM, Commissioner of Health and Family Welfare, and finally Principal Secretary of 
Health (Subject Matter Expert #7; Management Research and Training Institute-India). 
Effectively, Maarpu is perceived as a Health department initiative, and thus other 
departmental functionaries did not subscribe to the rhetoric of collaboration. Through this 
analysis, I have uncovered various factors that have contributed to this perception: the 
Collector’s programmatic focus on institutional deliveries, the fact that 15 of the 20 indicators 
are directly related to the Health department, the fact that training programs aimed at orienting 
functionaries to collaborative work are also technically related to a health worker’s area of 
expertise, and finally the fact that, due to state-level bureaucratic politics, there are no signals 
from the top to those below that this collaborative initiative needs to be taken seriously. The 
quotes below from informants provide insights into the role that perception has played in 
Maarpu’s implementation. 
In the past, other departmental representatives used to attend the orientation meetings, but 
nobody had the thought of working together…every department was thinking about 
191 
 
 
 
doing their own work, and the thinking was ‘why should we go to these meetings?’ 
(Informant #3; Health District) 
If it has to be implemented as expected, then all departments have to take an interest in 
this program…but this is only a medical topic…a medical problem, so everything has to 
be taken care of by the medical department, right? So that’s why all other departments 
have left this on the medical and health department. They come, attend and leave, all just 
for formality and show. (Informant #26; Health-Village) 
Basically…the indicators are related to health. While there are 20 indicators belonging to 
several departments…a majority of them are related to health. So, on paper, the nature of 
the program lends itself to being a Health department program. (Informant #2; Rural 
Development-District) 
What is more important is why this perception problem is emerging. [It] is emerging 
because we are focusing only on monitoring numbers. We are not focusing on educating 
and empowering that peripheral worker to think in terms of how he is contributing to the 
community, how his work is contributing to the community…we are only looking at, 
okay, how many numbers…you have achieved. And this is not just the Health 
department, this is across the welfare departments…you are never told why are you doing 
this activity, in what way is it going to contribute…those points are not made 
important….Even if it is important…then a small introduction will be given about it for 
half an hour….if somebody tells you to do this…you will feel ‘why should I do this 
work, day in and day out…and I don’t understand the value it will be bringing’…do you 
think I will be motivated to do that? (Subject Matter Expert #7; Management Research 
and Training Institute-India). 
 Not all my informants discussed about perception; only 7 out of 86 informants within the 
three departments and 3 out of 9 subject matter experts discussed the role of perception. Out of 
the 7 informants from the bureaucracies, 3 were from the district and 4 were form the village-
level of administration. Although not as widely discussed as the role of authority, the length at 
which these few informants discussed about perception convinced me that it is must be an 
important factor. In particular, informant #1 who discussed at length about perception is also a 
key informant with whom I had spent a lot of time during fieldwork and with whom I have 
discussed several aspects of my findings. This line of inquiry was further validated when three 
subject matter experts also discussed at length the issue of perception. My visits to villages, 
service delivery points, village meetings, and interactions with citizens were all aimed at 
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understanding how this perception (that Maarpu is a health-initiative and not a collaborative 
initiative) might have manifested itself on the ground. In the following section, I discuss how this 
perception manifested itself within the bottom-up narrative i.e., among the informants at the 
village-level of administration involved in the actual implementation of Maarpu.  
 The Bottom-Up Implementation Narrative 
 Across the board, the implementation narrative of Maarpu’s policy was well aligned to 
the perception that it is a Health department initiative and with the Collector’s focus on 
increasing institutional deliveries at government hospitals. During my interviews, I asked front-
line staff from all departments about their understanding of Maarpu’s implementation. The 
following quotes from Health department front-line staff members shows that the field-level 
narrative is aligned with that of the district administration. I interviewed a total of 28 frontline 
staff from the Health department, and the two quotes below are apt representations of the 
bottom-up narrative within the Health department.  
We discuss health and nutrition matters—that deliveries should happen in government 
hospitals, and that pregnant women and nursing mothers should have nutritious food at 
the Aaganwadi centers. There are 20 points that we need to discuss about Maarpu 
(Informant #56; Health-Village). 
 I observed the following conversation during a field visit I made with a district-level 
health officer who stopped by a Primary Health Center (PHC) to discuss Maarpu with the health 
worker. The focus of the conversation was on institutional deliveries.  
District Official [counting]: You have 34 Expected Deliveries, and out of them more than 
50% are high risk cases? How is that possible? 
 Field Worker: Many of them are previous cesarean cases, sir…that’s why.  
 District Official: Then why is this patient here in this PHC?  
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Field Worker: Yes, sir…sometimes there is no time to even refer them to another 
facility…they come to the PHC with full dilation. 
 
District Official: Hmm….and if there is any untoward incident, our hospital’s windows 
break, right? (Informant #10; Health-Village). 
 Even the frontline staff of the Rural Development department who oversee and manage 
the monthly SHG meetings described Maarpu in terms of its focus on health and nutrition rather 
than its focus on leveraging SHGs and VOs to monitor health and nutrition services. I 
interviewed 26 frontline staff from the Rural Development department, and the following quotes 
are all representative of their understanding of Maarpu. Interestingly, frontline workers seemed 
to describe Maarpu meetings as separate from their monthly SHGs meetings. This thinking is 
aligned with the training they all received to discuss the 20 indicators (i.e., Maarpu topics) for 
the first two hours before discussing money matters in their monthly SHGs meetings.  
We discuss health and nutrition issues…about going to government hospitals and the 
Aaganwadi center for nutritious food (Informant #84; Rural Development-Village). 
       
They discuss delivering at government hospitals, calling 108 Ambulance and eating good 
food at the Aaganwadi center (Informant #88; Rural Development-Village). 
Maarpu meetings are about discussing health and nutrition…mainly for pregnant women. 
(Informant #94; Rural Development-Village). 
The narrative is similar among the Women & Child Development front-line workers who deliver 
the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS). For several reasons, I was only able to 
interview five frontline staff from this department. First, I was informed that the ICDS staff were 
on strike over the issue of a salary increase (covered in the local news at the time). Next, at 
several villages with active ICDS centers, the woman cooking the food was not well informed 
about Maarpu and only described her cooking duties. 
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The ANM comes, I am there; the Aaganwadi…Sarpanch comes…we talk about pregnant 
women delivering in government hospitals and eating nutritious food at the Center 
(Informant #61; Women-Village). 
 
We discuss government institutional deliveries, eating good food, 108 ambulance, etc. 
(Informant #91; Women & Child Development-Village) 
 The one village-level review meeting I attended also reiterated the same agenda regarding 
Maarpu’s implementation. This is the monthly review meeting conducted at the Primary Health 
Center (PHC) by the Medical Officer and the supervisory cadre and is attended by all the field 
staff (i.e., ANMs and ASHAs). The following opening quote by the supervisor conducting the 
meeting set the tone for what is expected out of the ANMs and ASHAs. It is evident from this 
quote that change is understood as an increase in government institutional deliveries and not in 
the collective action (i.e., community monitoring) theme of Maarpu. 
Since this Collector has come and because of her effort and her instructions we are 
bringing about Maarpu…that is, change….to make sure deliveries happen either at 
government or private hospitals. Most importantly, we are trying for deliveries to happen 
in government hospitals.  Remember, no home deliveries at all. This month, there have 
been no home deliveries….this means the change has been achieved [and,] to that extent, 
your services have been useful. Institutional deliveries are most important, and in that 
what is most important: government institutional deliveries! 
Power Balances, Turf Protection, and Institutional Histories  
 The existence of power balances, turf protection, and institutional histories are key 
characteristics of a government bureaucracy (Appleby, 1949; Long, 1949). Although not all of 
my informants discussed these issues directly or specifically, the few informants who discussed 
it (the same informants who discussed about perception) were passionate about it. The same set 
of informants who discussed about perception discussed the issues of power, turf, and 
institutional histories, but in particular one senior state-level bureaucrat’s exposition of these 
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themes convinced me of its significance in the context of implementing a collaborative 
governance initiative. The following quote from this informant’s interview is provided below: 
An institution is known by its roots basically. So obviously when the Collector leaves, 
my hunch is that it [the institutions participating in Maarpu] will go back to their roots. 
For example, the natural tendency of an AWW is look at to look up to the supervisor and 
not at the community even though the community is just sitting right across and there all 
the time. But she is not willing to listen to the community, she [the AWW] is only going 
to hear the supervisor. The roots of ICDS are totally different. That’s what I am saying 
when you are talking about silos. You should also examine the structure… so unless, the 
structures are fundamentally redrawn by either bringing in accountability to a gram 
panchayat or accountability to the community [collaborative initiatives will not work].  
  Even if the Collector is able to make disparate administrative structures talk to each other 
and benefit from the few officers who are willing to work across boundaries, the Collector 
cannot change the power balances that exist in district and village administrative offices. The 
institution of the District Collector in rural India gets its power not only from the Collector’s 
formal mandate but also from its historical origins. Similarly, other institutions that have 
emerged at the district and village-level of administration also derive their power from their 
formal mandate. The source of power also comes from informal mandates in rural India, where 
certain offices carry prestige. Informal mandate requires these bureaucrats to behave in a certain 
way to maintain the legitimacy of that institution’s power in the local context.  
 For initiatives like Maarpu to work effectively, administrators and their field staff have to 
work across these hierarchies and need to be flexible if collaboration is to take place. The 
experience of creating the Senior Public Health Officer (SPHO) hierarchy between the District 
Medical & Health Officer (DMHO) and the Medical Officer at the Primary Health Center (PHC) 
showed that the SPHO cannot question not only line staff from other departments but also their 
own departmental line staff, because the DMHO maintained the balance of power (by not 
allowing transfer of administrative powers to the SPHO). These factors (i.e., power balances, turf 
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protection, and institutional histories) become even more pronounced when the perception at the 
district-level is that Maarpu is a Health department’s initiative.  
 The quote below from a district official captures the most basic barrier to working across 
departmental boundaries. When examined more deeply, the issue is not that individuals cannot 
work with their counterparts in other departments but rather that the traditional bureaucratic 
organization orients an individual to doing certain tasks in a certain way, whereas collaborative 
engagement requires flexibility at an organizational level. 
Every person has some individuality. Also there is the issue of being used to a certain 
pattern…some people in these departments have worked there for two or more 
decades…so mixing it up brings about friction (Informant #3; Health District). 
 Institutional histories are also a source of professional rivalries, and these need to be 
understood when designing an inter-departmental collaborative initiative. Maarpu’s policy of 
implementation is based on close collaboration between the Self Help Groups (SHGs) and 
Village Organizations (VOs). The VOs are registered as charitable societies, and the Society for 
Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP), within the Rural Development department, provides the 
necessary institutional legitimacy. Even though SERP is organized like any other traditional 
bureaucracy, with a state, district, and village-level hierarchy, it is quite different at the district 
and village levels. For example, at the village level, the Community Activist (CA) is from the 
local village and is paid an honorarium from the VO’s funds. The CA in turn reports to the area 
coordinator, who is part of SERP’s district level hierarchy. In effect, the entire bureaucratic 
structure of SERP is based around the needs of the community and the rhetoric is that the 
community demands and manages its own programs (while many of the programs it implements 
actually come from the top, they are actually managed by the VOs).  
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 The origins of the SHGs and VOs in Andhra Pradesh go back to 1995. The  Health and 
Women & Child Development departments gain their power and prestige from their historical 
legacy of implementing large-scale nationally sponsored health interventions (polio eradication, 
family planning, disease control) and nutrition programs (the Integrated Child Development 
Scheme or ICDS), which now exists in almost every village. These traditional bureaucracies are 
wired in the exact opposite way compared to the SHGs and VOs, in that the former are 
quintessentially top-down bureaucracies in the way services are delivered. They have a physical 
presence in local communities where these services are delivered, and people have to go there to 
receive these services; this in itself is a source of power and prestige for the front-line workers. 
However, for Maarpu to work effectively, these two different bureaucratic structures (that of 
Health and Women & Child Development on the one hand and SERP, VOs, SHGs on the other) 
must work together. Furthermore, as per Maarpu’s requirements the Health and ICDS field staff 
are required to change their traditional ways and now make themselves available to the VOs and 
SHGs village women at their village (compared villagers going to them for services). In such a 
situation who is more powerful—the VOs and SHGs (who are now supposed to question Health 
and ICDS staff) or the Health and ICDS staff who carry the power and prestige of traditional 
government bureaucracies? These questions cannot be easily resolved, but we will see in this 
section how front-line workers adapted to such a situation.  
 The following quote from a district official captures the tensions inherent in the different 
way that these departments are structured.  
The traditional thinking at Health and Women and Child Welfare is: why should I go and 
provide service? The service recipient must come and seek it themselves. Government 
officials want everything to revolve around and come to them, but this is not the case 
with the structure of Self Help Groups (SHGs) and Village Organization (VO) 
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federations. The institution is wired to go to the service beneficiary and revolve around 
them (Informant #2; Rural Development-District) 
 While ICDS has been the flagship program since the 1970s, malnutrition levels in Andhra 
Pradesh are not only high but are particularly skewed against women from socially and 
economically disadvantaged groups. In response, the institutional heads of SERP (with funding 
from external donors like UNICEF and World Bank) conceived the idea of operating 
community-managed kitchens that cater specifically to women from groups that have not 
benefitted from ICDS. Compared to SERP’s 4,000 NDCCs (Nutrition and Day Care Centers), 
that are operated and managed by the VOs (who charge a nominal fee for the food), ICDS 
operates in 80,000 villages. ICDS has traditionally provided free groceries, whereas the concept 
of NDCC is about providing a nutritious cooked meal; however, now ICDS is even providing 
free food and supplements (essentially replicating the NDCC model). The village woman 
managing the ICDS center is a government employee, while those managing NDCC are 
community members. While in concept these two programs have the same goal of improving 
women’s nutritional status, in terms of their bureaucratic structures they are in constant tension. 
The tensions are further exacerbated because the original purpose of the SHGs and VOs was to 
mobilize groups of women into collectives to promote savings and loans (micro credit economy) 
rather than to provide for the health and nutrition of their community members, which is the 
prerogative of Health and ICDS. Maarpu’s implementation envisions these two bureaucratic 
structures working in harmony, but the quotes below makes the tensions and politics clear. 
I hear the Aaganwadi center (i.e., ICDS) people are fighting to close down the 
NDCC…but the people like the food better here at NDCC (Informant #66; Rural 
Development-Village). 
What happened after the start of 4,000 NDCCs is that the whole ICDS staff went on 
strike for five days (Subject Matter Expert #11; multilateral agency). 
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Each department perceives it as a threat when another department tries to enter its 
area…for example, when health workers start looking at nutrition or growth monitoring, 
the ICDS-Women and Child Welfare department will feel threatened, and that is what 
happened when SERP actually started NDCCs….I don’t know if you are aware of this 
[but] they came up with NDCC…under the health and nutrition component. When they 
came up with this program, basically the need for this program was [that] under Women 
and Child Welfare Development, there was no organization of the community to accept 
the service, to receive the service and to monitor the service. You need to have some sort 
of organization within the community also. That’s how quality checks remain. You 
cannot control quality from the top. You need to have community monitoring those 
things, getting actively involved in them, and once they realize the services are for them 
they will start to contribute and pitch in the effort…to see that the same sort of quality is 
maintained, and if there are any gaps, they might try to fill those gaps also. But that was 
not happening with the Women and Child Welfare Department, because you had an 
Aaganwadi worker who was reporting to the top [and] was in no way accountable to the 
public or community over there….That’s when SERP started using self-help groups and 
VOs to look at the nutrition and health component…that’s where the threat came (Subject 
Matter Expert #7; Management Research and Training Institute—India). 
 Finally, individuals develop professional egos because of the positions they occupy 
within certain institutions. Even if an individual acts differently from what is expected from that 
institutional position, such change is not sustainable or even predictable for program 
implementation purposes. The quotes below provide potent examples of such bureaucratic 
politics that aimed at maintaining the power balances and legitimacy of certain institutions over 
others. The first quote provides an instance of village-level bureaucratic politics where the 
National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) provided funds for the development of the Primary 
Health Center (PHC), but to make a collaborative effort between the bureaucracy (the Medical 
Officer (MO) of the PHC) and the community (the Mandal Development Officer; i.e., the local 
community development representative) the use of these funds was to be jointly decided. 
However, the MO is from the educated elite class, while the MDO is from the local community. 
So who is more powerful—the medical doctor or the local community representative responsible 
for local development? Who should go to whose office decides the power balance and 
legitimacy, as shown in this quote: 
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NRHM funds are linked with MDO—Mandal Development Officers—even an attendant 
can become an MDO. But the Medical Officer (MO) is a gazetted officer and a 
professional…so how can the MO keep going with the file to the MDO for the use of 
funds? This is very embarrassing. That is why doctors are not interested in their work. 
Now they have given it to the SPHO—that is okay (Informant #55; Health-Village). 
 This conversation with a retired government official who rose up the ranks from district 
administration to the state level within the state bureaucracy further illustrates how institutional 
position reinforces power and prestige. Thus, when we expect the District Medical & Health 
Officer (DMHO) and the District Education Officer (DEO) to work together on Maarpu to 
provide health and nutrition education to adolescent girls, these power dynamics cannot be 
ignored. Who is more powerful here, the DMHO or the DEO? Is it the DMHO because Maarpu 
is related to health and nutrition, or the DEO who lords over more teachers than doctors? Who 
should go to whose office to collaborate? 
Researcher: Going back to the issue of bureaucratic power…it exists at the top, but does 
it also exist at the lower levels of the bureaucracy? 
Subject Matter Expert #6: Of course, 90% it [politics] exists. There might be only 10% of 
the people who will want to work together. The Medical Officer will say ‘why should I 
have to go and work with that school teacher?’ The DMHO will say ‘I am the DMHO…I 
have power over the doctors’….The District Education Officer has more power over the 
teachers, and since there are more teachers than there are doctors in any given district, the 
District Education Officer perceives himself to be more powerful than the DMHO…so 
why should the DEO officer go and work with the DMHO?  
 The quote below is an apt example of the macro-level bureaucratic politics that play out 
to maintain the power balances and legitimacy of institutions. A key component of Maarpu’s 
implementation strategy is to leverage the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) (represented by the 
Sarpanch at the village level as the locally elected leader), which are the instruments of 
democratic governance. However, the PRI’s participation in Maarpu has been conspicuously 
absent. While the Collector’s key strategy for making Maarpu sustainable was to get buy-in from 
the PRIs, SHGs, and VOs, the quote below suggests that the structures of PRIs and SHGs/VOs 
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are themselves in conflict with each other just like SHGs/VOs and Health/ICDS. In fact, 
SHGs/VOs emerged in response to ineffective PRIs in Andhra Pradesh and have since become 
instruments of development and political favoritism. The PRIs, on the other hand, are seen as 
threats to the political class (and perhaps the IAS) and thus continue to be sidelined. However, 
with constant pressures on the state government to give legitimacy to the PRIs, elections are 
conducted. So, between the Sarpanch (who typically represents the landed elite) and the VO 
President (who is likely to be a woman from the socially and economically disadvantaged local 
community), who is more powerful? Can the VO President rightly question the Sarpanch for not 
representing the village’s needs in front of their political superiors? This might happen, but 
India’s rural political economy and socio-economic milieu would make it an exception rather 
than the norm. However, for Maarpu to work effectively, the PRIs and SHGs/VOs must work in 
harmony. The quotes below show that they do not.  
Another problem we have in AP is that the Panchayat sector has been undermined by the 
politicians for a long time. They have not let the Panchayat grow as an 
institution…compared to line departments (i.e., the traditional service delivery 
bureaucracies). Panchayats are a bigger factor in my mind; the absence of Panchayats and 
having a meso-level institution mediate between citizens, and the state doesn’t exist. So 
you have no representation. Why have Self Help Groups (SHGs) and Village 
Organization (VO) federations become important? Because there is no representational 
structure, so they have become a proxy of the Panchayat (Subject Matter Expert #11; 
Multilateral Agency).  
The Sarpanch, who represents the landed elite, will not be pro-poor…that’s why the 
SHGs have virtually been existing parallel to the PRIs (i.e. the gram panchayats or 
village local bodies). The panchayat Sarpanch represents the landed sections who have no 
stake in the SHGs. The SHGs are all poor, basically. Poor and landless. So there are a 
number of issues, but I think the time has come when the integration must take place at 
the gram panchayat level; otherwise, it will not work. I think Maarpu is a good effort, but 
I have real doubts about its impact for this reason (Informant #41; Rural Development-
State). 
 With all the bureaucratic structures involved in Maarpu in tension with each other, the 
lack of signals from the top of the hierarchy, and a perception that Maarpu is a Health 
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department initiative, what do the front-line workers from different departments actually do, and 
what is their experience? With a charismatic and authoritative Collector driving the initiative, 
front-line workers have to not only deliver services and do not have the time to engage in 
bureaucratic politics like their hierarchical superiors. In this final section, I examine how street-
level bureaucrats adapted to the situation and yet responded to what was expected of them 
without upsetting local institutional and individual power balances and egos. I draw my findings 
from observations of 29 village-level Maarpu meetings, in addition to interviews with front-line 
staff from all relevant departments and interactions with service delivery beneficiaries in the 
village, at the Maarpu meetings, and at other service delivery points.  
Adaptation 
 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the bureaucratic structures at the village-level of 
administration are characterized by relatively clear lines of responsibility. I discussed that at the 
state and district-level of administration, lines of responsibility are diffused and thus the stakes 
are less for those individuals to commit to a collaborative initiative. However, at the village-level 
service delivery providers like the ANM (Auxiliary Nurse Midwife) of the Health department, 
AWW (Aaganwadi Worker) of the Women and Child Development department, the Sarpanch of 
the Panchayati Raj Institution, the Community Activist (CA) of the Society of Elimination of 
Rural Poverty (SERP), and the President of the Village Organization (VO) have specific services 
to deliver and specific individuals within their hierarchies to be responsible to. Maarpu, as a 
collaborative initiative, aims to make these village-level functionaries responsible to the local 
communities in which they serve; in addition to their departmental hierarchy. If in reality, 
village-level functionaries can be held responsible to their local communities, then Maarpu could 
be seen to have instrumental value. However, with the perception that Maarpu is a health-related 
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initiative and with existing power balances, turf battles, and institutional histories maintaining 
that perception, the following section closely examines village-level data to see how street-level 
bureaucrats adapt and what implications this has for Maarpu’s implementation.  
 The Village Meetings 
 Over the course of three months between March and May 2014 (during the tenure of 
Collector Smita Sabharwal), I observed 28 village-level meetings that were scheduled as Maarpu 
meetings (i.e., on the same day as the monthly Self Help Group (SHG) and Village Organization 
(VO) meetings). Previously, in May 2013, I had observed one meeting in district where Smita 
Sabharwal had previously been Collector, where she drove the district administration towards 
increasing institutional deliveries in government hospitals. While at the May 2013 meeting I was 
accompanied by a district official, I was unaccompanied for the 2014 meetings, as per the 
schedule given to me by the district administration. Based on what I observed, it is impractical to 
categorize the meetings as effective or ineffective, because the processes and outcomes of the 
meeting were totally unexpected; initially they seemed random, but over time a certain pattern 
began to emerge. I categorized the meeting as follows: Maarpu meeting, no-Maarpu meeting, or 
no meeting.  
 In a Maarpu meeting, there was an attempt to discuss maternal and child health outcomes, 
and the Health department’s ANM was present at the venue. In a no-Maarpu meeting, there was 
no ANM and thus no Maarpu-related discussion, but the SHGs and VOs still met to discuss their 
agenda, and there were discussions related to the food provided by the Aaganwadi Centers (part 
of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) or the Nutrition and Child Day Care Center 
(NDCC)) that are managed by the VOs. Instances in the last category, where no meeting took 
place, are also important because they help to understand the barriers to Maarpu meetings at the 
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village level and what drives the ANMs to adapt on the field. In total, I observed 5 Maarpu 
meetings, 12 no-Maarpu meetings, and 11 no-meetings. The exception was the meeting I 
observed along with the district official in May 2013, which was actually performed like a 
practiced script! 
 Before presenting the findings from the 28 meetings I observed in 2014, it is instructive 
to describe that May 2013 meeting. It was only later that I realized that this village was like a 
model village and that the groups here had already performed this script several times when 
dignitaries or other state-level officials visited to learn about Maarpu. The following opening 
quote from the Village Organization (VO) President at the meeting aptly captures the rhetoric 
that was used at the state level and at the district level regarding making SHGs and VOs discuss 
social issues in addition to money matters.  
As you all know, we have been conducting our own VO meetings, but ever since Maarpu 
has come, you all know what we have been doing….Previously, we used to discuss only 
the VO-related agenda; for example, discussing the issues of the SHGs like loans, how to 
avail schemes, interest on savings, etc. …But now, ever since this new Collector has 
come, we are discussing Maarpu….particularly the five departments involved with 
Maarpu….Can somebody tell me what those five departments are? 
 Following this question all the women together in the room recited the names of the 
departments. The VO President then went on to articulate all 20 key indicators of the initiative, 
how they helped two women with iron supplements, and how they were helping the ANM 
connect with newly pregnant women and motivating other pregnant women to deliver at 
government hospitals rather than private hospitals. I even observed four pregnant women who 
were sitting in chairs at the back of the room, while others sat on the floor. All field-level 
functionaries were present, including the Sarpanch. This was the only meeting at which I ever 
saw a representative from the Rural Water Supply (RWS) department. When he was asked about 
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his role in Maarpu, he answered curtly: “My job is to switch on and off the water pump to supply 
water to the village.” Even in this fully rehearsed meeting, however, there was no discussion 
about accountability, monitoring of services, or coming up with a village-level health and 
nutrition plan as discussed in Maarpu’s policy document. In the 28 meetings I observed in 2014, 
I never saw a single pregnant woman at any of the meetings, and only in two did I see a 
Sarpanch—one of whom, a male village elder, left after five minutes. In the other instance, the 
Sarpanch was a young woman who was motivated to attain state-level and national-level 
recognition by achieving the targets set for construction of toilets in the village.  
 At the 28 village meetings, I observed five instances where an ANM was present and an 
attempt was made to discuss Maarpu-related topics, but only in bits and spurts in the midst of 
constant interruptions from the women who wanted to settle their accounts, make payments, 
collect their interest and get on with their work day in the farm. While discussion of 20 points 
was scheduled for two hours on paper, getting through even 20 minutes seemed like an 
impossible task! This held true in all five cases, where the ANM was shouting at the top of her 
voice, reading off a list, dodging interruptions and in some instances fending off sarcastic jokes 
from the women. The point on encouraging late marriages for girls evoked particular ridicule. 
The average age of the women at these meetings seemed to be at least 45, and they joked that in 
the days of mobile phones it is impossible to prevent the girls and boys from secretly dating, so 
they would rather have them marry early than have children out of wedlock. In the midst of all 
this, the ANM was trying to get her message across: 
Remember, deliveries only in government hospitals….Deliveries should not happen at 
home…they should happen only at the hospital. Private hospital deliveries have 
decreased a lot; now a lot of deliveries are happening in government hospitals only….If 
the delivery takes place in a government hospital, the attendant also gets to eat food, and 
the mother also gets food…three meals a day…and you will be given money for delivery 
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also… [but] only for delivery at government hospitals. But now, no deliveries at home at 
all. Okay? (Village Meeting #1). 
 
Please, all of you, listen….Call 108 for an ambulance and ask them to take them to the 
PHC in our village, not the neighboring one. If the 108 guy does not take you there, then 
call me and I will talk to him. If he doesn’t listen to me, then I will have him call the 
Collector (Village Meeting #2). 
 What became apparent to me while observing these meetings is that Maarpu’s message 
had become distilled to very simple premises like not delivering at home, calling the ambulance, 
and eating good food. The following quote from the elderly Sarpanch who was present at one 
meeting for five minutes is a telling story of how Maarpu’s message had reached the village in 
its most diluted form, reinforcing its status as a Health department that had nothing to do with 
collective action. The Sarpanch asked one of the ladies to talk about Maarpu and applauded her 
response by saying this:  
Yes…can you repeat that again?…Eat good food, when you have kids give them 
injections, take them to check-ups….Now, that’s Maarpu….You should be healthy 
(Village Meeting # 5). 
 All 12 of the no-Maarpu meetings I attended had two common features: first, they were 
fully functional SHG/VO meetings with discussions about money matters, and second, when I 
asked the Community Activist (the frontline worker who oversees the SHG/VO meetings and is 
part of the Rural Development hierarchy) about Maarpu meetings, I was informed on every 
occasion that “the Maarpu meeting was held earlier on a different date” (Village Meeting #17).  
This was rather strange, because I had confirmation from the district administration that no new 
instructions were given regarding a change of date; the Maarpu meeting was to happen on the 
same day as the SHG/VO meeting. I then began to analyze the dates that were given for the 
purported earlier Maarpu meetings. In at least five instances, the date coincided with the 
Nutrition and Health Day (NH Day), a convergence effort between the Health and ICDS staff to 
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monitor  all pregnant women, nursing mothers, and children. While I observed Village Meeting 
#17, I noticed four pregnant women eating and talking in the Aaganwadi Center adjacent to the 
room where the meeting was taking place. I asked them about Maarpu meeting, but they didn’t 
seem to know the term; next, I asked when the ANM came for a checkup, and they said it was on 
a different date every month. 
 The topics of no-Maarpu meetings were money matters and SHG/VO-related group 
politics, leadership issues, and other money management issues. In one instance, in Village 
Meeting #21, an argument erupted towards the end of the meeting between the Community 
Activist (CA) and the woman managing the Nutrition and Day Care Center (NDCC). The 
woman was accusing the CA’s wife (who supplies milk to the NDCC) of diluting the milk with 
water. The CA was clearly furious at this accusation and retorted that the woman should take up 
this issue directly with his wife or bring it up as an issue early in the meeting. The woman 
responded that she had had to work and thus could not come to the meeting earlier. Regardless, if 
diluted milk is a nutrition-related topic for maternal and child health, then it is noteworthy that 
this was not discussed, monitored or even recorded as an issue to be followed up on later. In 
another instance, at Village Meeting #26, a group of about 50 women were in attendance and an 
argument had erupted over the issue of a vote of no confidence in the CA for mismanagement of 
accounts. A group of women were waiting for the usual business to be conducted before holding 
a vote on the CA.  
 I observed 11 no-meetings (instances where the meeting place was empty at the 
appointed time), and the reasons for not having a meeting at all were contingent upon the local 
village context. When I asked the villagers for information, they sent me to the local village 
representative. The reasons the representatives gave me for the lack of any meeting (even a 
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SHG/VO meeting) included: there was a marriage in the village (Meetings #3 and 7); SHGs had 
boycotted the VO because of mismanagement of funds, and the allegations were being 
investigated (Meeting #8); the meeting took place on a different date (Meetings #12 and 14); 
there were local body elections (Meetings #13 and 18); there was an inter-personal conflict 
between the CA and his or her supervisor (Meeting #23); the women had left for NREGA work 
and would return from the farm late (Meeting #28); and, finally, the CA had found a better job 
with the forest department (Meeting #25; this was a village habitation of Scheduled Tribes or 
indigenous population).  
However, the most valuable finding here was that, for Village Meetings #27 and 14, I 
was informed that pregnant women go to the NH Days and not to the SHGs/VOs. When I asked 
why, the reasons given were that the mothers-in-law did not like their daughters-in-law to leave 
the house for these meetings or that no new group members had been added for the past four 
years, so the newly married women in the village were not part of any groups. With the fate of 
the Maarpu meetings linked directly to the SHGs-VO meetings and all their environmental (both 
internal and external) complexities, it is futile for the ANM to depend on these meetings to get 
her work done. Thus, she instead regularly participates in the Nutrition and Health Days (NH 
Days) where she can directly interact with the target audience and convey her messages without 
any interruptions. The quotes below from different sources validate the futility of these meeting 
venues.  
Researcher: So why are no meeting taking place in this village? 
Informant: there were problems regarding the financial management…so the groups have 
boycotted…until all the accounts are explained (Informant #32; Rural Development). 
Researcher: Do Maarpu meetings really happen? 
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Informant [laughs] Not really….In the beginning, with this new Collector, it happened, but after 
that nothing….The Maarpu meetings are ineffective and do not serve any purpose….The ANM 
is irregular, yet reports go up every month….There is no discussion other than loans, money and 
savings (Informant #87; Rural Development). 
Researcher: If pregnant women don’t come, then what issues do you talk about? 
Informant: Nobody talks about Maarpu….It is only me and the ANM who read out the 
guidelines (Informant #17; Women & Child Development).  
Village Women at a Meeting: Oh gosh….they [the ANM] say the same thing over and over 
again, and we hear the same thing over and over again….It is such a pain….They will shout, we 
will shout….like cattle (Village Meeting #5). 
The Maarpu meetings? Yeah…they are happening. People do get together…meetings are more 
for the purpose of collecting reports. No…analysis or reflection is done (Subject Matter Expert 
#7; Management, Research, Training Institute-India). 
Maarpu meetings? It depends on the individuals. If somebody wants to be dishonest, they can be 
dishonest…and just write on paper that they are doing everything. To be frank, I am not even 
20% satisfied....I am telling you quite openly (Subject Matter Expert #6; Retired Official now 
serving as Consultant).  
 The Final Mutation  
Interacting with the service delivery beneficiaries (pregnant women, young mothers, and 
other women) provided the ultimate source of data to validate what was really happening on the 
ground with Maarpu’s implementation. The idea of interacting with them resulted from a field 
visit I made with a district health official during a polio immunization drive in late February 
2014. During these three days, I learned what questions to ask to find out if Maarpu had really 
reached its targeted audience, and I also learned which venues to visit in order to get this 
information. Thus, in total I interacted with 43 service delivery beneficiaries at different places: 
during the inspection visits with the district official (6 cases across several venues like polio 
immunization campus, Primary Health Centers, and in the villages), at Nutrition and Health Days 
(5 cases over 3 NH Days), at Primary Health Centers (9 cases), at the village while waiting under 
the shade of a tree (11 cases), and finally at the village meeting venue (12 cases). I refer to these 
as service delivery beneficiary cases, because in some instances I interacted with a single person 
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and in others with a group of people. In effect, these are 43 instances of my interactions with the 
community that was supposed to be engaged with Maarpu’s implementation on the ground. The 
most fascinating finding was that in not a single instance had the participants even heard of 
Maarpu! 
Pregnant ladies and young mothers at the PHCs, NH Days, and villages I interacted with 
were simply not part of the Maarpu system. They all carried the Mother and Child Protection 
Card (with the 20 key indicators) and upon request they showed me their ANM’s phone number 
and the list of their regular check-ups with the ANM. In spite of their close proximity with the 
ANM, however, none of them attended any meetings; they were not even members of the SHGs. 
The women I met at the village meetings were all middle-aged or elderly women, so the accounts 
I heard at the PHCs, NH Days, and villages was consistent with what I observed at the village 
meetings. What emerged at the village meetings was that even those who attended the group 
meetings only attended one per month in rotation. That is, in a group with 12 members (the 
average number), each person only attended a meeting once a year. Thus, there is no way for 
these group members to monitor community-level health and nutrition services or hold the 
Medical Doctor and sanitation worker accountable. The following aptly represents all 12 
instances of my interactions with the women at village meetings: 
Why would a woman want to come every month and lose her daily wage? If you add it 
up: once a month, 12 times a year, and then over the years…it all adds up to a lot of 
precious money. Instead, the smart thing to do is just to come once and then come again 
after 10 or 12 months…but by then the Collector would have changed; programs would 
have changed (Citizen Interaction #20; Village Meeting). 
I verified this concept at every meeting I attended. Every woman I spoke to said the same 
thing: that all group members rotate in terms of their participation, including the group leader. I 
had already encountered this finding while accompanying the District Official on his inspection 
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visit, which was in another administrative region within the same district, but I saw the same 
pattern even in the administrative region in which I did my field work. The following field notes 
from this field visit are representative of all six instances of the inspection visits. 
During this visit, we spoke with the ladies and their accompanying partners—husbands 
and/or parents or in-laws. Some of them were migrant workers and some were from the 
region.  
What struck us was that none of the woman there were part of the Maarpu eco-system. 
They had MCP cards, which were incomplete, and they didn’t know what the ANM’s 
number was to call. They said that they did not go to the monthly meetings, as they are 
not part of the groups. This really pained the district official I was with, as he told me that 
Maarpu is not working as expected (Citizen Interaction #9).  
 My interactions with pregnant women and their companions (usually mothers or mothers-
in-law) during my visits to the Primary Health Centers (PHCs) and my interactions with women 
in the villages all showed the same pattern. Those who were pregnant all had an MPC card and 
regularly visited the ANM during the NH-Days but were not part of any groups. No new groups 
had been formed in the village, and those who came to this village as recent brides were not part 
of any groups. Their mothers/mothers-in-law were part of a group, but they had not heard of 
Maarpu. The following field notes are representative of all nine instances of citizen interactions 
at PHCs and all 11 instances of interactions in villages.   
I saw a young lady who was pregnant sitting on a chair. Her mother was accompanying 
her. They told me that she was having some pains, and that is why she was sitting there. I 
saw her holding an MCP card, and it was stamped high-risk in red. I asked her if she 
knew what that meant, and sadly she didn’t know what it meant. She said she had studied 
only till the 5th grade and didn’t know how to read or write in any language. I saw her 
MCP book, and as usual it was incomplete. I asked her about the groups and Maarpu—
she was not part of a group in the village, nor had she ever heard about Maarpu meetings 
(Citizen Interaction #15; Primary Health Center). 
The five women I spoke to were not aware of MAARPU meetings. They were group 
members; they all rotate and take turns…they do not go every month. The ANM comes 
once a month to this village for checkups (Citizen Interaction #30; Village).  
 Finally, I came face to face with the ground reality of Maarpu’s implementation during 
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the three Nutrition and Health Days (NH Days) I observed. These were very well attended NH 
Days that included the Medical Officer, staff nurse, ANM, ASHAs, Aaganwadi worker, and a 
constant stream of pregnant women, nursing mothers, and young mothers. I saw the staff take 
pulse rates, check weight and height, ask and answer questions, update the MCP books, and give 
tablets and advice. Each NH Day lasted for more than three hours; over three such instances, not 
once did I observe any medical staff make any mention of Maarpu. If the purpose of Maarpu is 
really to help improve maternal and child health outcomes, then my observation is that 
combining Maarpu with the SHG/VO meetings is utterly counterproductive to that aim, because 
the ANMs, who are well aware of the field reality, know that their target group does not come to 
these meetings. Thus, the best way to help improve maternal and child health outcomes is to 
cater to these women on the NH Days.  
 Both parties have an incentive to attend this meeting—the ANM because the Collector is 
interested in maternal and child health outcomes, and the women because it is convenient to 
attend a health checkup in their own village rather than go to a private hospital far away. The 
question of where the delivery happens is another matter altogether, but from what I could gather 
based on my interactions it is fairly simple: the poor go to a government facility, and those who 
can afford it go to a private facility. While the district administration has been touting an increase 
in government institutional deliveries (especially in the larger district hospitals and government 
maternity hospitals), this could be because of the wide publicity the Collector has given the issue 
through local media and press. As for the numbers being reported from the Primary Health 
Centers (PHCs), their integrity cannot be vouched for when the head of the district 
administration only wants to see the numbers show an upward trend. Thus, ironically, the Health 
department’s street-level bureaucrats used their discretion and found the most effective way to 
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implement Maarpu’s policy—saying nothing about the meetings and taking care of the women in 
an exclusive setting. In effect, the NH Days became the implemented form of Maarpu, while the 
SHGs/VOs continued to be what they always were—venues to discuss village money matters. 
The following field notes are representative of all five instances of my interactions at NH Days.  
So even in the full presence of the medical staff and the village woman, not a word about 
Maarpu was spoken. Had I not known about Maarpu, and had I visited only this meeting, 
then I would never have known that something like Maarpu existed. Come to think of it, 
only a month ago I attended a Collector-level review meeting! What an illusion! (Citizen 
Interaction #10). 
During the time that I was there, at least 10-15 women—who are surely Maarpu’s target 
group—visited the facility and left. Not even once did the two ANMs broach the subject 
of Maarpu or inform them about these monthly meetings where information is exchanged 
and feedback about services can be given. This was in spite of my asking the ANMs and 
Aaganwadi about Maarpu meetings and what they think about it----of course, at first they 
gave the typical response that it was all well and then later on the ANM who came 
second told me that it is a total waste of time (Citizen Interaction #11). 
Discussion 
 The implementation of Maarpu’s policy was thus shaped primarily by three factors: first, 
the District Collector’s programmatic focus; second, existing power balances, institutional 
histories and turf battles among district officials and village functionaries; and third, the reality 
of the local village context. Through this process, at every level, bureaucrats exercised their 
discretion and re-interpreted the policy of implementing Maarpu, which in turn strengthened the 
perception that Maarpu is a Health department initiative and not a collaborative. I would like to 
underscore here the role of perception, which in my view actually guided how individual 
bureaucrats at each level exercised their discretion, ensuring that their actions were in line with 
the existing power balances, institutional histories and turf-related issues. The starting point of 
this perception is the 20 key points that effectively constitute Maarpu (the first research question 
uncovered the politics behind how these 20 points got onto the agenda). The Collector, who has 
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always been clear about her commitment to maternal and child health outcomes, perceived 
Maarpu as a health-related initiative (in a programmatic sense) and used her discretion to 
implement Maarpu with an aggressive focus on increasing institutional deliveries in government 
hospitals.  
 The Collector’s decision, in turn, further strengthened the perception that Maarpu is a 
health-related initiative, and thus district officials saw no need to rattle the cages of bureaucratic 
politics when there was no real focus on the village meeting themselves. For district officials, 
there is a dual effect of perception: their programmatic superior (the Collector) has focused on 
institutional deliveries, while their hierarchical superiors (at the state level) have not signaled to 
them to focus on the village meetings. As a result of this perception, district officials used their 
discretion to leave Maarpu to the Health department. At the village level, functionaries did the 
same; they acknowledged the Collector’s interest in institutional deliveries as a sign that Maarpu 
is a Health department initiative, and they understood what the lack of signaling from the top 
meant. Ultimately, it was left to the health worker to figure out how to implement this health-
related initiative. The ANM thus continued to do what she had always done; however, the overall 
effect of Maarpu within the district was that rural health services and maternal and child health 
services received much-needed attention. Thus, the implementation of Maarpu went through 
three different mutations: at the District Collector-level (from the 20 points to a focus on 
institutional deliveries in government hospitals), at the district administration level (the 
perception that institutional deliveries fall under the exclusive domain of the Health department), 
and finally at the village level (where the ANM bypassed the village meetings and attended to 
pregnant ladies and nursing mothers (i.e. he job description)).  
 I now discuss these findings using the implementation scorecard. As discussed in Chapter 
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4, the  institutional-level is where the organization is most exposed to the external environment 
and thus behaves like an open system; the managerial-level core refers to natural systems 
perspective where individuals in positons of public authority navigate through the internal and 
external environments; the technical-level refers to the organization working like a rational and 
closed system, and the political-level is where a clear set of winners and losers emerge as a result 
of the decision making process and the resulting rational model of program implementation. 
Figure 2 displays the implementation scorecard at the district-level of administration. Figure 3 
displays the implementation scorecard at the village-level of administration.  
 In Figure 2, at the institutional-level, the informal structure (i.e., personality, charisma, 
and interpersonal networks) that a District Collector brings to the formal structure of the 
institution had the most significant effect on shaping Maarpu’s implementation processes. 
Furthermore, existing power balances, turf battles, and institutional histories of the participating 
institutions (for e.g., District Medical and Health Officer (DMHO), Senior Public Health Officer 
(SPHO), District Education Officer, Village Organizations, Self-Help Groups, and the Sarpanch) 
played a key role in diluting the District Collector’s programmatic focus. Finally, central and 
state government priorities are also important influences. At the institutional-level, the 
organization behaves like an open system, where environmental influences infiltrates the 
organization forcing it to make changes and resemble the external environment. In my view, this 
attribute of the open systems perspective is instructive in understanding why a District Collector 
might be motivated in focusing on a collaborative governance initiative like Maarpu. A focus on 
Maarpu means the District Collector is able to directly align village-level health priorities to 
those of the central government. Given that a District Collector will eventually be transferred and 
perform duties in the central government, any Collector with such ambitions will have the 
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incentive to focus on programs that are aligned to the National Rural Health Mission. At the 
same time, we also know that an organization that is an open system is also constantly 
“maintaining stability and predictability in the organization” (Katz and Kahn 1978, p. 85).  
 We also know that organizations achieve this by formalizing and institutionalizing 
organizational activities (Katz and Kahn 1978, p. 86). Thus, all these external set of influences 
are finally reduced to a set of instructions by individuals in positions of public authority at the 
managerial-level of the organization. The natural systems perspective informs us that the 
decisions taken at the managerial-level will only be followed if they are seen as legitimate; and 
not only because they are given by an individual in a position of public authority (like the 
District Collector). When the District Collector in this case study, as an administrative 
entrepreneur, focused on institutional deliveries, employees from all participating departments 
other than Health did not see it as legitimate orders to be followed (institutional deliveries is 
under the exclusive administrative domain of the Health department).  
 Thus, at the institutional and managerial-levels what we see happening here is that a 
certain set of environmental influences was converted by the District Collector into a formal set 
of instructions. The focus on institutional deliveries is aligned with the tendency of the 
organization to pursue survival, stability, and maintenance of its status quo—such a 
programmatic focus is still aligned to Maarpu and it is an activity that the Health department has 
been doing for decades. The technical-level of the organization functions like a rational system 
where the focus is on goal specificity and alignment, and reducing the number of variables that 
need to be managed so as to increase predicable behavior among employees. Thus, at the district-
level of administration the technical functions took the form of training programs and 
administrative review meetings (to review institutional deliveries). Again, these activities do not 
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disturb the status quo of the district-administration, but at the same time allows it to position 
itself as adapting to change (i.e., discussing institutional deliveries in the context of Maarpu’s 
goals).  
 Finally, even though the District Collector’s orders did not get the consent from all 
participating departments, the coercive power vested in the institution of the District Collector 
ensured that all unwilling participants at least appear to be participating. This is evident based on 
my observation of the review meeting conducted by the District Collector on February 4, 2014. 
At the political-level, which is influenced by the politics of bureaucratic structures, the District 
Collector’s decision to focus on institutional deliveries benefits the Health and Women and Child 
Development departments (because they can continue to do what they have always been doing, 
but burdens the Rural Development because now they have an additional activity to their 
repertoire.) 
 The implementation scorecard for the village-level of administration looks markedly 
different than the state and district-level. In Figure 3, at the institutional-level the village’s local 
environmental infiltrates the organization (e.g., local customs and traditions). An additional 
influence at this level is the signals from superiors to street-level bureaucrats. In the case of 
Maarpu, the skewed programmatic focus towards health indicators (where 15 out of the 20 
indicators were health-related) as a result of bureaucratic politics in the upper echelons of the 
bureaucracy and the District Collector’s focus on institutional deliveries made district 
administrators signal to their field functionaries that Maarpu is about improving institutional 
deliveries and nutritional status of women and not about collaborative meetings to hold field 
functionaries responsible for service delivery. In this context, any lack of signals or 
communication (through Government Orders, memos, training programs, or review meetings) 
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from supervisors in other participating departments is deemed as signaling that Maarpu is a 
Health department’s initiative. These external influences have to now be converted into a rational 
set of instructions to be followed at the technical-level of the organization based on decisions 
made by those at the managerial-level.  
 Interestingly, there is no managerial-level at the village-level of administration to convert 
external influences into a rational set of instructions. In contrast, at the state and district-level of 
administration a managerial-level existed in positions of public authority that made participants 
at least come together to collaborate. With this component missing and with the perception that 
Maarpu is a Health department’s initiative, the technical-level of organization only performed 
what was signaled to it from the district-level of administration—improve institutional deliveries. 
As a result, what transpires at the village-level is that participants from Rural Development are 
the winners (i.e., they have escaped from getting involved in an activity they never perceived as 
legitimate to begin with) and those from the Health and Women and Child Development are 
losers (because the ANM and AWW, in particular the ANM, has to live up to the perception that 
Maarpu is a Health department initiative).  
 It would be unfair to say that the District Collector focused on institutional deliveries and 
ignored community participation and that this is why nobody took the meetings seriously. The 
fact remains that the Collector did give importance to community participation, but the tendency 
of the bureaucratic organization to strive towards rationality resulted in the programmatic focus 
on institutional deliveries and, in the process, strengthened the perception that Maarpu is a 
health-related initiative, thus alienating some groups from the rest. Ironically, at the state-level, it 
looked like the health and nutrition camps had won over Rural Development, but at the village-
level the burden of implementing Maarpu fell on the shoulders of the Health department after all. 
219 
 
 
 
Finally, in all this translation the message of community participation and collaboration got lost. 
 Based on these findings and analysis, I conclude that there is evidence to support the 
district-level research proposition that formal authority plays a key role in the adoption of 
collaborative governance, but only to the extent that it is not perceived as a threat to the 
bureaucratic structures’ historically accquired authority and legitimacy. Without the District 
Collector’s drive, district officials by themselves would never have wanted to implement Maarpu 
in its full spirit, because doing so would require several competing institutions to be in harmony 
with each other (e.g., the NDCC and the Aaganwadi Center, SERP, and other traditional 
bureaucracies like Health and Women & Child Welfare, and SHGs-VOs and the Panchayati Raj 
Institutions). For example, at which office will the discussions take place, and what are the 
implications if one district official visits another’s office? Who is acquiscing  power to whom? In 
the present case study, with the strong perception and signals that Maarpu is a health-related 
initiative, no one felt they needed to bother with collaboration anyway.  
 The evidence to support the third research proposition—that implementation of 
collaborative governance will be ineffective and problematic where participating administrative 
structures have, over the years, acquired the ability, legitimacy, and authority to operate in an 
environment of diffused responsibility—is not straightforward. Based on the evidence collected, 
it is clear that Maarpu-related collaborative meetings were so ineffective and problematic that 
they were basically abandoned. The case study, however, does not offer evidence to further 
examine the issue of diffused responsibility. Maarpu’s policy of implementaton underscored the 
need for community participation to monitor and hold functionaries accountable. Compared to 
the state and district levels, the threat of holding functionaries accountable at the village level is 
real (e.g., Primary Health Staff expressing fears over conducting deliveries they are not ready for 
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and then being questioned by villagers, who would never approach the state or district officials). 
If the meetings were functional, it would be conceivable that there would be more visible forms 
of resistance from field staff. However, in this case study, the role of perception and signals that 
Maarpu is a Health program and not really a collaborative program was so well entrenched that a 
different type of adaptation was observed in the field. 
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Figure 7: District-level Implementation Scorecard 
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Figure 8: Village-level Implementation Scorecard   
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Chapter 8 
Discussion and Conclusion—the Bureaucratic-Collaboration Paradigm 
Introduction 
Public administration scholars have argued that engaging citizens in the decision making 
process of the government has both instrumental and intrinsic value (Bingham, 2005; Nabatchi, 
2012; Nabatchi 2010). Development scholars, multilateral aid agencies and governments in 
developing countries refer to “demand-side governance mechanisms” when they discuss 
community involvement to bring about accountability and transparency to the bureaucratic 
service delivery processes (Murgai, 2006; Martines, 2005; Cornwall, 2008; Joshi, 2013).  
This study examines one such instance of intergovernmental coordination and citizen 
engagement mechanisms. In response to its commitment to attaining the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of maternal and child health outcomes, the 
Government of India, in 2005, launched the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) with a 
focus on service delivery integration and community participation. However, little systematic 
research has been conducted at the subnational level, where the implementation happens, to 
examine how bureaucrats interpret, operationalize, communicate, and diffuse information related 
to collaborative governance mechanisms and how these dynamics shape the policy 
implementation processes and outcomes.   
This study aimed to better understand the casual mechanisms between collaborative 
governance and service delivery. The study explores the question whether collaborative 
governance mechanisms have an instrumental value, i.e., do they facilitate boundary spanning 
work, address the concerns of accountability and transparency, and thus improve the overall 
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quality of service delivery. To do this, the study examines the policy formulation and 
implementation processes of a collaborative governance initiative, called Maarpu, in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh aimed at improving maternal and child health services through inter-
departmental coordination and community participation. The overarching research question 
guiding the study is: how do bureaucrats in an intergovernmental setting shape the 
implementation processes of a collaborative governance initiative? To examine this question 
further, the following two subsidiary research questions are addressed: 
1. How and why did Maarpu emerge the way it did? 
2. To what extent and under what conditions can bureaucrats at multiple levels of the 
hierarchy engage in intergovernmental and inter-departmental coordination and 
involve the community? 
Together, the findings for these questions provide micro-level insights into the 
implementation life cycle of a collaborative initiative in India by examining Maarpu’s 
antecedents, processes, and outcomes (organized under the themes of The Policy of 
Implementation (Chapter 6 examining the antecedents) and the Implementation of Policy 
(Chapter 7 examining the implementation processes and outcomes). The importance of this study 
lies in the fact that it directly responds to the calls by public management scholars for more 
studies on how bureaucrats in other country contexts interpret and implement collaborative 
initiatives (O’Leary and Vij, 2012).  
As the first step in developing context-specific theoretical propositions, in Chapter 2 and 
3, I examined the structural pre-conditions to collaborative governance in India. The key finding 
that emerges from this chapter is that the Constitution of India’s primary aim is to ensure an 
indestructible union through a strong central government vis-à-vis the subnational governments; 
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a reflection on part of the planners’ acute awareness to India’s history of fragmented 
administration and centrifugal forces as a result of a centuries old influence of feudalism and 
colonialism. As a consequence, India’s administrative structures and intergovernmental 
functioning make for a strong central government—primarily through a central cadre of civil 
service officials (for example, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) or formerly known as the 
Indian Civil Service (ICS) during the British colonial rule) that are structurally wired to be loyal 
towards the central government vis-à-vis the subnational governments in which they operate.  
In his reports on India’s administrative functioning, Paul Appleby (1953, 1956) describes 
the functioning of India’s bureaucracies as being marked with diffused lines of responsibility and 
rigidity throughout the intergovernmental structures and attributes this to the constitutional 
mandates of India’s federal polity. The chapter also examines other reforms and institutional 
changes post-independence to understand the functioning of India’s public bureaucracies. Thus, 
the rise of regional political parties, constitutional status to local government institutions (i.e., the 
Panchayats Raj Institutions), and economic liberalization and public sector reforms were all 
aimed at making India’s bureaucracies responsive, agile, and democratically accountable. The 
chapter concludes that the effect of all these changes and reforms on the bureaucracies has been 
an expansion of administrative structures to respond to new mandates of decentralization, 
devolution of power, and democratic governance all the while maintaining the same qualities of 
rigidity and a centralized command and control mode of administration. In this context, I coin 
the term collaborative bureaucrat to capture the inherent contradiction India’s administrative 
structures. Thus, the organizational actor in India’s bureaucracies is expected to engage in 
democratic governance (i.e., collaborative) and at the same maintain status quo, rigidity, and 
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power balances (i.e. bureaucrat). Based on this concept of a collaborative bureaucrat, I developed 
three theoretical propositions to further guide the study: 
1. State level: I expect department heads to facilitate collaborative initiatives, 
because lines of responsibility for senior officials are diffused and cannot be 
easily ascertained. 
2. District level: I expect formal authority to play a key role in the adoption of 
collaborative governance, but only to the extent that it is not perceived as a threat 
to historically acquired agency authority, legitimacy. 
3. Village level: I expect the implementation of collaborative governance to be 
ineffective and problematic where participating administrative structures have, 
over the years, acquired the ability, legitimacy, and authority to operate in an 
environment of diffused responsibility. 
In Chapter 3, I look for clues within the organization theory literature to further 
understand India’s government bureaucracy. Thompson (2008), Scott (2003), Tompkins (2006) 
all point to the fact that organizations are rational, open, and natural systems—all at the same 
time. In Thompson’s (2008) classic work Organizations in Action, he address this administrative 
paradox by positing that organizations have “a suborganization” within them where rational, 
natural, and open system characteristics are displayed. Thompson (2008) identifies three 
organizational locations that “exhibit three district levels of responsibility and control—
technical, managerial, and institutional” (p. 10; italics in original). In effect, the technical core is 
where the organization behaves like a rational or closed system, the managerial core relates to 
decision making processes and thus the natural system, and finally the institutional core where 
the external environment infiltrates the organizations like an open system.  
227 
 
 
 
To make this framework more relevant to the study at hand and to make it reflect the 
reality of bureaucratic politics within India’s intergovernmental structures, I draw upon Moe’s 
political theory of organization (1984, 1989, 1991, 1995, and 2012) to integrate politics and 
administration to better reflect the bureaucratic organization. The political theory of organization 
posits that politics within the bureaucratic organization results in structures that create winners 
and losers; in effect, structures emerge to suit the interests of those in positons of public authority 
and that these structures and decisions are forced upon those who do not have the power to 
oppose. Thus, the implications for the bureaucratic organization is that its structures are 
rational, natural, open, and political and the collaborative structures that emerge from such an 
organization are also rational, natural, open and political.  
Finally, I contextualize this organizational framework to India’s decentralized 
intergovernmental structures. I posit that the rational, natural, open, and political influences 
operate at all three locations of the implementation hierarchy: state, district, and village-levels of 
administration. I develop an implementation scorecard that traces the implementation processes 
and articulates how the bureaucratic organization functions at the institutional, managerial, 
technical, and political-level at the state, district, and village-level of administration. In effect, 
the implementation processes of a collaborative governance initiative are governed by these 
organizational characteristics at all levels of the implementation hierarchy. In Chapters 6 and 7, I 
use this analytical framework to understand how these multiple organizational influences shaped 
Maarpu’s implementation emergence, and implementation processes and outcomes. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss the case study context, research design, and methodology used to 
examine the implementation processes and outcomes of Maarpu. The case study’s data collection 
and analysis is guided by the three theoretical propositions developed in Chapter 2. Using Yin’s 
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(2009) typology of case study designs, I use a combination of a single-case study (at the state and 
district-level) embedded with multiple cases (at the village-level). Two waves of field work was 
conducted for data collection in May 2013 and between January-June 2014. Data were collected 
from multiple sources across different levels of the implementation hierarchy for triangulating 
my findings primarily drawing on in-depth interviews of those engaged with the implementation 
process and observing the implementation processes. Data were collected through interviews of 
bureaucrats from across all the departments involved in the collaborative initiative, interviews of 
subject matter experts, interactions with citizens, and observing review meetings and village-
level collaborative meetings in addition to numerous Government Orders (GOs) and media 
articles.  
The findings, presented in Chapters 6 and 7, support the broader theoretical proposition 
that collaborative governance will not be effective if collaborative arrangements are super-
imposed on administrative structures whose traditional lines of authority and responsibility have 
not changed. Thus, collaborative governance mechanisms have little instrumental value in 
improving service delivery under such conditions. The findings confirm that bureaucratic 
structures responsible for implementing the collaborative initiative are rational, natural, open and 
political at the state, district and village level with varying degrees of influence at each 
administrative level with profound impact on the implementation processes and outcomes. The 
overarching finding is that the policy of implementing Maarpu was one of collaborative action, 
the implication of Maarpu’s policy was skewed towards programmatic indicators dominated by 
the Health department’s agenda. The findings indicate that such processes and outcomes 
resulted because of bureaucratic politics and the role of perception and how that perception 
shaped discretion at each administrative level of the implementation hierarchy.     
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This chapter reviews these findings with a substantive discussion about what these 
findings mean for collaborative governance in India. Following the discussion of findings, 
relevance for practice, limitations of the study, and directions for future research are outlined.  
Discussion 
The Bureaucratic-Collaborative Paradigm  
What do these findings actually mean for understanding theoretically and practically how 
India’s bureaucracies implement collaborative governance initiatives? The overarching finding is 
that while the policy of implementation is one of collaborative action, implementation of the 
policy was skewed towards programmatic indicators dominated by the health department’s 
agenda. How did this happen? The implementation scorecard at the state, district and village-
levels of administration provides a holistic and granular understanding of what happened and 
puts us in a position to theorize. In effect, the bureaucracies and officials adopted a collaborative 
governance initiative (with all its constituent parts of an open system; diffused power, shared 
values, collective good, joint action, horizontal hierarchies through convergence committees) and 
essentially converted it into a rational and closed system (Government Orders (GOs), training 
programs, and review meetings at the state and district-level and functioning in bureaucratic silos 
at the village level). I refer to this process of converting (and reducing) a collaborative 
governance initiative into a set of formalized instructions by individuals in positions of public 
authority as the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm.  
What began at the state-level as an initiative to improve inter-departmental coordination 
and encourage citizen participation to improve maternal and child health outcomes and framed as 
a collective action problem for the departments of Health, Women and Child Development, and 
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Rural Development was finally being implemented as an initiative to increase institutional 
deliveries in government maternity hospitals at the village-level. Is this an example where the 
policy is sound, but implementation weak (as is most commonly argued is the case in India’s 
social sector) or is it a classic case of divergence between the top-down and bottom-up narratives 
(as its mostly commonly understood in the implementation studies literature)? It could be both, 
but I propose an alternative explanation—this dilution or divergence is actually the tendency of 
the organization to strive towards rationality in order to maintain stability and ensure survival 
without upsetting the status quo in any radical way. This process of conversion is aptly captured 
in the implementation scorecard (Figures 1, 2, 3).  
At the state-level of administration we see that the influence of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) were converted into a 
rational program model called Maarpu. At the district-level of administration, we see that the 
influences of the District Collector, power, turf, and institutional histories were converted into a 
focus on increasing institutional deliveries. Finally, at the village-level of administration, 
influences of the local village environment and signals from superiors was converted into the 
Health department’s field functionary, the ANM, diligently doing her duties as per the 
departmental job description. When Maarpu was initiated, its program theory was based on the 
notion that involving the local community in the service delivery process will make field 
functionaries responsive and accountable to the people they serve. While the goals are aligned 
with democratic governance, such clear articulation of responsibility and accountability, as 
discussed in-depth in Chapters 2 and 3, are alien to India’s bureaucratic structures. Thus, at a 
conceptual level, I argue that this process of conversion across the inter-governmental structures 
was a way for the bureaucratic organization to internalize an external pressure and yet ensure 
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stability and legitimacy of the bureaucratic machinery. Thus, all those involved in Maarpu can 
claim to be responsive to the global and national discourse on participatory and democratic 
governance while at the same they have ensured that each department does what they have 
always been doing.   
Now, we are able to construct, at least conceptually, the causal pathways regarding the 
initiation and implementation of collaborative governance initiatives in the context of India’s 
social sector. To be theoretically succinct, we can expect that, after initial resistance, a 
bureaucratic organization will finally yield to external pressures to adopt collaborative 
governance (the open system perspective). Once this is done, internally, the organization works 
towards managing internal resistance and external pressures (the natural systems perspective). 
However, management decisions within an organization are not neutral; they are inherently 
political, because decisions have to be made about how multiple actors and institutions with 
varying levels of public authority will participate (i.e., articulating their roles and 
responsibilities) in the collaborative initiative (the political theory of organization perspective). 
As a result, the resulting set of actions will benefit some groups, while the rest have to 
compromise and be part of the implementation process. The net effect of all these processes is 
that the organization has incorporated an external pressure into its internal structures and ensured 
stability and legitimacy.  
Thus, the collaborative governance initiative is reduced to a formalized set of 
instructions with the aim of institutionalizing collaborative practices among the participants. In 
effect, what is essentially meant to be implemented as an open system (responsive to citizen 
concerns, shared values, diffused power, and through a horizontal network of actors and 
institutions) is reduced to actual implementation as a closed system (where the number of 
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variables that need to be addressed are fixed and delivered through a top-down hierarchy of 
formal structures). In this process, the bureaucratic organization has reduced the number of 
variables it has to handle, thereby reducing uncertainty and ensuring stability. This is the first 
aspect of the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm.   
The findings make a contribution to the collaborative governance literature by showing 
how individuals (policy and administrative entrepreneurs) in positions of public authority made 
decisions that resulted in Maarpu’s bureaucratic structures becoming politically charged; thus 
alienating some groups and shifting the burden of implementation on other groups. What 
emerges here, then, is a different conceptualization of collaborative governance from what is 
presented in the extant literature, which underscores shared values and mutually beneficial 
outcomes. Thus, the second aspect of the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm is that 
collaborative structures are not necessarily designed for the mutual benefit of actors and 
institutions involved; rather, they are the result of the politics of bureaucratic structures that are 
designed to create winners and losers. This means collaborative structures are inherently 
political. A closer like at the managerial and political-levels of the implementation scorecard 
sheds light on this aspect, with its most profound effect at the state-level of administration where 
the seat of public authority exercises maximum power of coercion.  
At the state-level, the Chief Secretary and other Principal Secretaries (i.e., policy 
entrepreneurs) at the managerial-level used their power of coercion to weave a narrative that the 
reason why Andhra Pradesh’s maternal and child health were lagging behind its peer group of 
states was because there was no demand for these services from local communities. In the state 
of Andhra Pradesh, there is a readily available bureaucratic structure to mobilize community 
groups—the Self Help Groups (SHGs) and Village Organizations (VOs) that fall under the 
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purview of the Rural Development department. The political theory of organization informs us 
that the nature of politics within bureaucratic structures is such that those with public authority 
can impose their will (i.e., through the structures and programs they design) on others. These 
decisions are political and creates a clear set of winners and losers—and the losers have no 
choice but to accept this unfavorable outcome. In this case study, the Chief Secretary’s will got 
imposed on Rural Development where it was decided that SHGs and VOs will be used as the 
central institutional platform for village-level field functionaries and citizens to interact. In 
effect, Maarpu expanded the scope of the SHGs and VOs while Health and Women and Child 
Development gained an additional partner and also a narrative to explain why their services are 
not reaching the intended groups. 
At the district-level of administration, the District Collector as the administrative 
entrepreneur is in a position of public authority. In this case study, the District Collector’s 
programmatic focus on institutional delivery further strengthened the position of Health and 
Women and Child Development relative to Rural Development. Furthermore, at the district-level 
of administration there are other political influences at play; namely, power balances, turf battles, 
and institutional histories. The findings indicate that these three factors played a key role in 
diluting the effect of formal authority of the District Collector and provided an opportunity for 
the losers (those from Rural Development) to adapt and silently resist a health-related initiative 
that was thrust upon them. The political nature of collaboration at the district-level was marked 
by the perception that Maarpu is a health-related initiative. The politics of bureaucratic structures 
in India’s civil service bureaucracy ensures that the District Collector rotates every two years 
with no guarantee or incentives that the successor will continue the predecessor’s programmatic 
focus. If anything, the incentives for the District Collector are structured such that each new 
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officer charts their own legacy, identity, and programmatic focus. Thus, district officials, in the 
case of Maarpu, essentially waited-out the Collector’s turn and signaled to their village-level 
functionaries to get involved in the collaborative meetings. 
Finally, it is at the village-level of administration where we see the real manifestation of 
the political nature of collaborative structures. In this case study, Maarpu was finally reduced to 
conveying simplified messages about eating good food, getting kids vaccinated on time, and 
encouraging women to deliver at government hospitals. In effect, the burden of Maarpu’s 
implementation fell on the Health department’s field worker, the ANM, because Maarpu was 
perceived as a health-related initiative. All other village-level field functionaries from the local 
community got away without participating in Maarpu. Thus, the idea that collaborative structures 
are inherently political and not necessarily designed for the mutual benefit of the actors and 
institutions involved has profound implications for understanding the implementation of 
collaborative governance initiatives. From a practical perspective, this theoretical mechanism 
provides insights as to why collaborative initiatives that appear great on paper never translate to 
results on the ground in India.  
This conceptualization is the starting point for infusing studies of collaborative 
governance with bureaucratic politics. In the conceptual world of the bureaucratic-collaboration 
paradigm, the extent to which a collaboration is bureaucratized (i.e., converted from an open 
system to a closed system to maintain stability) should be seen as a variable. Thus, in the US, 
where bureaucracies are relatively more flexible than in India, we can expect to see collaboration 
that is relatively less bureaucratic. It is also important to note that in the bureaucratic-
collaboration paradigm, the frontiers of collaboration are always being pushed by policy 
entrepreneurs or charismatic leadership.  
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For practice, this study suggests that even in bureaucratic systems which are antithetical 
to collaborative practices, program design, structure and perception can make a difference. The 
findings from the study suggest that structure shapes perception, which in turn shapes how 
bureaucrats exercise discretion. If we accept that bureaucratic structures are inherently political 
and thus the collaborative structures that emerge from them are also inherently political then 
practitioners and program planners must be acutely aware of which groups are benefitting and 
which groups are being imposed upon to make sure the intended goals, outcomes or groups are 
on the winner’s side of the implementation scorecard. Even if the proper signals are sent, 
messages effectively diffused and communicated, and perception well managed, the key is really 
the structure of the collaborative arrangement that has a direct bearing on how bureaucrats 
exercise discretion. In this study, the structure of Maarpu was such that it was skewed towards 
the Health department’s programmatic goals. While individuals may subscribe to collective goals 
and community development, the same individuals within bureaucratic organizations will only 
subscribe to what they are structurally wired to do i.e., be responsible for their department’s 
work.  
Another interesting paradox that emerges from the scorecard is the role of the 
managerial-level. While the role of the public manager and individual is well understood in the 
collaborative public management literature, what is interesting here is that a public manager only 
in a position of public authority can make collaboration happen. This brings me to the third 
aspect of the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm—formal authority and power is needed to 
make bureaucratic actors collaborate across departmental boundaries. This is different from our 
understanding of collaboration that is typically not associated with the use of formal authority or 
power. I must underscore here that this does not mean that in the bureaucratic-collaboration 
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paradigm, hierarchy and collaboration are the same. Instead, an implication of this paradigm is 
that only formal authority at the highest level of hierarchy can facilitate and initiate 
collaboration. The managerial-level in the implementation scorecard sheds further light on this 
issue. At the state and district-level of administration we saw that individuals in positons of 
public authority were able to bring different actors and institutions to talk to each other in spite 
of all the power balances, turf battles, institutional histories, and perception issues. However, at 
the village-level of administration we see that although there is a managerial-level for each 
department, there is no hierarchy at the managerial-level in a position of public authority to help 
drive collaboration. In such a vacuum of power, local village environment, perception, and 
signals from superiors to abandon Maarpu thrived and finally diluted the message of 
collaboration. 
The Illusion of Collaboration 
In summary, the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm has three aspects: first, that a 
collaborative governance initiative is reduced to a formalized set of instructions with the aim of 
institutionalizing collaborative practices among the participants, second, that collaborative 
structures are inherently political and that they are not necessarily meant for the mutual benefit 
of the actors and institutions involved as they create a clear set of winners and losers, and third, 
that formal authority and power is needed to make bureaucratic actors collaborate across 
departmental boundaries. The combined effect of these three aspects is that the emergence and 
implementation of Maarpu can be seen as an illusion of collaboration. In effect, collaborative 
governance in a bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm is the exact opposite of our understanding 
of collaborative governance in the extant literature which its emphasis on responsiveness to 
citizen concerns, shared values, inter-dependency, diffused power, and through a horizontal 
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network of actors and institutions. The paradox is that even though it is the exact opposite in 
operationalization, in concept and intended goals the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm is 
aligned with the central tenet of collaborative governance—that what a single actor or institution 
cannot achieve, can be achieved working together.  
There are several aspects to this illusion that is created within the bureaucratic-
collaboration paradigm. The first is that even as everybody in the hierarchy from the state to the 
village-level of administration espouses the values and advantage of collaboration, they are all 
committed to working within their bureaucratic silos. The second instance of illusion is that in 
the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm what appears to be a joint statement of collaborative 
effort like Maarpu is actually the imposition of one department’s agenda over the others. In this 
case study, there was actually no divergence between the policy of implementation and the 
implementation policy—from the very beginning Maarpu was always a Health initiative. It was 
only hoped that the use of coercive power at the state and district-levels of administration will 
bring everybody towards collective goals. The illusion is that if one were to only read 
Government Order #249 (the executive order announcing Maarpu) it would indeed look like 
Maarpu has been collectively designed by all department heads for the mutual benefit of all, but 
it is not until we get behind the bureaucratic politics that the political nature of the initiative is 
revealed. A third aspect of the illusion is at an organizational level. Even as the organizations 
involved appear to be incorporating external influences and adapting to a changing environment 
of governance, in reality India’s bureaucratic organizations are still able to retain their structural 
characteristics and ensure stability, predictability, legitimacy, and survival.  
I will end this discussion with the following quote that aptly captures the essence of this 
dissertation—the illusion and the bureaucratic politics of collaboration in India  
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An individual in handling government business with a citizen adjusts that business, 
within his area of discretion, to that citizen. In these adjustments he is limited by having 
to deal also with other citizens, he is limited by directions from superiors, by his own 
sense of policy and public responsibility, and by his anticipation of trouble he would 
invite from the public and his administrative superiors by an excessive deviation 
(Appleby 1969; p. 89). 
Limitations 
 At least two limitations of the study must be noted. First, the study looks at only a single 
instance of Maarpu’s manifestation in Medak district. This raises the question about the study’s 
generalizability: are these findings applicable in other districts within the state? Are these 
findings applicable to other states in India? Even within the same district, I was only able to 
examine villages under the purview of 12 Primary Health Centers (PHCs) whereas the district 
has a total of 66 PHCs. In the strict sense of statistical generalizability, the findings from the 
study have limited generalizability, but as explained in Chapter 4 for case study research it is 
important to underscore the logic of analytic generalization. Thus, the findings should be seen if 
they are generalizable to the level of theory being tested, which is that collaborative 
arrangements do not work when super-imposed on existing administrative structures without 
doing any structural reforms. Thus, those districts and villages where these contextual and 
administrative conditions exist, the findings will be insightful.  
Furthermore, it can also be assumed that there is a certain diffusion of information among 
the informants I interviewed, i.e., they would be aware at a general level how Maarpu is being 
implemented in neighboring districts because of their interactions with their counterparts during 
review meetings and training programs. Thus, during my interviews if informants would have 
known of other places where Maarpu is being implemented effectively then I would have been 
informed about it. To the extent that I did not hear any such instances, I can be confident that the 
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findings from the administrative regions I conducted fieldwork in Medak district are 
generalizable to the remaining administrative regions in the district and other districts of the state 
as well. Regardless of the extent to which these findings are generalizable, the primary aim of 
this study has been to uncover implementation processes in an intergovernmental setting as it 
relates to collaborative governance and this was only possible in Medak district because of the 
overwhelming feedback I received from the state-level informants that Medak district is where 
all the action is. As a result, findings from this revelatory case provide insights to refine theory, 
guide practice, and design better collaborative initiatives.  
A second limitation emerges from the first, i.e., the uniqueness of Maarpu and the 
implications this has towards other manifestations of collaborative governance. To my 
knowledge no other state in India, at the time, was implementing anything like Maarpu with its 
particular focus on convergence meetings at each administrative level and involving Self-Help 
Groups (SHGs) and Village Organizations (VOs) to monitor service delivery to help improve 
maternal and child health services. Had Maarpu been a program designed by the Central 
Government then the findings would have had greater generalizability, but Maarpu was specific 
to the context of Andhra Pradesh. The question then becomes: are other collaborative 
arrangements also inherently political? Even in other collaborative contexts (for example, in the 
implementation of the National Employment Guarantee Program) do perceptions matter in 
shaping discretion that ultimately shapes service delivery processes and outcomes? I would argue 
using the same logic of analytic generalizability I used earlier. To the extent that collaborative 
arrangements are being super-imposed on bureaucrats who are operating through administrative 
structures that are antithetical to collaboration the findings from Maarpu’s case study will be 
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relevant. However, this study cannot tell the extent to which each aspect of bureaucratic politics 
will influence collaborative efforts as that was not the primary purpose of the study.    
On a similar note, studying the unique and revelatory case like Maarpu in Andhra 
Pradesh also is the study’s strength. Choosing a unique and specific collaborative initiative like 
Maarpu provides an opportunity to examine an area that has received little scholarly attention: 
how India’s bureaucrats and bureaucracies function in the 21st century to implement the agenda 
of inter-sectoral partnerships, citizen engagement and inter-departmental coordination in the 
social services sector. By selecting to study Maarpu’s implementation, this study makes a 
contribution to the collaborative governance literature with an in-depth study that looks at the 
full life-cycle of a collaborative initiative—antecedents, processes, and outcomes all together as 
an organic whole. Regardless of Maarpu’s findings being generalizable, this study provides a 
widely applicable case study research framework to examine a range of collaborative initiatives. 
Future Research 
 The study’s limitations set the stage for future research that will involve multiple cases at 
the district-level and comparative research between districts or even between states—the 
common denominator being collaborative governance initiative that focus on inter-departmental 
coordination and citizen engagement. The next phase of future research I plan to focus is on 
comparing different districts and how the story of implementation unfolds. To better compare 
and validate findings, I plan to select a district where the District Collector is not playing the role 
of an administrative entrepreneur and see if really the force of a District Collector is indeed 
necessary to move district officials out of inertia. 
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 Another area of future research is changing the sectoral focus and comparing findings. 
For example, will the same findings hold if the sectoral focus is primary education in rural areas 
where a collaborative initiative is being implemented to improve inter-departmental coordination 
and citizen engagement to improve rural government schools? Furthermore, as a result of this 
dissertation, I wish to study the office of the District Collector and district administration in India 
in greater depth. Given that the District Collector bears the burden of implementing all programs 
it is important to know how the District Collector’s decision making process works; which 
programs get priority over the other and why in their two year tenure. This is critical to 
understand if public management scholars are to really understand what goes on inside India’s 
administrative black hole—the district administration. The work of the street-level bureaucrat 
and the state-level bureaucrat or technocrat seems fairly straightforward, but it is at the district 
administration that lines of authority, responsibility, and programs crisscross from the village to 
the state capital to the nation’s capital and become diffused. Yet, there is very little systematic 
research that examines district administration analytically other than descriptions of how 
prestigious and laborious the work of the District Collector is.    
 Finally, my interest is in studying administrative structures. An ideal research design is to 
pick regions near neighboring states so that geography, culture, language, and socio-economic 
factors can be controlled for. The only difference would be how administrative structures are 
organized. For example, in some states the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) of the 
Women & Child Welfare department is organized under the Panchayati Raj Institutions structure 
whereas in Andhra Pradesh it is organized as its own bureaucratic structure. It would be 
interesting to see if there is any variation in the way services are delivered and in accountability 
mechanisms because of how they are structured differently.  
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Conclusion 
 This dissertation studies an instance of collaborative governance (called Maarpu) in a 
subnational government in India (Andhra Pradesh). Through an in-depth case study, this 
dissertation examined the implementation of Maarpu by studying its antecedents, processes and 
outcomes. At the outset, the study began by understanding India’s bureaucratic functioning from 
a historical perspective and took an organizational theory approach to understanding how 
organizational structures influence the decisions that organizational actors make.  
There are three major findings of the study that have theoretical and practical relevance to 
collaborative governance. I coin the term bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm to situate these 
insights; I refer to the process of converting (and reducing) a collaborative governance initiative 
into a set of formalized instructions by individuals in positions of public authority as the 
bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm. There are three aspects of such a paradigm:  
4. A collaborative governance initiative is reduced to a formalized set of instructions 
with the aim of institutionalizing collaborative practices among the participants.  
5.  Collaborative structures are not necessarily designed for the mutual benefit of actors 
and institutions involved; rather, they are the result of the politics of bureaucratic 
structures that are designed to create winners and losers.  
6. Formal authority and power is needed to make bureaucratic actors collaborate across 
departmental boundaries. 
The study argues that this is the result of bureaucratic politics that infiltrates 
organizational structures and functioning. The bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm is the exact 
opposite of what is generally understood about collaborative governance in the West where the 
243 
 
 
 
focus is on bottom-up participation, horizontal hierarchies, shared values, and diffused power. 
The study also debunks the popularly held notion that in India, it is implementation where the 
problem lies and not in the policy itself. However, seen from the bureaucratic-collaboration 
paradigm, the problem actually lies in the policy itself that sets the stage for how the (Luton, 
2015)implementation will happen. The study shows that there was actually no disconnect 
between the top-down and bottom-up narratives. In fact that what is observed is that Maarpu has 
been a Health department initiative at the state-level and was translated thus onto the 
Government Orders with its focus on the 20 key indicators. The same perception continued at the 
district and village-levels of administration where the programmatic focus was on increasing 
government institutional deliveries.  
Thus, even as all participants in the initiative espoused the values of collaborative action, 
they remained functioning in their bureaucratic silos. Finally, what appears to be a collaborative 
action in the form of Maarpu between the departments of Health, Women and Child 
Development, and Rural Development was actually behind all the bureaucratic politics a Health 
department’s agenda thrust upon others. At an organizational-level, the bureaucracies were able 
to absorb an external pressure and influences for a different expectation of governance and 
internalize it into regular bureaucratic practices and ensure survival, stability, and legitimacy. In 
conclusion, seen from the lens of the bureaucratic-collaboration paradigm, Maarpu was an 
illusion of collaboration.   
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Interview Protocol  
 
From: Harish P. Jagannath, Harish Jagannath, PhD-Public Administration Candidate, Syracuse 
University (USA) 
Contact information: harishjagannath@yahoo.com Mobile: 315-744-7041 
 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
 
Title of Project: Examining the Management Structures and Uncovering Implementation 
Processes to Deliver Integrated Health Services in Developing Countries----Comparative Case 
Analysis of subnational governments in India 
 
Interview Instrument: brief description of research project and informed consent.  
Thank you for sparing your time and agreeing to participate in this interview. The main objective 
of this interview is to understand the implementation model of the National Rural Health Mission 
(NRHM), which has been initiated by the Government of India (GoI) to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. The NRHM calls for integration of health, nutrition, and 
sanitation services to improve health service delivery and maternal and child health outcomes. 
 
In the context of NRHM, the purpose of this interview is to understand the existing governance 
structures at the State and district level to implement social-sector development programs, for 
example public/primary health services delivery, nutrition and sanitation. Additionally, based on 
your experience and knowledge, I seek to explore any alternate delivery mechanisms that could 
be developed. The aim of my doctoral research project is to understand how decisions regarding 
implementing these programs is made, what is the process, which factors and actors influence 
this process and what the strengths and limitations of existing delivery structures.  
 
I also wish to inform you that participation in this interview is voluntary and that you can 
withdraw from the interview at any point during the interview. If I have your permission, this 
interview will be recorded using a digital voice recorder, but no names will be recorded and it 
will be kept confidential; only I will have access to the taped interview, which will be stored in a 
digital folder that is password protected. The interview is only meant for the purpose of my 
research project. The same set of questions will be asked of every participant with some 
variations depending on the relevance in the implementation hierarchy. Depending on your 
responses, I will ask further questions as follow ups and those might not be listed in this 
protocol. Your name will not be used directly, but with your permission I may use select quotes. 
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There are no foreseeable risks to your participating in this interview, but there could be 
discomfort if you are asked to articulate the limitations or shortcomings of the policies being 
implemented by you or your department. No monetary benefits of any sort will accrue to the 
participants in this interview, but my sincere hope is that this research will yield indirect benefits 
to the society at large and to the individual as their insights will be seen as beneficial by the 
government agencies involved in policy implementation in the development sector.  
I expect this interview to take no more than 45minutes. I would be happy to answer any 
questions or concerns you may have before we begin. I will now begin if I have your consent. 
 
Examining the Collaborative mechanisms and Institutional Arrangements of NRHM.  
The National and State Government are committed to achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Specifically, MDGs #4, #5, #6 and related to reducing infant mortality, 
improving maternal health and combatting infectious diseases. The National Rural Health 
Mission (NRHM) was launched in 2005 with the aim of integrating all health programs. I am 
interested in examining how State governments implement an integrated approach to health 
service delivery. I understand that the Government of Andhra Pradesh is currently implementing 
a program called Maarpu to achieve the goals of NRHM. 
 
A. Formation of Maarpu: 
1. Why and how was Maarpu formed?  
i. Was there a discussion among the three departments that inter-departmental 
collaboration is necessary in order to achieve better health outcomes?  
ii. Were all departments enthusiastic about this new institutional arrangement 
called Maarpu?  
iii. Was there any resistance? Why or why not? 
2. Did leadership play a key role? Leadership from the bureaucracy or political 
will? 
B. Functioning of Maarpu 
3. What is the role of the Rural Development and Panchayat Raj? And what is the 
role of the other departments? 
4. Within the Rural Development and Panchayat Raj: how were services being 
delivered before Maarpu and has it changed after Maarpu? 
5. What changes [administrative or service delivery structures] were made within 
the departments upon the announcement of Maarpu? 
6. What is the nature of collaboration under the Maarpu program?  
i. Is there greater sharing of financial resources, human resources or physical 
infrastructure?  
ii. What sort of cooperative arrangements have been initiated?   
C.  Maarpu as an Institutional Arrangement  
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7. Who is expected to take the responsibility for results? Who is accountable? Who 
calls for the meetings? What are the reporting mechanisms? 
8. Is it more effective to work as individual departments rather than such a 
collaborative arrangement?  
9. In order to achieve better health outcomes: would be it more effective and 
efficient to bring nutrition and sanitation under the under control/hierarchy of the 
Health and Family Welfare Department? That is, Women and Child Welfare and 
Panchayat Raj are no longer responsible for nutrition and sanitation services. 
10. What are the strengths and limitations of Maarpu? 
i. Does it help in being more efficient or does it make it slower to take decisions?  
D. Measuring the performance of Maarpu 
11. How do you measure the success or failure of Maarpu? 
12. Who reviews the progress? And what are the indicators used to measure the 
progress? 
13. What sort of results are expected: 
i. Decreased maternal mortality and infant deaths and decreased burden of 
infectious diseases? 
ii. Increased financial resources for each department? 
iii. Political support and public acknowledgment of this collaborative project?  
14. Is this arrangement likely to continue in the future? Why or why not? 
E. Public management capacity:  
15. Do state and district level officials understand collaboration?  
16. How do they interpret collaboration? 
17.  What additional training is needed to better facilitate inter-departmental 
collaboration? 
18.  What sort of new skill sets are needed for an institutional arrangement like 
Maarpu to succeed?  
i. Does the department have these skill sets among their administrators now? 
If yes, how did they acquire them and if not, then is there any plan to 
acquire them? 
ii.  Is there is a perceived need for a new skill set?  
iii. And what skills should be included in such a skill set? 
Thank you for your participation. Please feel free to make suggestions or discuss a question 
that you feel is important to this research project that has not been covered. I welcome 
further feedback or ideas.  
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